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Natural resources are collective goods that the state has the authority and 
responsibility to protect from overuse and overexploitation. In order to achieve this 
protection, the state must rely on the actions of local actors, experts, and business 
leaders who are most closely connected to the natural resource base.  The dependence 
of the state on local actors to implement resource-protection policies makes the 
conduct of environmental management within authoritarian regimes a particularly 
interesting area in which to observe the state’s strategic choices concerning its 
relations with civil society. The potential threat to state control posed by an emergent 
civil society means that the state must weigh its interests in maintaining its 
authoritarianism against the benefits provided by civil society, such as the ability to 
analyze and implement the state’s policies effectively.  
  
This dissertation focuses on how the government of Vietnam manages these 
apparent tensions between allowing participation on a critical issue area and 
maintaining its control as an authoritarian state. I argue that the state does not respond 
uniformly or consistently to all types of civil society actors, even within a single issue 
area such as natural resources protection. Prevailing explanations of why the 
authoritarian state has shown permissiveness toward civil society actors fail to 
account for variation in the state’s response to different actors and across levels of 
governance. In this paper I present an alternative framework that provides a more 
nuanced understanding of the state’s interests with respect to various types of civil 
society actors. I argue that the state’s engagement with various civil society 
organizations depends primarily on three characteristics: 1) the organization’s 
mobilizing capacity; 2) issue independence; and 3) the external strategic value of the 
organization. These three characteristics shape whether the authoritarian state of 
Vietnam views the organization as a threat to be subverted and repressed in order to 
maintain its own authority, or a cooperative partner in the management of the state’s 
natural resources. In addition, this dissertation discusses the implications for 
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Chapter 1: The Authoritarian State and Civil Society 
Natural resources are collective goods that the state has the authority and 
responsibility to protect from overuse and overexploitation. In order to achieve this 
protection, the state must rely on the actions of local actors, experts, and business 
leaders who are most closely connected to the natural resource base since resource-
protection regulations set by the state will be non-productive in the absence of 
effective implementation by the resource users.  State decision making regarding 
natural resources management, and implementation of regulations within the state, 
can be assisted by civil society actors who possess the expertise and ability to 
communicate between scales: communicating both local environmental needs to state 
actors for policymaking, and state policies to local actors for implementation.  
The dependence of the state on local actors to implement resource-protection 
policies makes the conduct of environmental management within authoritarian 
regimes a particularly interesting area in which to observe the state’s strategic choices 
concerning its relations with civil society.  While civil society does not always seek to 
challenge the state, it does present a potential threat to both the legitimacy and the 
authority (referred to in this dissertation together as “control”) of authoritarian 
regimes. In a democratic polity legitimacy is conferred through elections, and its 
authority is defined and maintained by its political institutions, such as a Constitution, 
the free press, and the accountability of democratic regimes to the rule of law. In 







elections and political institutions are subordinate to the regime, they must more 
vigilantly and strategically guard their control of the state.  
Civil society organizations have the potential to undermine authoritarian 
control. As Foley and Edwards (1996) note, one branch of the vast literature on civil 
society “lays special emphasis on civil society as a sphere of action that is 
independent of the state and that is capable—precisely for this reason—of energizing 
resistance to a tyrannical regime,” (p. 39). These associations that, by definition, 
develop outside of state institutions, have the potential to challenge the status quo of 
state governance by drawing attention to injustices and inefficiencies, advocating 
alternative courses of action, and building social ties among community members that 
transcend membership within a nation. To a state such as Vietnam, which is 
increasingly exposed to Western democratic nations through cooperation and 
economic interdependence while maintaining a Communist system of government, 
the emergence of civil society poses a particular challenge:  
In contexts of democratic transition, in particular, where established political 
parties have been repressed, weakened, or used as tools by the authoritarian 
state, autonomy from traditional politics seems to be a prerequisite for 
oppositional advocacy. In such contexts, civil society is treated as an 
autonomous sphere of social power within which citizens can pressure 
authoritarians for change, protect themselves from tyranny, and democratize 
from below. (Foley and Edwards 1996, p. 46)    
 
The potential threat to state control posed by an emergent civil society means that the 
state must weigh its interests in maintaining its authoritarianism against the benefits 
provided by civil society, such as the ability to analyze and implement the state’s 







stakes are high, such as the state’s management of the looming socio-economic and 
environmental challenges in the Mekong delta. Will the authoritarian state recognize 
that top-down directives might not be the most effective form of engagement? Will it 
privilege maintaining its control over finding the most effective ways of achieving 
policy goals? Analyzing the state’s strategic interactions with civil society actors will 
demonstrate to what extent the state recognizes the importance of civil society 
participation in the management of natural resources, seeks cooperative relations with 
civil society actors, or subverts such actors in an attempt to maintain its own control. 
This dissertation focuses on how the government of Vietnam manages these 
apparent tensions between allowing participation on a critical issue area and 
maintaining its control as an authoritarian state. This dissertation thus makes an 
important contribution to the literature on activism within authoritarian contexts, 
which largely fails to distinguish among the different types of actors that compose the 
nebulous term of “civil society.” I argue that the state does not respond uniformly or 
consistently to all types of civil society actors, even within a single issue area such as 
natural resources protection. Prevailing explanations of why the authoritarian state 
has shown permissiveness toward civil society actors – including internal 
fragmentation, bolstering regime legitimacy, and informational needs – fail to account 
for variation in the state’s response to different actors and across levels of 
governance. In this paper I present an alternative framework that provides a more 
nuanced understanding of the state’s interests with respect to various types of civil 







depends primarily on three characteristics in its calculation of risk vs. reward: 1) the 
organization’s mobilizing capacity, or potential threat to state control; 2) issue 
independence, or the degree to which the organization’s environmental focus 
intersects with other state priorities; and 3) the external strategic value of the 
organization, defined as the organization’s ability to confer external legitimacy to the 
state or attract outside funding. These three characteristics shape whether the 
authoritarian state of Vietnam views the organization as a threat to be subverted and 
repressed in order to maintain its own authority, or a cooperative partner in the 
management of the state’s natural resources. 
The primary focus of this dissertation is to demonstrate that the authoritarian 
state varies its strategy toward civil society actors depending on the characteristics of 
the organization as well as of the issue area being addressed. However, these strategic 
decisions by the state have implications for water management and the long-term 
environmental sustainability of the region. This dissertation will thus contribute to a 
more nuanced understanding of the emergence of the nascent civil society within 
Vietnam, and the state’s ability to control their domestic activities as well as their 
transnational partnerships. The dissertation will also elucidate the implications for 
successful water management in the region, and the challenges that are created for 
regional and international partners who seek to work with or on behalf of local actors 







Authoritarianism in Vietnam 
The nature of authoritarianism in Vietnam has evolved since reunification and 
consolidation of power under the Communist regime in 1975.  As noted by Le Hong 
Hiep (2012), the independence movements and struggle for national unification 
served as the source of legitimacy for the Communist Party of Vietnam from its 
founding in 1930 until reunification. However, due to the socio-economic crisis and 
widespread famine resulting from failed central planning, and diplomatic isolation 
following Vietnam’s occupation of Cambodia in 1978, the unified government 
quickly faced a legitimacy crisis. In 1986, the government adopted the Doi Moi 
policy of reform which, in addition to other political reforms, opened the centrally 
planned economy to foreign investment and trade.1  Hiep identifies this reform 
process as the government of Vietnam transitioning its source of legitimacy from the 
traditional sources of nationalism and socialist ideals to what he refers to as 
“performance-based legitimacy.”  As part of the process of reform and opening, new 
political and economic space was created and filled by non-state actors, stepping into 
the role of providers of education, health and other social services. 
A plethora of scholars has noted that the transition from ideologically based 
legitimacy to performance-based legitimacy has meant that the government has had to 
adapt to working with and responding to a wide range of new actors outside of the 
government (Sidel 1997; Gray 1999; Mercer 2002; Landau 2008; London 2009; 
                                                 
 
1 The structure of the government of Vietnam, including the Doi Moi reform process and the events 







Thayer 2009; Kerkvliet 2010; Wells-Dang 2010; Bui 2013). However, a cross-cutting 
theme across these studies is that the organizations that have emerged since the Doi 
Moi reform process represent a uniquely Vietnamese form of civil society that is not 
fully independent from the state. For example, Gray (1999) and Landau (2008) 
emphasize their roles as “assisting” the state rather than challenging it, noting that 
they operate within the political constraints that are set by the government. Gray 
(1999), Kerkvliet (2010) and London (2009) show that the government has not 
hesitated to resort to traditional forms of authoritarian repression towards 
organizations that have attempted to challenge the control of the state.  For example, 
London (2009) notes that when Vietnam hosted the APEC conference in 2006, that 
many human rights protesters who were part of the “Bloc 8406” democracy 
movement were rounded up and sentenced to lengthy prison sentences, as were their 
lawyers. 
This dualistic approach to working with – or against – non-state actors in 
Vietnam is what Kerkvliet (2010) refers to as the “Responsive-Repressive State.” On 
the one hand, the emergence of these organizations facilitated the transition under the 
Doi Moi reform process as the state gave up its monopoly role on the provision of 
social services. The organizations attracted financial resources from international and 
domestic sources at a time when the state was in particular need of economic 
development assistance (Sidel 1997). Bui (2013) and Sidel (1997) discuss the 
tolerance of these new organizations as a strategic tradeoff for the state, which 







civil society must also be managed so as not to undermine state control of the pace 
and direction of growth, or social stability more broadly. Thayer (2009) emphasized 
that this form of social control is not reflective of “political civil society” at all, 
drawing a sharp distinction between what he sees as developmental NGOs and CBOs 
and political organizations such as Block 8406 that are illegal in Vietnam and that are 
consistent targets of state repression.  However, this distinction presents a blunt 
characterization of what constitutes the “political.” In this dissertation I will 
demonstrate that not all newly formed associations in Vietnam can be so neatly 
categorized into development associations that work alongside the state or those that 
seek to challenge it politically. For organizations that straddle the line, the state must 
make a strategic choice whether to engage in repression or reap the benefits of social 
services provision that the organization can provide, and this choice can vary over 
time and across different types of organizations. 
Scholars diverge on what the implications are for the emergence of these non-
state actors for the long-term stability of the authoritarian state. As Kerkvliet (2010) 
points out, this debate centers over whether direct confrontation with the state is 
needed for political reform, or whether it can be achieved through a more transitional 
process. Mercer (2002) points out that the connection between an emergent NGO 
sector and the process of democratization may be overstated.  The social services that 
these organizations have stepped in to provide have not undermined the state, she 
argues, but rather have strengthened it. If the state is able to maintain its legitimacy 







improved standards of living, political challenges to the state may not gain traction. 
This understanding of the Vietnamese state’s calculations with respect to its own 
control raises interesting questions with application to environmental organizations in 
particular, as the character of environmental problems intersects local and 
transnational politics, as well as short-term versus long-term strategic choices. It is 
therefore unclear at the outset whether these organizations will be perceived primarily 
as benign actors assisting in social services provision or more explicitly political 
actors, potentially triggering a more repressive response by an authoritarian state 
seeking to subvert potential challenges to its control.     
The Vietnamese State’s Dilemma 
In 2008, the OECD created a traffic-light system to identify and classify the 
urgency of environmental trends to 2030. Red-light problems were those 
“environmental issues which are not well managed, are in a bad or worsening state, 
and which require urgent attention” (p. 24). Included among the 15 identified red-
light issues are two related to the impacts of climate change, six related to 
biodiversity and renewable natural resources and three related to water quality and 
quantity.2 While this framework provides a clear list of the most critical threats, it 
fails to highlight that these red-light issues often intersect and, while global in nature, 
affect certain regions and population groups disproportionately. This is the case in the 
Mekong delta in Vietnam, where the combined effects of upstream development, 
                                                 
 







climate change and urbanization are contributing to rapid land and water loss and 
degradation. The region is thus 
plagued by at least 11 of the most 
critical environmental threats as 
identified by the OECD, and these 
problems are exacerbated by the 
dependence of the local population 
on the resource base. An estimated 
60 million people live in the 
Mekong basin, 80 percent of whom 
rely directly on the river system for 
their food and livelihoods (Baran 
and Myschowoda, 2009; ICEM, 
2010). The welfare of this 
population is dependent upon the 
governments of basin countries 
finding long-term solutions to the 
sustainability challenges that the 
region faces. As residents of the country farthest downstream (See Figure 1.1), the 
Vietnamese are in the most vulnerable position as they are affected by the governance 
decisions made upstream by the other riparian states, as well as by their own 
country’s decision-making on how to protect the delta environment.  
Figure 1.1 Map of the Mekong Basin 







Given this livelihood and food security crisis, how is the Vietnamese 
government responding to ensure the welfare of its citizens? This question is of 
particular importance in the context of recent scholarship on how to achieve effective 
environmental governance, particularly in the critical area of water resources 
management. Persistent environmental problems, such as those affecting the Mekong 
delta, are viewed as difficult to solve not only due to their scientific and technical 
complexity, but also because their intersection with other policy areas, such as 
economic development, amplifies the number of stakeholders who are affected by 
how they are managed. Furthermore, the effective management of transboundary 
water resources necessarily involves actors and institutions outside of the Vietnamese 
state. For these reasons, multi-stakeholder participation of actors across the Mekong 
basin is increasingly viewed as critical to the formulation of effective policy in order 
to improve knowledge, implementation and coordination between stakeholders and 
those responsible for policy decisions. While the precise relationship between 
participation and effectiveness is debated, this position presents an interesting 
potential dilemma for an authoritarian state like Vietnam, which limits the space in 
which civil society is allowed to operate. How does the authoritarian state manage 
participation in the protection of the water resources of the Mekong delta? I will 
answer this question by examining a case study of the Vietnamese state, exploring the 
ways that the state incorporates, or fails to incorporate, participation of civil society 
actors into its environmental governance practices, balancing its effective 







The Participation Debate 
The role of participation in the policy making process is an area of debate 
among scholars; some cite the benefits of having input from all actors (Kvarda & 
Nordbeck 2012; Chambers 1983), while others show how including a large number of 
actors with potentially competing interests can have a distorting effect on decision-
making (Layzer 2008; Cooke and Kothari 2001; Abel and Stephan 2000). The 
arguments in support of participation in the policy-making process can be broadly 
divided into two categories: those emphasizing the process of governance and those 
emphasizing the outcome.  Those who argue that participation is critical to the 
process argue that participation increases legitimacy and transparency, which 
reinforce the acceptance of the authority of the regime as well as more the direct 
acceptance of a policy decision, even one that ultimately produces a sub-optimal 
outcome. For example, Kvarda and Nordbeck (2012) argue that a participatory 
process improves the feeling of inclusion as well as acceptance of the final outcome, 
which they refer to as input and output legitimacy: 
Enhanced participation promises to bring about input legitimacy by giving 
stakeholders or citizens fair, balanced and equal access to political processes, 
by elevating their transparency, by making (especially state) actors 
accountable to the citizens, members or actors concerned, and by getting non-
state actors’ voices heard and taken into account in political decision-making. 
The procedural achievements of participation on the output side should result 
in improved output legitimacy as the participating actors get better insights 
into, and knowledge about, political processes and, with that, better accept and 
actively support the formulated policies. (p.17)  
 
Having a highly participatory process might not make it easier to come to a policy 







more likely to be accepted by stakeholders who feel that their voices have been heard 
and understand the rationale by which the decision was made.         
The relationship between participation and outcome is more contentious. While 
participatory processes help protect against inferior outcomes that are the result of 
limited information or privileged access, some scholars argue that participation 
actually leads to sub-optimal policy outcomes. The explanations for why participation 
decreases policy effectiveness are varied, including that contention among multiple 
actors or “veto players” prevents deviations from the status quo (Tsebelis 2002; Gray 
and Lowery 1995); the pursuit of consensus leads decision-makers to privilege 
policies that minimize contention, or that “satisfice,” rather than achieve the best 
result (Layzer 2008; Simon 1956); and “capture” of government agencies by 
stakeholders with greater legal, technical and financial resources means that policies 
may be adopted that still privilege the interests of the powerful, despite nominal 
inclusion (Berkman and Viscusi 1973; Gerson 1993; Cooke and Kothari 2001; Abel 
and Stephan 2000).3 Participation cannot simply be viewed as a panacea that 
necessarily leads to good governance, but should rather be understood as a complex 
process that can wield beneficial results or create new impediments, depending on 
how it is managed. 
                                                 
 
3 For a more complete discussion of the relationship between participation and governance, see: Bill 
Cooke and Uma Kothari (eds.) Participation: The New Tyranny (London: Zed Books, 2001); Samuel 
Hickey and Giles Mohan (eds.) Participation: From Tyranny to Transformation? (London: Zed Books, 







Despite these caveats, participatory processes are increasingly viewed as 
essential to environmental governance because of the complexity, functionality and 
scale of many environmental issues. Because of these characteristics, scholars and 
practitioners have made a stronger push for “new modes of governance” (NMG) in 
recent decades, which are more adaptive in addressing complex environmental 
challenges.4 While acknowledging that there is not a specific formula for 
implementation, Kvarda and Nordbeck (2012) define the three pillars of NMG as  
(1) the endeavor to enhance participation of non-state, civil actors in 
environmental decision-making; (2) the attempt to improve coordination, both 
horizontally between sectors and vertically across territorial levels; and (3) the 
effort to effectively integrate different types of scientific and civic expertise in 
environmental policy-making in a transparent and democratically accountable 
way. (p. 5) 
 
Advocates of NMG do not dismiss the potentially confounding effects of high levels 
of participation, but rather argue that the characteristics of issue complexity, 
functionality and scale elevate the necessity for broad participation. This perspective 
receives indirect empirical support from the poor track record of top-down 
environmental management regimes that failed to account for interrelated ecological, 
political and cultural dynamics, which have led to the environmental management 
crises such as the red-light issues noted earlier by the OECD. 
The characteristics of complexity, functionality and scale make participation 
important to environmental governance for the following reasons:  
                                                 
 
4 For a good overview, see Karin Backstrand et al (eds.) Environmental Politics and Deliberative 








Complexity: Participation in governance is particularly important to the 
adoption of effective policies in areas where the complexity of the issue leads to 
disputes on what constitutes “knowledge.” Many environmental problems are marked 
by high levels of uncertainty and technical complexity, which leads to disagreements 
in interpreting evidence as well as over acceptable levels of risk. However, 
overcoming informational deficits involves more than bringing experts to the table, 
which can overlook the value of local knowledge (Ehlert 2012). Examples of this type 
of contribution include historical knowledge of the local ecology prior to scientific 
study, observational data of changes to the local ecology, and a deeper understanding 
of how local populations interact with and respond to changes in their natural 
environment. When local stakeholders are valued for the unique knowledge that they 
provide, this leads to what Jongman and Padovani (2006) call the development of 
“integrated knowledge.” Discussing river basin management in Brazil, they note that: 
Integrated knowledge was generated by combining different types of scientific 
knowledge with visions, information and solutions developed in cooperation 
with local, regional and national stakeholders. The process showed that this 
integrated knowledge was essential for involvement of stakeholders in 
problem formulation, identification of solutions and decision-making on 
preferred developments. Stakeholders have helped to direct the research 
process by bringing in ideas about causes and solutions and adding local and 
regional knowledge to the research process. Once involved in the process, 
stakeholders took on board new ideas and visions, and were critical about 
solutions. Research is important in gaining insight in complex processes 
(climate, hydrology, geology, ecosystems and politics); stakeholders display a 
wide knowledge of the regional history that generally is not documented and 
inaccessible to scientists. (p. 49).  
 
Their research highlights that it is not only for purposes of interest aggregation that 







particular types of knowledge, including undocumented social, ecological and 
historical knowledge. 
 The integration of local knowledge, however, is just one example of the need 
for an expanded set of actors to effectively address complex environmental issues. 
Funtowicz and Ravetz (1991, 1992) argue that the “extreme uncertainty of the 
methods used to address the disturbed global environment limits the application of 
traditional scientific methodologies to current problems” (1991, p. 137). They place 
such environmental challenges within a new category of postnormal science, in which 
“facts are uncertain, values in dispute, stakes high and decisions urgent” (1991, 
p.137).  Under such conditions of trying to tame “wicked problems,” technocratic 
solutions are precluded and decision-making cannot be based on a simplistic 
estimation of costs and benefits (Rittel and Webber 1973). Instead, the policy process 
must integrate the estimation of risks and value judgements. The authors thus call for 
“extended peer communities” beyond the classic community of experts, bringing in 
other types of community leaders including those with social capital alongside leaders 
with more technical expertise. The scientific complexity of a range of environmental 
problems thus calls for the inclusion of a diverse range of experts and community 
members since none have a monopoly on knowledge and the uncertainties involved 
mean that normative questions must be weighed in addition to empirical ones.  
 Functionality: A second reason why participation is critical to environmental 
governance concerns the translation of policy into action, or the functional aspect of 







behavior change; for example, implementing recycling programs, changing private 
waste management practices, or reducing energy consumption. More specific to the 
Mekong region, the direct involvement of individual citizens is necessary to 
effectively prepare for disaster risk reduction, particularly important in regions 
expected to feel the negative impacts of climate change in the form of extreme 
weather events, and land and food insecurity. Behavior change cannot always be 
achieved by a top-down directive, and is arguably better achieved when the 
implementers understand the rationale and their responsibility under the policy 
change. The link between participation and the functional aspect of environmental 
governance is encapsulated in Kvarda and Nordbeck’s “synergy model” (2012). They 
argue that high levels of participation are correlated with effectiveness  because of 
better norm compliance and fewer implementation deficits. Participation thus allows 
the public to understand and internalize the priorities that are driving the policy 
decision, which in turn will better enable them to conform to the new regulations.  
 Scale: Environmental challenges are unique from many other areas of 
governance because they are not confined by political borders. The causes of an 
environmental threat might be geographically distant from where its effects are most 
acutely felt. This limits the state’s ability to address environmental problems through 
national-level legislation; other actors must be brought into the process in order to 
address these issues at their source. Since the 1980s, the environmental governance 
literature has emphasized that the scale of the institution must match the scale of the 







subsequent literature on managing the global environment focused on the creation of 
new institutions that bring together states that share resources in order to promote 
policy convergence and to prevent interstate disputes over these resources (Young 
1999; Keohane and Levy 1996). These efforts bring all relevant actors to the table, 
coordinate responses, and build trust and reciprocity among states that do not want to 
shoulder the costs of action alone. The issue of scale thus also increases the 
importance of participation in decision-making. Top-down policy-making at the 
national level excludes many stakeholders whose action and responses are crucial to 
managing the issue effectively. 
 As previously noted, participation may bring benefits to governance, such as 
increased legitimacy and transparency. It also may create obstacles, as various power 
dynamics and competing interests make the inclusion of all voices a contentious 
process. However, because of the complexity, functionality and scale of many 
environmental issues, participation is increasingly viewed as an essential component 
for effective solutions to be achieved. While establishing a requirement for 
“stakeholder participation” has been widely adopted as an essential component of the 
effective management of environmental resources, the extent to which this norm has 
been internalized by relevant actors still remains weak in some cases. For example, 
having stakeholder participation in the policy process can be perceived as a box for 
governmental elites or private sector actors to check off out of political obligation, 
without permitting any actual effect of the participation on the planned outcome of 







Although the concept of participation has gained support among the 
multinational banks and donors in the region, its political ambiguity and 
contrasting meanings have at times lent its use to justify the states and 
proponents’ projects, programmes and policies while suppressing the voices 
of dissents and hence removing perceived obstacles to achieve the goals of 
certain projects. Participation, in this sense, is often seen in consultation 
meetings and forums where the public is ‘invited to participate’ (Cornwall 
2002) and become passive audience/listeners, lending legitimacy to the 
inviters and their planned interventions. This kind of the ‘invited 
participation’ (ibid.) is often strategically employed in various mega 
development projects and the state’s ‘territorialization’ policy (Anan 2000) 
such as declaration of national parks on tribal people’s forest land and the 
nationalization of river basins previously communally controlled. (p.81) 
 
In such cases, the process of participation has been hijacked and produces the 
opposite effect of what inclusive policies are designed to promote – the perspective of 
local stakeholders is sidelined or ignored, while elites benefit from the legitimacy that 
a supposedly open process provides prima facie. Such tactics may attempt to create 
the appearance of participation in response to political pressure for transparent and 
democratic processes, but clearly do not place significant value on the knowledge or 
perspectives that local stakeholders can provide in the management of critical natural 
resources. 
 Because of the tendency for the state (or other authorities) to permit only 
superficial participation, it is important not to think of participation as a binary term, 
where it either takes place or does not. Poolman and Van de Giesen (2006) provide a 
useful scale to understand levels of participation, along with the explicit or implicit 
promises that the state is making to these participants (See Table 1.1). The spectrum 
of participation here varies from stakeholders being passive recipients of information, 







making power in the cases of strongest participation. Because of this broad range of 
what constitutes participation, the quality and method of participation must also be 
considered in assessing the authoritarian state’s management of civil society actors. 
Increasing Level of Stakeholder Impact  
(Poolman & Van de Giesen 2006) 
Inform Consult Involve Collaborate Empower 
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Participation in Context: Transboundary Water Resources Management 
The role that participation plays in environmental governance is especially 
relevant in the context of water resources management. Water is a unique natural 
resource because it is scarce and yet fundamental to human survival. As the global 
population increases and assuming that current consumption patterns continue, it is 
estimated that the number of people living in water-stressed basins will reach 3.5 
billion– or 48 percent of the world’s population – by 2025 (WRI 2006). Water is also 
a unique resource because it holds increased potential to lead to transborder conflict 
due to its fluidity; as water flows across territorial borders, multi-stakeholder conflicts 
can emerge over water quality, quantity and access that are not applicable to other 
non-mobile natural resources that can be claimed and maintained by a single national 
government. Additionally, the power relationships between the countries in managing 
the water resources are unequal; upstream users are able to use water in ways that 
affect the access of downstream uses, but not vice versa. Upstream users thus can 
make decisions about hydropower development, river pollution and resource use that 
privilege its own national interests, and countries that live farther down the river 
experience the impact of those choices. Thus the management of transboundary water 
resources is inherently complex, requiring cooperation at the international, national 
and local level if conflicts are to be managed or avoided.  
The combination of the multiple levels of governance needed to effectively 
manage transboundary water resources, the high-stakes nature of water access and the 







making over water resources often brings together actors with highly divergent 
interests. In addition to the controversies among actors shaped by their different 
geographic positions vis-à-vis water resources, the stakeholders involved in the 
process of policy making bring to the table different types of knowledge as well as 
different value systems in assessing the tradeoffs of various management schemes.  
Furthermore, some stakeholders, and especially those who live close to the resource 
base and thus are most vulnerable to the decisions made on water management issues, 
are not necessarily given access to the policy-making process due to limited resources 
or exclusive systems of governance. The large number of stakeholders affected by the 
governance of transboundary water resources within this highly complex process 
means that participation – specifically who has a voice and how this voice translates 
into policy outcomes – becomes vital to understanding the effectiveness of the 
management of the river.  
In order to address these complexities, the principles of Integrated Watershed 
Resource Management (IWRM) have been widely adopted by the policy community, 
emphasizing an integrated and holistic approach to managing water.5 According to 
the FAO and Dutch government in a document prepared for the International 
Conference on Water for Food and Ecosystems, IWRM “is a process which promotes 
the coordinated development and management of water, land and related resources in 
order to maximize economic and social welfare in an equitable manner without 
                                                 
 







compromising the sustainability of vital ecosystems and the environment” (2005). 
Promoters of IWRM argue that this form of management is “emerging as an accepted 
alternative to the sector-by-sector, top-down management style that has dominated in 
the past” (GWP 2010a). Based on the four principles agreed upon in 1992 at the 
International Conference on Water and the Environment in Dublin, Ireland and 
presented in 1992 at the UN Conference on Environment and Development in Rio de 
Janeiro (the “Dublin Statement”),6 the IWRM framework emphasizes decentralization 
of decision making and inclusion of marginalized groups. However, the Global Water 
Partnership, an international network created to promote IWRM, also makes clear 
that there is no one administrative model for carrying out IWRM, but rather that it is a 
process for change from which a variety of tools may be selected, adjusted and 
applied for a given situation (GWP 2010b). While such a framework provides a 
necessary amount of flexibility for various contexts and regions, the converse of this 
adaptability is a lack of specificity in the precise meaning of participatory 
mechanisms and how they are to be conducted.   
One of the essential components of IWRM is that cooperation and development 
should take place within the regional (hydrological) delimitation of the river basin 
(Lauridsen 2004), as opposed to fragmented national management systems. Many 
                                                 
 
6 The four principles are: 1) Fresh water is a finite and vulnerable resource, essential to sustain life, 
development and the environment; 2) Water development and management should be based on a 
participatory approach, involving users, planners and policy-makers at all levels; 3) Women play a 
central part in the provision, management and safeguarding of water; 4) Water is a public good and has 









would consider this increased “regionalization” of cooperation as a positive 
international development that is indicative of improved security in the region. 
Especially in the case of water resources, due to the persistent hype created in the 
mass media over the possibility of “water wars” caused by increasing water scarcity, 
transboundary cooperation is viewed as an important component in mitigating the 
outbreak of international conflict (Starr 1991; Amery 2002; Shiva 2002; Pearce 
2006). For some, international cooperation is seen as a panacea that will allow states 
to address environmental problems comprehensively and to avoid ad hoc bilateral 
negotiations that could increase the level of hostility between countries sharing 
scarce, vital resources. For example, Kukk and Deese (1996) write that “If 
environmental-resource issues such as water scarcity can be framed in international or 
regional security terms—in other words, as a problem for all water scarce countries 
along a respective river basin to solve together—then disputes and conflicts may be 
avoided or resolved.” (p. 32). Participation in transboundary water resource 
management thus includes the regional institutions and governments of all states 
within the basin, a much more complex set of actors that governance problems for 
which the causes and effects remain intra-national.  
While regional cooperation may be essential to mitigating interstate disputes, 
such cooperation only addresses potential conflict at one level of analysis. The most 
vulnerable stakeholders in the management of shared rivers are the downstream local 
residents, particularly those in rural areas whose livelihoods depend on the resource 







(Conca 2012). On the one hand, a regional body adds an additional degree of distance 
from local stakeholders in terms of access and participation. On the other hand, a 
regional institution based on norms of participation within and amongst member 
states might provide an additional forum for interest articulation and representation. 
However, it is important to note that it cannot be assumed that national governments 
will necessarily represent the interests of downstream stakeholders within their 
borders either in regional governing bodies or national policy frameworks. Water 
resources are spread unevenly within states, and government officials may privilege 
the interests of some users over others: 
States, however, tend to represent only part of the water-interests within the 
national boundaries and unfortunately, it tends to be the same types of 
interests which go unrepresented by different states, such as the interests of 
the poor rural and urban consumers, artesian irrigators and fishers, people 
living close to dams and environmental concerns. The likelihood is that no or 
only inadequate institutions exist for negotiating such local conflicts, i.e. 
conflicts which are nationally contained, whether they take place in a 
transboundary basin or not. (Ravnborg 2004, p. 16).  
 
Regionalization may draw increased attention to unequal representation of local 
stakeholders, or may exacerbate these problems by further distancing local 
stakeholders from the site of decision-making. Given the tensions between the 
different interests and actors involved in transboundary water resource management, 
the mere existence of a nominally “inclusive” regime at the regional level is not 
necessarily a proxy for the participation of local stakeholders.  
 What the environmental governance literature increasingly shows in general 
and the IWRM paradigm particularly applies to water management, is that 







participation might not always be directly correlated with effective policy outcomes, 
and having “too many cooks in the kitchen” might actually lead to less effective 
outcomes, the specific case of water management is contentious and complex. These 
characteristics mean that many actors are involved who have a high-stakes interest in 
governance outcomes. While the government itself may not value the input of all 
actors or even the process of participatory governance, how the state manages such 
problems reveals whether state actors have internalized the benefits of participation in 
this issue area. In the case of authoritarian states, the state’s response also reveals how 
it balances the potentially competing objectives of maintaining control of the state 
and effectively managing its resources.  
Activism Under Authoritarian Regimes 
The arguments in support of participatory governance might be lost in 
political systems that do not value or feel threatened by the role that inclusion and 
deliberation play in reaching optimal policy decisions. Authoritarian systems, by 
definition, limit the space in which civil society movements can operate. However, 
only in the most totalitarian systems are the freedoms of speech and assembly fully 
repressed; many authoritarian regimes, such as Vietnam, are more tolerant of these 
activities when they do not directly confront the authority of the government. 
Explanations for how activism develops in such regimes tend to focus on the strategic 
choices of the actors. One set of scholars, who focus on the state, have found that the 
state permits such activity because it is in its interest, either because it reduces the 







local actors can actually improve governance by bringing parochial interests to the 
attention of the state (Mertha 2008; Gandhi 2008; Brettell 2003; Teets 2014). Another 
set of scholars focuses on the strategic choices of the activists, who seek out ways to 
circumvent the political blockage imposed on them by the regime (Tarrow 2005; della 
Porta and Tarrow 2005; Keck and Sikkink 1998). While the pathway of pressuring 
the state may be blocked to them rendering domestic pressure ineffective or 
dangerous, these activists can network with other NGOs and state actors to pressure 
their target state from the outside. Given the state’s interests at the international level, 
such as the reputational costs and loss of external legitimacy that can result from 
domestic repression, this can be an effective way to generate pressure on the state to 
obtain concessions on an otherwise domestic issue. What both of these strands of 
scholarship indicate is that even in authoritarian contexts, citizens are often able to 
voice their concerns and target a variety of actors in order to demand political 
changes.  
The utility of citizen activists to political elites in authoritarian systems is best 
understood when the state is not viewed as a unitary actor. Divisions among political 
elites in the system can create political opportunities for supporters of one side or the 
other to express their interests (Mertha 2008; Gandhi 2008). This concept of 
fragmented authoritarianism provides explanations for activism in non-democracies 
that range from a focus on bureaucratic bargaining that emphasizes the divergent 
interests of politicians within a single institution or at different scales of governance, 







political elite to include the media and nongovernmental organizations (Mertha 
2008). Even in cases where the state is more unified, the inclusion of nonstate actors 
within the policy-making process can be a strategic decision on behalf of the 
repressive state. Allowing some forms of controlled political expression and input 
into decision-making can increase the perceived legitimacy of the regime, lead to 
improved policy outcomes, and prevent more serious contestations against the 
authority of the state that might result from the use of more repressive tactics against 
nonstate challengers (Gandhi 2008). The decision to allow increased participation in 
the authoritarian setting can thus be viewed as tradeoff for the regime between 
effectiveness and control (Brettell 2003; Teets 2014).   
In addition to focusing on the permissiveness of the state, understanding the 
strategic choices of activists is also critical to understanding activism within 
repressive states. When the pathway to the state is blocked, the role of external actors 
becomes more prominent. International NGOs and other external state or non-state 
actors are capable of generating international attention to issues within non-
democracies through their access to media that is outside of the control of the regime. 
For example, Keck and Sikkink (1998) argue that in cases where citizen access to the 
national government is blocked by an authoritarian system, activists may reach across 
borders to other sympathetic organizations and use these transnational ties to put 
political pressure on the government from outside of the state. While authoritarian 
states may not be responsive to their domestic constituencies, they may be more 







depend on for trade, security guarantees, or economic assistance. International 
organizations may also serve as a forum that domestic activists can access through 
which normative political pressure can be placed on regimes that are perceived as 
violating the rights of its own citizens. Viewing the literature on activism within non-
democracies cohesively, one can see that there are strategies available to political 
activists despite constraints upon freedom of speech and assembly; these constraints 
simply shift the strategies available to them. Political opportunity structures7 within 
non-democracies can range from inclusion within a controlled political process to 
reaching outside of the state to more powerful actors that can help advance the issue 
of the activist group. 
The existence of these internal and external strategies available to activists 
who operate within repressive political contexts presents an interesting dilemma for 
the state as it manages its responsibility to provide public goods. On the one hand, 
participation is increasingly viewed as an essential component of environmental 
governance, as discussed in the previous sections. If the state recognizes this 
connection, one might expect the state to be more permissive of civil society activity 
in the area of environmental governance. For example, Teets (2014) argues that the 
changing state-civil society relationship in China is a result of a process of learning 
                                                 
 
7 Tarrow (1998) defines political opportunity structures as “consistent – but not necessarily formal or 
permanent – dimensions of the political struggle that encourage [or discourage] people to engage in 
contentious politics,” (p.19-20). The determinants of political opportunity thus include such 
characteristics as the level of political enfranchisement, the repressiveness of the regime, and division 
among political elites. Depending on the nature of these structures, activists can determine whether 
their efforts are most effectively channeled by working within or outside of the authoritarian state, or 







by local elites that leads to endogenous institutional change. On the other hand, 
participation is incongruous to maintaining control in an authoritarian state, where an 
independent civil society presents a challenge to the state’s control over policy 
decisions. For an authoritarian state like Vietnam, which faces critical challenges in 
managing the Mekong delta, the critical question thus emerges: How should the state 
manage these apparent tensions between allowing participation on a critical issue area 
and maintaining its control as an authoritarian state? 
Disaggregating Civil Society 
The literature on activism within authoritarian contexts, which focuses 
overwhelmingly on the strategies of states or NGOs, largely fails to distinguish 
among the different types of actors that compose the nebulous term of “civil society.” 
The state does not respond uniformly or consistently to all types of civil society 
actors, even within a single issue area. Current explanations of the level of 
permissiveness of the authoritarian state – including internal fragmentation, regime 
legitimacy, and informational needs – thus each fail to account for variation in the 
state’s response to different actors and across levels of governance. An alternative 
framework is needed that presents a more nuanced understanding of the state’s 
interests with respect to various types of civil society actors. 
 Within Vietnam, the primary civil society actors in the area of water 
governance can be broadly classified into three categories: local citizens who live in 
the delta and are directly impacted by its environmental quality; the nascent civil 







actors including INGOs that have at least a potential role in advocating on water 
issues from outside of the state, including at regional venues such as the Mekong 
River Commission. Each of these categories of actors has highly differentiated 
scientific and technical expertise, levels of organization, and resource constraints. The 
way in which the state chooses to engage with each of these potential “participants” is 
thus shaped by their utility to – and potential to challenge – the state. Because of the 
regional nature of the issue there are also multiple sites of potential contestation, so 
the strategic choices of the state can be observed toward civil society actors 
domestically, as well as through attempts to control their transnational activity, such 
as engagement with international actors and participation at regional fora.8   
The state’s response to these actors is best understood as a continuum ranging 
from repression to encouraging participation (See Figure 1.2).9 If repression is 
undermining the existence of any form of civil society activity on an issue and 
encouragement is the fostering of deliberative governance, one might expect the 
authoritarian state’s activities to lie between these two extremes, which might be 
more closely associated with totalitarianism and democracy, particularly given the 
potential tradeoffs between control and effectiveness noted earlier. Indeed, within this 
range the state has other options, including: tolerance, or allowing stakeholders to 
                                                 
 
8 See Appendix 1 for the table of observed episodes of state-civil society engagement. 
9 The spectrum of participation as depicted in Table 1.1 represents forms of engagement that may fall 
within the Co-optation to Encouragement categories on the Repression-Encouragement Spectrum. 
However, the Repression-Encouragement Spectrum focuses on the full range of strategic options 








exercise their rights to speech and association without directly supporting it; co-
optation, or bringing stakeholders’ perspectives into the authoritarian state’s 
institutions of governance; limitation, or allowing some forms of political 
participation while restricting others; and exclusion, or putting formal restrictions on 
an actor’s ability to engage in the political process. These categories are not 
necessarily mutually exclusive, and the state might also maneuver between them in its 
treatment of an actor; for example, the state may move from exclusion to repression if 
a shift in the political climate leads the state to view an actor as increasingly 
threatening to its authority.  
 
Figure 1.2 Repression-Encouragement Spectrum 
 
Given this range of responses available to the state, what determines its level 







main determinants of the authoritarian state’s behavior: the actor’s mobilizing 
capacity, issue independence, and external strategic value.  
Mobilizing capacity: Mobilizing capacity is defined by the actor or 
organization’s knowledge and awareness of an issue, its available resources, and level 
of political engagement, or attempts to influence policy outcomes. Where mobilizing 
capacity is high, the state is expected to behave more repressively, since 
knowledgeable and well-resourced actors are more likely to present a challenge to the 
authority of the state. Organizations with weaker mobilizing capacity are less likely to 
present a direct challenge to state control, meaning less need to respond with 
repressive tactics. While a well-resourced, influential group could potentially bring 
benefits to the state when it supports the state’s objectives, and the state may choose 
to collaborate directly with such an organization, the ability of the organization to 
mobilize other actors presents a challenge to state control that the authoritarian state 
seeks to limit.  
Issue independence: Issue independence is defined by how interconnected an 
issue is with other areas of governance. Participation might be encouraged in dealing 
with functional problems, such as highly localized environmental management issues. 
However, the state is predicted to be more wary of participation in addressing 
transboundary issues that intersect with foreign policy priorities, or issues that 
challenge its economic development objectives, for example. While the state may 
benefit from the services provided by an NGO addressing a parochial issue and 







transnational issues over which the state is more protective of its political control. 
Thus issue independence is expected to be positively correlated with a higher level of 
state permissiveness toward civil society actors, as it can manage that participation 
within a confined policy context that does not threaten other state priorities.  
External strategic value: Finally, external strategic value can be understood as 
how the perception of the state and its policy-making process is viewed by external 
actors. The state operates in an international context, and has an interest in 
maintaining its legitimacy both inside and outside of the state. It may, therefore, allow 
for increased participation of civil society actors not because it is functionally useful 
or internally stabilizing, but rather because it provides the perception of legitimacy to 
outside actors. Participation in this sense is strategically useful to the state in that it 
can facilitate cooperation with democratic donor states that attach conditions to their 
funding, as well as increase project funding into the state from donors that seek to 
partner with “local” or “non-governmental” organizations. The state is thus also 
expected to factor in the external strategic value of allowing a civil society actor to 
engage in the decision-making process when determining its response along the 
Repression-Encouragement spectrum.  The overlay of these three determinants of 
state behavior and how they affect the authoritarian state’s choice of strategy along 








Figure 1.3 Spectrum with Determinants of State Action 
 
 The three determinants of state action are not fixed characteristics of a civil 
society actor, but can vary according to the issue area that the actor is addressing. For 
example, a civil society organization may not try to mobilize the public on every 
issue; some issues may be of parochial interest while others involve transnational 
actors; and not all issue areas may be of interest to external donors or the attention 
they receive may vary over time. This framework thus provides a more nuanced 
understanding of state-CSO relations, which sees this interaction not as a fixed 
characteristic of the state structure or its tolerance of political engagement, but as a 







simultaneous interests of effectively managing their natural resources while 
maintaining political control. The focus on issue area provides a more accurate 
depiction of this interaction since the state’s chosen approach along the Repression-
Encouragement spectrum can vary across CSOs as well as over time toward a single 
CSO. 
Dissertation Framework 
This dissertation proceeds by demonstrating how the authoritarian state of 
Vietnam has managed participation in the governance of the water resources of the 
Mekong delta. The dissertation is organized as follows: Chapter 2 defines the 
Mekong delta as a collective good that the state has the unique authority and 
responsibility to protect, regardless of its willingness or ability to act. This chapter 
shows how the status quo in water resources management, and especially the threat of 
the numerous planned hydropower projects, presents a dire threat to Mekong delta 
residents. The governance choices that are made now will invariably impact the lives 
and livelihoods of those living in the delta. Chapter 3 discusses the political 
framework for the management of water resources in Vietnam and more broadly in 
the region, identifying the key actors who shape policy decisions inside and outside of 
the state. The relationship between national and sub-national levels of government in 
Vietnam is explored, as is the recent opening of space for civil society to operate in 
Vietnam. Chapter 4 explores the state’s interaction with the emergent formal NGO 
sector in Vietnam. The differences identified in how the state interacts with each 







is needed to advance our understanding of the state’s strategic choices. The state 
relies on these organizations for their information and expertise, and yet represses 
their ability to communicate with the public when it contradicts state interests. 
Chapter 5 shows how the state engages with an alternative set of stakeholders in 
water resources management, the local actors that live within the Mekong Delta. This 
chapter shows that the state takes a different approach to engaging with stakeholders 
whose mobilizing capacity is more limited and interests more parochial. Because their 
grievances are focused on the local level, the state does not suppress their collective 
action and encourages local actors to problem-solve through the apparatuses of the 
state. Chapter 6 explores how the state responds to activism taking place outside of its 
borders, which it has less ability to control. This chapter thus identifies a third set of 
stakeholders, proxy actors outside of the state who may represent the interests of delta 
residents, focusing on the role of international organizations and INGOs, respectively. 
Within the alternative operating space of the regional organization, this chapter 
demonstrates that the state limits the ability of domestic actors and INGOs to 
participate in international bodies, evidence of the state’s hesitancy to let its 
developing civil society further strengthen through the establishment of transnational 
bonds. This chapter also shows the ways in which the state can limit the activities of 
INGOs, which while not necessarily directly under the state’s control, must balance 
whether their objectives are best achieved through an adversarial or cooperative 
relationship with the state. Together, these chapters make clear that the state has a 







and/or sources of disruption, depending on their capabilities, the issue area, and the 
organization’s external strategic value. (See Appendix 1 for a catalogue of episodes 
discussed throughout the dissertation.) Chapter 7 discusses the implications of how 
the state interacts with civil society in the Mekong basin for both the political future 
of Vietnam as well as for effective water resource management. It also explores 
future research trajectories, and identifies some potential avenues that might improve 
the outlook for local stakeholders that take into account the political context of a 
region that is dominated by authoritarian regimes.     
Methodology  
In order to observe how the state interacts with various actors across time and 
levels of governance I conducted field research in the region; this enabled access to 
government officials, stakeholders, experts and the donor community who each share 
a role in the management of Vietnam’s water resources. The data for this dissertation 
was collected over 10 months of field research conducted in Southeast Asia from 
January-November 2013. The field research in Vietnam was paid for primarily by a 
scholarship awarded by the U.S. Department of State’s Fulbright Program. The 
supplementary travel within the region was supported by a grant from the University 
of Maryland’s Program for Society and the Environment. For the duration of the 
project, I was based in Long Xuyen, Vietnam, the capital city of An Giang province 
within the Mekong delta and received logistical support from the faculty and staff at 
An Giang University. The field research period also included field trips to other 







Hanoi, as well as to Vientiane, Lao PDR and Bangkok, Thailand. These regional trips 
allowed me to speak with officials of the MRC, donor governments, and other 
transnational actors who were able to provide a better understanding of regional 
governance of the delta resources.  
The primary method of data collection was semi-structured interviews, which 
allowed me to identify the interactions between state officials, local actors, and other 
experts and activists in water governance. Semi-structured interviews are ideal for 
this type of analysis because they balance the flexibility of allowing follow-up 
questions and clarifications with the structure of asking standard questions of all 
respondents, while avoiding leading questions that are common to survey format that 
might influence the identification of connected actors (Wengraf 2001; Galletta 2013).  
In the specific context of this study, this research method allowed the interview 
subject to independently identify their partners, strategies and interlocutors, leading to 
the identification of new actors and activities for the best possible understanding of 
how the governance of water resources in the delta is managed. The open-ended 
questions also allowed for interview subjects to provide a deep description of their 
experience and understandings, which was especially important since state-CSO 
interactions varied over time and cannot be accurately captured out of context. 
Approximately 50 interviews were conducted, which ranged from about 45 minutes at 
the shortest to over two hours. Because the number of Vietnamese NGOs, as well as 
government officials at the provincial, national and regional level working in delta 







and it was possible to reach a saturation point at which new information was not 
being obtained from additional meetings and/or the list of experts had been 
exhausted. Because of the small sample size, relations between these individuals 
cannot be tested statistically, but can be described in detail and this description will 
accurately reflect the universe of interactions between groups. Due to the sensitivity 
of conducting interviews in an authoritarian context and in order to ensure the highest 
level of protection of interview subjects, respondents are kept anonymous, with 
limited identifiers used only for officials speaking in their professional capacity. 
Interviews were conducted with the assistance of a translator when necessary and 
taped when permitted. While taping interviews does inevitably involve a risk that the 
interview subject will be less comfortable or forthcoming, this risk is balanced against 
the need for accuracy in recording and analyzing responses. In order to mitigate this 
risk, respondents were given the option to conduct interviews without recording. 
Taped material was kept in my own possession at all times on a recording device that 
cannot be connected to the internet.  
Identification of Interview Subjects 
 There are only three Vietnamese “NGOs” (as opposed to research institutions 
or government associations) working specifically on water governance,10 and I spoke 
to multiple staff members from all three organizations. I have high confidence that I 
have exhausted the list of local groups working on this issue because the participant 
                                                 
 







lists of the major environmental conferences that I attended in Vietnam support this 
determination. In addition, I asked other types of actors within the delta provinces to 
identify independently the local groups working in this field, and the results of these 
interviews confirm that only the three identified organizations actively work on water 
governance issues in Vietnam.  
Aside from the central government, the most relevant level of government 
regarding Mekong River water governance in Vietnam is the provincial level, which 
is the strongest level below the central government (See Figure 1.4). This level is 
tasked with water resource management for irrigation and flood control within each 
province, and thus has the strongest authority to address water governance issues. I 
conducted interviews with 8 officials at the provincial level, which represents nearly 
all government officials in An Giang province focusing specifically on water issues; 
one at the district level (level immediately below province); and one at the national 
level (ex-officio member of the Vietnamese National Mekong Committee). The 
information that officials at each level provided about available pathways of 







provided by other types of actors. Additional interviews would not be expected to 
provide additional data of significant value. 
At the MRC, which is the regional institution dedicated to the governance of 
the Mekong River, I met with staff from 
both of the units that have responsibilities 
with regard to stakeholder participation: 
the International Communications Unit 
and the Basin Development Plan unit, as 
well as representatives from the 
Sustainable Hydropower Unit and joint 
programs with German Agency for 
International Cooperation (GIZ).11  Each 
of the interviews with MRC staff 
confirmed the procedural rules regarding 
communication with local stakeholders, 
i.e., interested parties who were not 
official representatives of member states. 
In addition, I have interviewed officials 
from donor governments (Germany and United States) to understand their perceptions 
of political participation within the MRC. 
                                                 
 
11 See Chapter 3 for more detail on the structure of the MRC and its organizational chart. 
Figure 1.4 Provincial Map of Vietnam  
An Giang Province is indicated by dark 
red shading 









International NGOs were identified from conference lists, snowball sampling 
(those identified by the government officials and local NGOs in interviews), as well 
as those listed as partner organizations of the MRC. These include International 
Rivers, World Wildlife Fund (WWF), International Union for Conservation of Nature 
(IUCN), and the Challenge Program of Food and Water (CPFW). In addition, other 
organizations were named that are primarily virtual organizations connecting these 
INGOs and local groups within each of the Mekong River countries: Save the 
Mekong Coalition and Vietnam Rivers Network. These groups, however, do not have 
a staff that exists separately from the groups already named, but rather operate as 
umbrella organizations that allow the Vietnamese NGOs and INGOs mentioned to 
coordinate and present a united voice. Interviews with staff from each of the 4 INGOs 
mentioned were included in the study. 
Additional Data Collection 
In addition to the interviews, I participated in two major conferences held in 
Ho Chi Minh City on governance of the delta’s water resources that included 
presentations by MRC and government officials. I visited several climate change 
project sites and research institutions across the delta, as well as the Vietnam Union 
of Friendship Organization-NGO Resource Centre, based in Hanoi. The VUFO-NGO 
Resource Centre provided information, background and the text of recent legal 
decrees regarding registering INGOS and NGOs in Vietnam. I presented the 
preliminary findings of my research to a group of Vietnamese scholars specializing in 







within the Mekong Delta. This presentation allowed for discussion and feedback from 
the Vietnamese scholars, helping to validate the research by presenting the data in a 
local context in which my interpretations of the data could be challenged or 
confirmed. 
Significance and Broader Generalizability 
The significance of the findings in this dissertation is threefold, and each 
contribution offers important lessons to understanding environmental governance in 
authoritarian states beyond the case study of Vietnam. First, this dissertation adds to a 
growing literature on civil society development within authoritarian states. 
Increasingly, these states are seen as not simply repressing these groups, but 
interacting with them in ways that might be strategic or otherwise useful. However, 
previous research has failed to show why states may choose one form of strategic 
interaction for one civil society actor, while choosing another strategy toward a 
different actor. The new framework presented in this dissertation reveals that 
authoritarian states do not evaluate the threat to their political control by “civil 
society” in general, but disaggregate this concept to determine whether specific actors 
working within specific issue areas offer greater benefits to or potentially undermine 
the control of the state. By focusing on the characteristics of the CSO’s mobilizing 
capacity, issue independence and external strategic value, this study makes a unique 
contribution to the literature on civil society within authoritarian states by 







shape the ways that the authoritarian government chooses to engage with specific 
actors.  
Second, the findings of this study demonstrate that context matters in 
determining which form of engagement authoritarian states will choose from along 
the Repression-Encouragement spectrum. Not all issue areas are of equal importance 
to external actors, shaping the amount of international attention they receive and 
funding that may be directed toward them. Similarly, some issues are more likely to 
intersect with other key priorities of the authoritarian state, such as those that compete 
with foreign policy priorities or trade policy. The framework presented in this paper 
not only presents a more disaggregated view of civil society actors, but provides a 
more nuanced understanding of issue characteristics that these actors may address. 
This element of the framework reveals why authoritarian states may use different 
approaches along the Repression-Encouragement spectrum toward the same actor, 
depending on which issue it is focusing its advocacy activity.  Taken together, the 
disaggregation of civil society actors and the focus on issue characteristics provided 
by this study enhance our understanding of not only when the authoritarian state 
might work in tandem with civil society actors, but also when it might fall back on 
more repressive measures to counteract any potential threats to the state. 
Finally, the findings presented here are of particular importance in assessing 
the authoritarian state’s willingness and ability to address environmental challenges. 
While authoritarian states might have an advantage in their ability to impose 







governance, environmental challenges are unique in their characteristics of 
complexity, functionality and scale, making participation a more essential component 
of achieving effective outcomes. If authoritarian states perceive a tradeoff between 
engaging in these participatory processes and ceding some political control, it is 
unclear whether authoritarian states will privilege their long-term environmental 
interests or their immediate political interests. The answer to this question will 
provide some indication as to whether authoritarian systems will be able to manage 
complex and increasingly threatening transnational environmental challenges such as 
climate change. While the management of the resources of the Mekong delta is but 
one example of how an authoritarian state is addressing an environmental crisis, its 
lessons are important to gauge these states’ ability to respond to future challenges. As 
the impacts of climate change and rapid development become increasingly evident, 
the willingness and ability of the state to manage participatory processes may 














Chapter 2: From Collective Goods to Collective Ruin? 
The Mekong delta provides critical environmental services that are essential to 
both regional ecological systems as well as to direct users in the form of providing 
life-sustaining environmental goods. An estimated 80 percent of delta residents rely 
directly on the resources provided by the river system for their food and livelihoods 
(Baran and Myschowoda, 2009; ICEM, 2010). In Vietnam alone, approximately 20 
million people live directly off of the resources tied to the Mekong River, which 
provides the flood water used for rice production as well as the aquaculture that 
serves as the main source of dietary protein in the delta (GSO 2012).  
Notwithstanding this high level of dependence on the river resources, the Mekong 
delta is facing an environmental and development crisis that threatens the area’s food 
production, water quantity and quality, and the rapid loss of land to sea level rise and 
subsidence. In coastal provinces, agricultural production already is affected by 
increased soil salinity, and as sea level rise continues and upstream development 
affects land subsidence and sedimentation rates, the challenge to the region’s 
productivity and livability will continue to deteriorate. The dynamics of this crisis – 
high levels of dependence on environmental goods and services accompanied by 
rapid environmental change – provide a complex problem for the state it terms of its 
capability and responsibility to manage the environmental goods within it. 
 This chapter provides a detailed account of the environmental changes 







resources provided by the river system are conceptualized as collective goods, 
situating this case within a large body of literature that addresses the management of 
these services as a primary function of state. Particularly within an authoritarian state 
structure, which is hierarchical and control-oriented, the state bears responsibility for 
environmental management as it continues to rely upon a top-down command and 
control system over a shared-power approach. (Ingle and Halimi 2007). This chapter 
also provides an overview of the geography of the Mekong delta and highlights the 
current trends that are causing environmental change, both at the global level through 
the increasingly visible impacts of climate change and the more localized effects of 
rapid industrialization, urbanization and hydropower projects within the region itself. 
Included within this chapter is a discussion of the socio-economic drivers that are 
pushing the states within this region to weigh their short-term development interests 
against the longer-term environmental impacts on the region. Finally, this chapter 
provides an overview of the range of responses by the authoritarian state, anticipating 
what the potential tradeoffs are to the state as it considers its strategies to manage the 
region’s natural resources. 
The Mekong Delta as a Collective Good 
Environmental goods are often classified as public goods or common-pool 
resources because of their characteristic of non-excludability.  This characteristic 
means that unlike goods that are subject to market forces (i.e., private goods and club 
goods, for which access can be limited to the owners of the good) individuals cannot 







between the properties of goods may be traced back much further, Paul A. Samuelson 
is usually credited with developing the theory of public goods. In “The Pure Theory  
of Public Expenditure,” (1954) he defines “collective consumption goods” as those 
“which all enjoy in common in the sense that 
each individual's consumption of such a 
good leads to no subtraction from any other 
individual's consumption of that good” (p. 
387).  The property of non-subtractability 
that Samuelson describes in his article is now 
often referred to as “non-rivalry,” and this 
property distinguishes purely public goods 
from common-pool resources, which can be diminished in supply through overuse.  
Examples of environmental goods that fall into each of these categories include fresh 
air as a public good and fish stocks as a common-pool resource, given the former’s 
supposedly “unlimited” supply and the latter’s susceptibility to depletion from 
overfishing. In effect, there are very few examples of pure public goods; even fresh 
air can be diminished in supply through air pollution. Therefore, the characterization 
of this type of good as non-rival or “unlimited in supply” does not mean that its 
presence is guaranteed or that the quality of the good cannot be degraded.  
 



















This dissertation classifies the environmental goods provided by the Mekong 
River ecosystem as collective goods.12 Individual goods provided by the ecosystem, 
such as the river’s fish stocks, might be accurately classified as common-pool 
resources due to their vulnerability to depletion from overfishing. Nonetheless, the 
dynamics that are the key focus of this study, specifically the effects of the larger-
scale forces of climate change and upstream development, present a particular type of 
management challenge through the threat of environmental degradation that cannot be 
corrected by simple top-down directives such as access restrictions. Thus while 
depletion of the fish stock is in fact a primary concern, the primary causal mechanism 
is not the unrestricted access of fishermen but rather that the ecosystem itself is 
threatened. The ecological goods provided by the Mekong delta system are thus 
conceptualized in this study as “collective goods,” which, like fresh air, have the 
properties of non-rivalry and non-excludability but that nonetheless can be degraded 
in the absence of careful ecological management. 
The classification of environmental goods in fact becomes essential to 
understanding where management interventions are possible and appropriate.  The 
utility in distinguishing between public/common-pool and private/club goods is that 
the former represent market failure – individuals have little incentive to maximize 
public goods when they can benefit from the contributions of others, hence leading to 
the problem of the “free rider” (Hardin 1968). Public goods that are subject to 
                                                 
 
12 The terms “public good” and “collective good” are often used interchangeably. Collective good is 
preferred by the author because it provides a more clear distinction from the normative concept of the 







degradation, and well as common-pool goods which are subtractable , thus tend to be 
undersupplied, as individual utility maximization leads to overexploitation. In 
economic theory, the state is assumed to maximize the utility of its citizens. In order 
to correct for the undersupply of private goods, governments thus often serve as a 
coordinating body to ensure their provision, such as by collecting taxes to pay for 
them or enforcing laws that protect them. States thus have a central role to play as 
utility-maximizers through the provision of public goods, either directly or indirectly 
by setting rules that ensure their provision by third parties. 
The economic presumption of the state as a utility-maximizer is not as widely 
accepted in political science, where assumptions of the state as rational, unitary or 
serving the public interest all may be challenged. Correspondingly, this study makes 
no assumptions that states necessarily will provide public goods, and in fact the 
central research question leaves open to inquiry whether the state will engage in 
public goods provision if such activity runs counter to its other competing interests 
such as maintaining its internal stability. Countless studies have shown how states fail 
at public goods provision, and that this failure can occur in strong as well as weak or 
failing states (Lee et. al 2014). Other actors can step in to assume the role of public 
goods provision where the state is unwilling or unable to do so, such as the voluntary 
sector that may assist by collecting donations from public benefactors. The ability for 
other actors to assume the role of the state is limited, however, in the case of 
transnational environmental goods that straddle the authority of more than one 







ultimately states are the sole authority able to manage this intersection between their 
internal and external affairs.  Thus, while states may not always adhere to their 
responsibilities in the provision of public goods and other actors are theoretically 
capable of stepping in to provide them, the state has critical and undisputed 
responsibility in the management of transboundary environmental goods. If the 
authoritarian state of Vietnam does not take an active role in the management of the 
collective goods of the Mekong delta by prioritizing this issue in its relations with its 
riparian neighbors, no other actor has the clear authority or ability to do so on a 
transnational scale. 
Use or Abuse: Exploiting the Delta Resources  
The Mekong River is extremely valuable in terms of its current productivity as 
well as its future potential to each of the riparian states.  It is the 10th largest river in 
the world by annual discharge, supports the largest fishery in the region, and presents 
an enormous amount of tapped and untapped hydropower productivity. However, the 
costs and benefits of exploiting these resources are not shared equally, as upstream 
states can benefit from hydropower production without suffering the consequences of 
reduced water supply, water quality or other threats to ecosystem health, such as a 
reduction in fish supply, that accompany changing the flow of the river.  Vietnam’s 
geographical location as the state farthest downstream on the Mekong River thus 
shapes its interests in river basin management; the development decisions taken by its 
upstream neighbors affect its fish and agricultural productivity, while the benefits are 







The benefits provided by the river ecosystem are of critical importance to the 
delta residents who depend on these resources for their livelihoods, as well as for the 
economic strength of the country as a whole. The preservation of these environmental 
goods is thus not only a biodiversity or conservation concern, but a socio-economic 
imperative. Rice production in the Mekong Delta contributed heavily to the overall 
economic recovery of the country following the Doi Moi economic reforms as the 
country progressed from a net importer of rice to an exporter (Garschagen et al 2012). 
The Mekong delta is now a driver of Vietnam’s national development and foreign 
trade, producing 90 percent of Vietnam’s rice exports and 73 percent of the country’s 
farmed aquatic products, which have made this sector the fourth highest source of 
Vietnam’s foreign exchange (Fabres 2011; Garschagen et al 2012). Known as the 
“rice bowl” of Asia, the region produces 53 percent of the country’s paddy rice, 81 
percent of its aquaculture shrimp production and 77 percent of its aquaculture fish 
production.  While the agricultural sector contributed 21 percent to overall GDP in 
2009, agricultural production accounted for 38 percent of the economic activity in the 
Mekong Delta, meaning that the environmental vitality of the region is essential to 
maintaining its economic output (Renaud 2012). Nearly one quarter of the 
Vietnamese population lives in the delta, with 51 percent of the delta work force in 
the agricultural sector (compared to a 48 percent national average). However, this 
does not take into account that 75 percent identify agricultural activities as a 
secondary occupation (Renaud 2012). The interests of the Vietnamese state in 







collective goods in the public interest, but because these resources provide a critical 
role in the state’s national economy. 
The delta ecosystem is threatened by a variety of local and global forces 
including urban and industrial pollution, agriculture, habitat damage, and climate 
change.  However, one of the most contentious issues regarding the management of 
the river is the development of dams, which threaten the ecological health of the delta 
due to the effect they have on the natural river flow compounded by the rapid pace at 
which they are being planned and constructed.  Currently an estimated 134 major 
dams are in various stages of development, including twelve that are planned or under 
construction for the main stem of the river (MRC 2011; ICEM 2010).  The arguments 
in favor of dam-building tend to focus on the principle benefit of hydropower 
generation. Economic growth and electricity demand increased at an average rate of 8 
percent in the Mekong region from 1993 to 2005, with the growth in demand 
expecting to continue at about 6-7 percent annually to 2025 (ICEM 2010). The twelve 
dams proposed along the Lower Mekong Basin would represent 11 percent of the 
additional installed capacity required between 2015 and 2025. Lao PDR is likely to 
receive 70 percent of the export revenues (USD 2.6 billion/year) generated by the 
main stem dams, although these benefits would accrue to the developers and 
financiers of the projects and not directly to the government or local communities, 
thus the impacts on poverty alleviation would be indirect. In addition to power 
generation and associated revenues, the other benefits attributed to the proposed main 







spinoffs from the large investments in goods and services, greater navigability of the 
river with higher water levels, expansion of irrigation agriculture, and offsetting of 
greenhouse gas emissions from thermal power plants.” (www.mrcmekong.org). These 
benefits will not be equally distributed, however, and the 2010 MRC Strategic 
Assessment produced by ICEM predicts that despite these benefits associated with 
main stem hydropower development, that Vietnam specifically will likely suffer an 
overall economic loss, and that these losses will be borne predominantly by poorer 
communities within the Mekong delta. 
The concerns associated with the proposed main stem dams include that the 
scale of upstream development will result in changes to the river’s hydrology, 
sediment load and water quality and will cause interruptions in the water flow (Fabres 
2011). The change in sediment patterns caused by hydropower development is of 
particular concern in conjunction with the effects of climate change, presenting a 
double whammy to the agricultural productivity of the delta.  The sediment that is 
transported by the river is nutrient-rich and distributed across the floodplain during 
the rainy season that lasts from June to October, providing a crucial ecosystem 
service upon which the agricultural production of the delta is dependent (Kummu and 
Varis 2007).  Trapping of sediment in dams leads to reduced sedimentation reaching 
the delta, depriving the cropland of these nutrients as well as causing land subsidence 
and backwater effects that cause floodplain inundation from seawater.  As climate 
change simultaneously contributes to sea level rise, brackish sea water encroaches on 







Manh and coauthors (2015) developed a sensitivity-based approach to estimating the 
effects of the three main drivers – hydropower development, climate change and land 
subsidence – on future sedimentation patterns in the Mekong delta.  They find that 
among these three drivers, hydropower development is estimated to have the most 
significant impact: 
We found that hydropower development dominates the changes in the 
sediment dynamics of the [Mekong Delta] MD in case of medium to high 
hydropower development. Under these circumstances sediment trapping by 
the reservoirs reduces dramatically the provision of sediment to the MD, with 
climate change acting as a second-order effect. Even the highest level of 
climate change, which increases the flood peak and the sediment input to the 
MD, does not significantly counteract the hydropower sediment reduction 
effort. Overall, sea level rise has the smallest effect on sediment dynamics. If 
median changes of all factors are assumed as the most likely pathway for 
sediment dynamics in the MD for the period 2015-2060, our findings indicate 
that the inundation extent would slightly increase in the VMD, particularly in 
the [Plain of Reeds] PoR, but the overall floodplain sedimentation is likely to 
be reduced significantly. (p. 31). 
 
The implications of hydropower development for agricultural production in the delta 
are dire. In the analysis of their findings, Manh and his coauthors conclude that 
“floodplain sedimentation can provide an average of 50% of the nutrient requirements 
for rice crops … [but this] would be reduced to negligible amounts already with a 
basin wide sediment trapping efficiency of 53%.” (p. 31). While the global-scale 
challenge of climate change is thus threatening to food security in the Mekong delta 
primarily through its contribution to sea-level rise, the primary threat to food security 







In addition to its impact on agricultural productivity, hydropower 
development threatens the food security of the delta through its impact on fish stocks 
(See Table 2.2) 
 Impact of Proposed Main Stem Dams on Vietnam 
Fish Loss The loss of fish catch yield per year is 344-374 million metric tons (or 
49.7-54%), and around 33 species (10%) in catch composition. 
Sediment Loss The total sediment loss per year in Tan Chau – Chau Doc, An Giang 
province, is 13.9-15.3 million metric tons/year (56.7%-63.8%). 
Agriculture 
Loss 
552,500 metric tons of rice (2.3%) over 10 years; 2,432,800 metric 
tons of rice (10.1%) over 50 years. 
Table 2.2: The Impact on Key Sectors in Vietnam of Proposed Main Stem Dams 
Source: DHI (2015). 
 
The delta is one of the most biodiverse regions of the Mekong River in terms of fish 
species with 481 species in 73 families catalogued (some estimates place the total 
number of species much higher).  According to Fabres (2011), the impact that dams 
will have on blocking the migration patterns of many of these species will cause 
significant disruption to the flourishing fish industry: 
With 40-70% of the total fish catch in the Mekong reported to depend on 
migrating species (Barlow et al. 2008; Baran and Myschowoda 2008). The 
future of fisheries’ livelihoods in the world’s largest inland fishery looks 
bleak.  Vietnam’s delta fisheries are considered as “High Risk” due to the 
biodiversity changes and barriers to completion of life cycles and migrations.  
Poor households that are the most dependent on capture fisheries will be the 








Downward trends in fish capture are already evident, as recent studies of fish catch 
show a decline in large migratory fish and increases in low-value species and young 
and immature fish (Fabres 2011, Baran and Myschowoda 2008, and Tran Van Viet 
and Tran Xuan Loi 2007).  This reduction of the fish supply is likely to have a 
significant impact on the national economy and the livelihoods of many delta 
residents. International Rivers estimates the first sale value of Mekong fish to be 
between $3.9 and 7.0 billion, with a much higher economic value overall factoring in 
those that live tangential to the fish market making related products and supplies, and 
subsistence fishermen who live outside of the formal economy (International Rivers 
2013). The decreased supply of fish could also lead to higher prices, potentially 
increasing the cost of the region’s primary protein source within a region already 
stricken by high levels of poverty. Annual per capita income in the Mekong Delta is 
about USD$1,535 (VND 34.6 million), compared to a national average of about 
USD$2,000, (VND 46.2 million) (Hoang 2015).       
Despite these drastic food security impacts on downstream Vietnam, upstream 
hydropower development continues apace. Rather than taking a cautious approach to 
further deterioration of the delta ecology, multiple large hydropower projects have 
been planned that will invariably have a negative impact on the downstream 
inhabitants of the delta (See Figure 2.1). Two projects are under construction with an 
additional nine in the proposal stage that would place hydropower dams on the main 
stem of the Mekong River in the Lower Mekong Basin, which is currently one of the 







tributaries in the basin. (ICEM, 2010; Molle et al., 2009). These hydropower 
proposals, in addition to the 17 tributary dams that have already been completed, 
reflect the privileged position that the production of energy and related economic 
interests have held in political decision-making in the region, over a careful 
consideration of the dams’ social and environmental impacts. A World Wildlife Fund 
report highlights that although the minimization of the impact of hydropower dams is 
discussed in the context of recommendations, tools and protocols, that few new 







Figure 2.1 Mekong Main Stem Dams Map 
Source: International Rivers and ICEM (2010) / CC BY-NC-SA 3.0 US. 
 
The main stem dams are of particular concern given their potential to 







operational dams on the main stem of the river in the Lower Mekong Basin, although 
there are 6 operational dams in China on the Lower Lancang River, the Chinese name 
for the Mekong, with a seventh in the planning stage. (See Figure 2.1 for a map of 
hydropower projects on the main stem that are planned, operational and under 
construction.) Construction on the first of the Lancang main stem dams, the Manwan 
dam, was completed in 1994, and the Dachaoshan and Jinghong were completed in 
2002 and 2006, respectively. China did not engage in consultations with any of the 
downstream countries during the planning processes for these dams (Hirsh 2010).  
According to Darrin Magee (2006), the hydroelectricity generated by these Chinese 
dams is significant, estimated at “more than 100 TWh, [or] slightly more than that of 
Lao PDR, and between two and 20 times more than that of the other four Mekong 
countries. For comparison, 80 TWh per year would be enough to power Guangzhou, 
Shenzhen, Dongguan and Kunming combined.” (p. 29).  The environmental impacts 
of for the downstream countries are correspondingly significant. According to 
International Rivers (2014), the annual mean sediment trapped by the Manwan Dam 
was estimated to be about 35% of total sedimentation transported from Lancang 
Basin to Lower Mekong in the first 10 years of the dam’s operation, and the dam has 
also caused changes to water quantity and temperature downstream, negatively 
impacting the fish supply. While the Lancang River flow only contributes about 16 
percent of the overall average of the water flow of the Mekong River, the downstream 







Because of the transboundary impacts, the construction of main stem dams on 
the Mekong has been a contentious process within Southeast Asia. Plans for main 
stem dams on the Mekong River date back to the mid-20th century when the ideology 
of large infrastructure projects as paving the pathway to development was at its peak 
(Hirsch 2010). However, none of these dams were ever constructed due to the 
political turbulence in the region, particularly the Vietnam War.  When dam-building 
re-emerged on the development agenda in the 1990s, the prevailing consensus was 
that main stem dams were too environmentally destructive and thus construction 
should be limited to tributary dams. However, the development benefits associated 
with main stem hydropower development soon took precedence over environmental 
concerns: 
In 2007-2008, mainstream dams reappeared on the agenda in a big way. A 
range of factors and events explain this extraordinarily rapid shift in the 
prevailing influence. Immediately prior to this MRC’s Secretariat and its 
Council had seen a distinct shift toward more developmentally minded 
leaders, notably the CEO Olivier Cogels (Hirsch 2008). At the same time, 
those purporting to represent national interest in some of the riparian countries 
expressed decreasing patience with external voices that put a brake on rapid 
development of hydropower. For example, Madame Khampeng Pholsena, 
MRC Council member for Lao PDR, has been adamant that these are 
decisions for the riparian countries alone to take (Osborne 2009). (Hirsch 
2010). 
 
Despite resistance from local stakeholders as well as transnational environmental 
groups, two of the eleven dams planned for the main stem of the Mekong River are 
currently under construction, the Xayaburi and the Don Sahong dams. Given their 







planning, financing and environmental impacts of both of these dams are worth 
exploring in detail. 
Xayaburi Dam 
The Xayaburi Dam is currently under construction in northern Lao PDR and is 
expected to span the entire channel of the Mekong River upon completion, raising 
concerns about the possibility for fish passage.  The dam is projected to generate 
1,260 megawatts of electricity.  The lead developer of the project is Ch. Kamchang 
Public Company, a Thai construction company that signed a Memorandum of 
Understanding with the Lao government in 2007 and a Project Development 
Agreement the following year.  A Power Purchase Agreement was then signed 
between Thailand and Lao PDR in 2010, which arranges for 1,220 MW of electricity, 
or around 95 percent of the energy produced, to be exported to Thailand.  Under the 
terms of the 1995 Mekong Agreement, discussed in more detail in Chapter 3, Lao 
PDR is obligated to formally notify Cambodia, Thailand and Vietnam of its intention 
to build a dam on the Mekong River, and it began this consultation process in 2010.  
Consensus is not required under the terms of the 1995 Agreement, but because the 
states could not agree about how to proceed they tabled the discussion for review at 
the ministerial level.  Lao PDR nonetheless began construction of the dam in 2012. 
The environmental impacts of the dam are expected to be felt by downstream 
users inside and outside of Lao PDR. According to International Rivers (2011),  
Around 2,100 people would be resettled by the project, and more than 
202,000 people living near the dam would suffer impacts to their livelihoods, 
income and food security due to the loss of their agricultural land and 







in accessing products from the forest, such as wild banana flower and rattan. 
The changes caused by the dam to the river’s biodiversity and fisheries would 
be felt throughout the river basin, affecting millions of people. (n.p.) 
 
In an attempt to address the concerns raised by the other riparian states, the 
government of Lao PDR hired the Swiss engineering company Pöyry Energy AG in 
May 2011 to evaluate the compliance of the Xayaburi dam with requirements set by 
the Mekong River Commission.  The content, interpretation, and neutrality of the 
Pöyry Report has proven controversial. First, because the report was not conducted in 
cooperation with the other riparian states, the scope and accuracy of the data 
regarding the environmental impacts were called into question. Second, although the 
government of Lao PDR has treated the report as an official review and emphasized 
its finding that the Xayaburi dam is “in principal compliance with MRC 
guidelines,”13 the Swiss company was never authorized by the MRC to conduct a 
report on its behalf.  Furthermore the report’s findings are qualified. “It is necessary 
to develop additional baseline data on biology, ecology and livelihood restoration … 
and there is a need to improve the knowledge concerning the specific requirements of 
the aquatic fauna on the fish passage facilities,” (p.10). This report also found that it 
was outside the scope of its mandate to perform a Cumulative Impact Assessment.  
Some critics also called into question whether Pöyry Energy AG held a conflict of 
interest in completing the report, given that it is working as a business partner with 
the Thai developer Ch. Karnchang on another hydropower project in Lao PDR, the 
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Nam Ngum 2 dam. (Herbertson 2011).  Overall, while the construction of the 
Xayaburi dam steadily moves forward, the ecological impacts of the dam are still 
largely unknown, even according to the ostensibly neutral report that the government 
of Lao PDR relied upon to justify proceeding with its development.   
Don Sahong Dam 
Despite ongoing disagreement regarding the consultation process of the 
Xayaburi dam, Lao PDR gave notification of its intent to build a second main stem 
dam in September 2013.  However, engagement in the consultation process was 
widely viewed as a superficial attempt by the government of Lao PDR to legitimize 
its actions without actually allowing the process to inform its planning.  The 
downstream states argued that due to inadequate baseline information the 
environmental impacts of the dam could not be assessed. International Rivers (2015) 
reports that Lao PDR treated the notification process as perfunctory: 
Prior Consultation took place without adequate baseline information and with 
no transboundary impact assessment, meaning that neighboring countries 
were limited in their ability to assess the real impacts of the project on their 
use of the river. Additionally there were a large number of concerns raised 
about the problematic implementation of the Xayaburi Dam’s PNPCA14 
process, including by the MRC and donor governments, issues that were not 
addressed or resolved before the process was started again for the Don Sahong 
Dam.  
 
On 27 January 2015 the MRC’s Joint Committee met at the close of the first 
six-months of the Prior Consultation process for the Don Sahong Dam. At the 
meeting, Thailand, Cambodia and Vietnam each called for an extension to the 
Prior Consultation process, requesting further baseline studies and greater 
                                                 
 







assessment of the project’s transboundary impacts. The Government of Laos, 
however, insisted that the Prior Consultation process was complete.(n.p.) 
 
In a similar procedural outcome to the Xayaburi dam, the MRC Council was unable 
to reach an agreement and decided to escalate discussions to the ministerial level.   
Also similarly to the Xayaburi outcome, Lao PDR began construction of the dam 
without waiting for that process to lead to a resolution. 
 Construction of the Don Sahong dam, which is located less than 2 kilometers 
upstream of the Lao PDR-Cambodia border, began in 2015.  The completed dam is 
expected to be 25 meters high and generate 260 MW of electricity for both domestic 
use as well as for export. Mega First Corporate Berhad, a Malaysian company, signed 
a Power Purchase Agreement with the government of Lao PDR in 2015. Shortly 
thereafter, a contract to construct the project was granted to China’s Sinohydro 
International Corporation.   
 In addition to the standard concerns about water flow and quality, the impact 
on migratory fish stocks, and sedimentation transport that arise with all main stem 
dams, the Don Sahong dam also threatens the school of dolphins that lives in Veun 
Nyang/Anlong Cheuteal deep pool, just one kilometer downstream of the project site. 
The Irrawaddy dolphins that live in this pool are a critically endangered species with 
fewer than 100 remaining, and this is the only location in Lao PDR where they can be 
found. The dolphins are one of the biggest tourist attractions of the area and a key 
source of income for nearby communities in Cambodia that are dependent on 







dolphins, but even if not directly harmed by construction the depletion of the fish 
supply on which they live could present a secondary threat to their survival.  An 
IUCN Report (Reeves et al, 2009) that was updated in 2017 with data collected since 
the start of the dam’s construction noted further reduction in the local dolphin 
population and estimated that there is now “virtually no hope for its persistence.” 
(IUCN 2017). Loss of the population of Irrawaddy dolphin that live in this pool 
would greatly enhance the risk of species extinction. 
 The process by which the Don Sahong dam was planned showed little 
improvement from the contentious process first undertaken with the Xayaburi dam.  
Both dams present significant socio-economic and environmental threats to their 
downstream neighbors, but construction began on each before the consultation 
process reached a conclusion or the impacts could be fully assessed.  The dams 
undoubtedly present benefits, at least in the short term, to their host states in the form 
of electricity generation, an infusion of cash via the sale of concessions, and resultant 
infrastructure development. However, the benefits of these development projects, 
particularly given the decision to locate them on the main stem of the river, are not 
equally shared by states in the region. As the state farthest downstream, Vietnam in 
particular must find a way to manage the impacts of these hydropower projects 
without the ability to share in its benefits.  
Mekong Delta Resource Management: The Geopolitical Context 
Given the vulnerability of its downstream delta residents, one might expect 







upstream developments that are exacerbating this environmental change. However, 
the political reality is more complex. As the building of the Xayaburi and Don 
Sahong dams reflect, most of the current dam construction along the Mekong River is 
taking place in geographically opportune locations in Lao PDR. Lao PDR is an 
extremely poor country and – together with Vietnam – one of the five remaining 
nominally communist governments.15 These dam construction projects allow Lao 
PDR to increase its revenue by selling its hydropower primarily to neighboring 
Thailand, which as a relatively developed country has increasing energy needs. Lao 
PDR is expected to experience significant economic growth from main stem 
hydropower investment, although the MRC Strategic Environmental Assessment also 
warns of the possibility of macro-economic imbalances developing due to a booming 
hydropower sector and negative impacts on vulnerable communities (ICEM 2010). 
Despite operating under similar political systems, the relations between Lao PDR and 
Vietnam are complicated, as Vietnam and China increasingly compete for influence 
and investment opportunities within the developing state. Vietnam has thus at times 
taken a position against further hydropower development upstream in the Mekong 
River, but has also muted this position when it has exacerbated regional geopolitical 
tensions. 
The Chinese government is one of the main financiers of the dam building 
projects in Southeast Asia, which further escalates the political calculations as the 
                                                 
 







states in the region make decisions about how to engage with a state that is 
simultaneously viewed as an overbearing regional hegemon and a significant source 
of potential revenue.16 Through its state-owned enterprises (SOEs), China is actively 
involved in financing dozens of dams in the Lower Mekong Delta.  The dam 
development initiatives are part of China’s “Going Out Strategy” that was issued 
during the 10th Five-Year Plan (2001-2005) that is designed to increase the revenue of 
Chinese SOEs.  
The ‘Going Out Strategy’ is geared towards expanding the markets of 
domestic firms overseas as they have outgrown the domestic market. 
Expanding overseas means increased revenues for Chinese firms and does not 
limit them to domestic markets. The Chinese practice is hence often to bundle 
aid, trade and investment by providing, for example, both investments and 
concessional loans for dam building and linking this to the export of 
electricity coupled with the import of Chinese manufactured goods and trade 
goods for Chinese firms. (Urban et al 2013, p. 312).     
 
According to Matthews and Motta of the food-security research partnership CGIAR 
(2013), Chinese developers frame these projects as a “win-win” because of the 
financial benefits they bring to host nations and political influence that benefits the 
Chinese state, highlighting that the dams provide large financial injections, 
infrastructure and electricity into states struggling with economic development.  
                                                 
 
16 China has a recent history of contentious relations with its Southeast Asian neighbors: it fought a 
war with Vietnam in 1979, did not have formal relations with Lao PDR from 1979-1999, and 
supported the communist Khmer Rouge dictatorship in Cambodia. Although China has recently tried 
to build greater trust with the states within Southeast Asia in order to advance its national security and 
economic interests (e.g., ACFTA and the Chiang Mai Initiative, which focused on trade and currency 








Because of these incentives presented to Lao PDR and other developing states from 
Chinese investment, the government of Vietnam must carefully balance whether its 
opposition to upstream development, even taking into consideration the socio-
economic and environmental impacts on its own residents, is worth the potential 
disruption to its relations with its regional neighbors and loss of influence as 
compared to its historical adversary, China. 
Maximizing Utility or Maximizing Stability?   
The environmental, economic and geopolitical implications of development 
projects in the Lower Mekong Basin present a complicated set of calculations for the 
state of Vietnam to consider in managing the delta resources.  On the one hand, 
upstream development presents a socio-economic and ecological crisis to the 
Vietnamese citizens living in the Mekong delta, threatening their livelihoods, food 
security, and even their land security as parts of the delta are lost to subsidence or 
made uninhabitable due to sea level rise.  On the other hand, Vietnam must also 
weigh the geopolitical implications for putting more political pressure on its upstream 
neighbors to cease development projects that threaten its interests.  With respect to 
Lao PDR in particular, the Vietnamese government must consider whether 
challenging its rapid hydropower development will have the unintended 
consequences of moving Lao PDR closer to China, still viewed with mistrust by 
Vietnam due to historical antagonisms and ongoing territorial conflicts in the South 







How will the government of Vietnam respond to these competing sets of 
interests?  Will it act upon its role as the most capable actor to protect transnational 
collective goods and take steps, domestically and internationally, to support the 
provision of goods that the Mekong River system supplies to its delta residents?  Will 
it engage with local actors in order to support this provision through participatory 
processes, or rely upon top-down policy implementation in accordance with its 
authoritarian structure?  Will it privilege its foreign policy objectives over its interests 
with respect to collective goods provision, repressing actors who challenge this 
prioritization of objectives?  Given this complex array of interests, the strategic 
choices of the authoritarian state cannot be predicted a priori, but can be observed 
through its strategic interactions with civil society actors and transnational actors who 
try to influence its choices within this policy space.  These strategic interactions will 
be analyzed in detail across levels of governance, but first a more careful 
understanding of how the government of Vietnam is structured to manage its water 







Chapter 3: Water Governance in Vietnam 
The governance of water resources in Vietnam intersects with multiple types 
of actors and layers of government.  From the grassroots users to the transnational 
actors responsible for basin-level administration, decisions about water use and 
management affect stakeholders throughout the river basin. Within the government of 
Vietnam, the responsibility for water resources management primarily is shared 
horizontally across two government ministries as well as vertically between the 
national and local governments.  The state also interacts transnationally with 
representatives of the other riparian states through its participation in the Mekong 
River Commission, the regional body officially tasked with jointly managing the 
shared resources of the Mekong River.    
In addition to formal government actors and institutions, Vietnam is 
witnessing the emergence of an increasingly active civil society sector, including non-
governmental organizations focused on the protection of water resources.17 These 
organizations operate within a fluid space with respect to their relations with the state 
– at times supporting and at times challenging its governance objectives.  In order to 
                                                 
 
17 The use of the term “NGO” within the Vietnamese context can be a source of confusion. All of the 
NGOs discussed in this dissertation have formally registered with the state and have been granted 
permission to operate, which makes the “non-governmental” adjective somewhat inaccurate. Other 
scholars prefer the terms “civil society organizations” or “civic organizations.” However, the NGOs 
discussed consist of paid, professional staff, not voluntary members from the general public, which 
may be associated with these alternative terms. Additionally, each of the organizations used the term 
“NGO” in self-reference, indicating that this term does reflect the type of services that they see 
themselves providing. I have chosen to maintain their use of “NGO” in this paper, with the caveat that 








provide a contextual understanding of the strategic choices made by the state 
regarding its management of public goods, this chapter will provide an overview of 
the authoritarian institutions of the state, a more detailed description of those 
institutions most relevant to the management of water resources, and finally a 
discussion of the shifting opportunity structures within the state that are allowing new 
actors to participate in water governance.  
State Institutions and Water Management  
The management of water resources in Vietnam is best understood within the 
context of its authoritarian system.  Vietnam is a single-party socialist republic that is 
led by the Communist Party. In 2013, the government undertook a comprehensive 
constitutional review process and adopted its fifth constitution in November of that 
year, its third since reunification of the country in 1976.  The review process, which 
lasted from January to April 2013, was notable for the unprecedented degree of public 
participation on sensitive, substantive, and controversial questions (Bui 2014; Bui and 
Nicholson 2016).  For example, a group of 72 senior scholars drafted a petition to the 
Constitutional Amendment Drafting Committee that came to be known as Petition 72. 
The petition called for radical proposals that would dramatically change the 
fundamental structure of the Vietnamese government. While the reforms were thus a 
non-starter for serious consideration by the government, the drafting process was 
much more participatory than  in earlier eras.  Despite significant public debate 
regarding the civil and political rights of Vietnamese citizens, the final draft of the 







4, referring to the party as “simultaneously the vanguard of labourers and of the 
Vietnamese nation, the faithful representative of the interests of the working class, 
labourers and the whole nation,” (Trans. International Idea, 2013).  The reform 
process thus solidified the party’s political control, although it simultaneously 
revealed the potential for citizens to engage in oppositional discourse as well. 
The constitution identifies the National Assembly, or the legislative branch of 
the Vietnamese government, as the “highest representative body of the People and the 
highest body of State power of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam.”  (Article 7; Trans. 
International Idea, 2013) While the Constitution describes the process of election to 
the National Assembly as based on the “principles of universal, equal, direct and 
secret suffrage,” the reality is that the candidates list is tightly controlled by the 
Communist Party and thus candidates that present a challenge to the Party’s authority 
are commonly eliminated through its strict vetting process (Petty 2016).  The elected 
National Assembly is responsible for choosing the president, and the president 
nominates the prime minister, who is then confirmed by the National Assembly.  
Thus despite a nominally “democratic” electoral process to choose the deputies to the 
National Assembly, the procedural restrictions exercised by the Communist Party 
ensure its de facto control over the executive and legislative branches. Because there 
is such overlap between the party and the state, the country’s leaders can be thought 
of as a triumvirate: 1) the Party Secretary, 2) the President who functions as the head 








   At the sub-national level of government, the state extends its authority 
vertically through four generally recognized units: 1) province/city; 2) district; 3) 
commune/ward; and 4) village/hamlet.18  The numbers of each sub-unit can fluctuate 
due to population and administrative changes, but as of 2010 included 63 
provinces/cities and 599 districts. The northern part of the country tends to rely only 
on the first three levels of local government, although the necessity of even the 
commune/ward level has been questioned by local officials, as they lost some of their 
purpose when farming was collectivized in 1960 (Kerkvliet 2004).  The primary sub-
national levels through which the party and state exercise their authority are thus the 
province and district level, which house local offices of the legislative, executive and 
judicial branches of government.19   The Communist Party also maintains branches at 
the subnational levels of government, creating a parallel structure in which the party 
and government are only nominally separate and, in fact, the party exercises control 
across each level of government.  In other words, officials at the provincial level must 
report to their superiors at the ministry level, as well as to the authorities of the 
Communist Party that are located within their province.  
The centralized control of sub-national levels of government is evident from 
their dependence on the national government for funding.  Only the national level of 
government has the ability to levy taxes. Tax administration is carried out by the 
                                                 
 
18 Different terms are used to distinguish between provinces and large cities, which are nonetheless 
administratively equal. There is also some variation in administrative structure among the lowest two 
levels of government, particularly in the south, where centralized administrative control has 
historically been more difficult (Kerkvliet 2004). 







central government’s General Department of Taxation, although it does rely upon 
provincial and district offices under its direction for enforcement and collection. 
Provinces that exceed taxation collection targets may, however, be able to keep some 
of the excess revenue generated in order to incentivize tax enforcement. (Rao et al 
1999). While the sub-national units of government are thus financially dependent on 
the national government, the provinces retain a lot of budgetary discretion: 
From those locally collected tax revenues and other income, the central 
government makes allocations to each province. As of the mid-1990s, “the 
bulk” of provincial governments’ budgets came from the central government. 
… Allocations from the national level are more or less fixed for three to five 
years through budget negotiations between provincial and central government 
offices. In the process, the central government attempts to moderate 
inequalities by redistributing tax income from better off provinces to poorer 
ones. Having received funding from the centre, provincial authorities are 
responsible for allocating it to province-wide programmes and to districts, 
which in turn give a portion to communes.  For this internal distribution, each 
province reportedly “has its own system.” (Kerkvliet 2004, p. 14). 
 
This funding model reinforces the primacy of the provincial level of government 
among the sub-national units, as it holds significant formal authority as compared to 
the less institutionalized district, hamlet, and ward levels.   
There are 22 ministries or executive agencies under the authority of the prime 
minister, who serves as the head of government. Many ministries have branches at the 
provincial and district level, so that the directives from the central government can be 
implemented through this vertical structure. The two most significant ministries for 
the purposes of water resources management are the Ministry of Natural Resources 
and the Environment (MONRE) and Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development 







DONRE and DARD, respectively.  The division of labor between these two 
ministries with respect to water resources management is clear on paper, albeit more 
complicated in practice.  
Ministry of Natural Resources and the Environment 
MONRE is “in charge of submitting the development strategies, master plans, 
long-term, five-year and annual plans, and national programmes and projects on 
water sector protection to the Prime Minister. Furthermore, MONRE has the 
responsibility to formulate master plans and plans on the management of, as well as 
measures for using, water resources for sustainable development and multipurpose 
uses, and the proactive prevention and control of the degradation and exhaustion of 
water sources.” (Nguyen 2010, p. 93).  Within this mandate, MONRE is responsible 
for monitoring and preparing for floods, droughts, or other adverse conditions related 
to the availability of water, and conducting scientific surveys and research in order to 
prepare for the efficient and rational use of water. The National Committee of the 
Mekong River Commission, discussed in more detail later in this chapter, is also 
situated within MONRE.  This ministry thus has the primary responsibility for 
national planning as well as international coordination of the water resources of the 
Mekong River delta. 
Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development 
MARD is responsible for “performing state management functions in the 
fields of agriculture, forestry, salt production, fishery, irrigation/water services and 







delivery of public service in accordance with legal documents,” (MARD website, 
n.d).  Included under the authority of MARD are five subdivisions, including the 
Department of Science, Technology and Environment; Department of Fisheries 
Resources Management; Department of Irrigation Management; the National Centre 
for Rural Water Supply and Environmental Sanitation, and the Department of Dykes, 
Flood and Storm Management.  The MARD is thus primarily responsible for ensuring 
that the land is cultivable and productive, that chemicals, fertilizers and other 
agricultural wastes are used according to legal provisions, and that water is 
distributed efficiently at the local level through irrigation systems in order to ensure 
agricultural productivity.  It is particularly interesting that irrigation/water services is 
situated in a separate ministry from national and international water use planning. 
Contrary to the IWRM framework discussed in Chapter 1, the segmented approach to 
the management of water resources within Vietnam seems to make an arbitrary 
distinction between water management at the local level and national/international 
water use planning.          
Other Related Ministries 
  While not specifically tasked with water resources management, the following 







MINSTRY MANDATE MINISTRY MANDATE 





Ministry of Health  Water standards and 
regulations (drinking 
and domestic water) 
Ministry of 
Construction  
Urban water supply 
and drainage; 
handling of urban 
wastewater 
Ministry of Transport Inland waterway 
navigation 
Ministry of Finance Allocation of state 
budgets 
Ministry of Planning 
and Investment 




Table 3.1 Ministries with Mandates that Overlap with Water Resources Management 
(Adapted from Nguyen 2010) 
 
There is thus considerable overlap, in practice, between the ministries formally tasked 
with aspects of water resources management, as well as ministries that only address 
water resources management in tangential ways.  In a governmental system in which 
policy directives typically come from the top down, this leads to a “stovepiped” 
approach to policy formulation and implementation in which problems are addressed 
outside of their wider context and communication across ministries is limited. A more 
effective approach to water resources management, as demonstrated by the IWRM 
paradigm described in Chapter 1, is an integrated approach that is responsive to local 
and cross-sectional realties.  The coordination of water resources management is thus 
a particular challenge within the institutional structures of the authoritarian state. 
Coordination is needed horizontally across ministries with overlapping mandates; 
horizontally between the authority structures of the Communist Party and the 
government; and vertically among the national-level ministries and their respective 







The Mekong River Commission 
Adding yet another layer of complexity to the coordination of water 
governance is the fact that the transboundary water resources require cooperation 
with the other riparian states.  In order to address this need for regional cooperation, 
the Mekong River Committee, the precursor to the current Mekong River 
Commission, was established in 1957 as the primary coordinating body for the 
management of the river’s resources.  Set up by statute under the auspices of the 
United Nations, at the time it was the single largest development project that the UN 
had attempted (MRC). Original members of the Committee included Vietnam, 
Thailand, Cambodia and Lao PDR. The Committee was established with the strong 
financial backing of the United States, which saw the economic development of the 
region through large-scale infrastructure projects, such as hydropower, as a way to 
prevent communism from gaining a stronger foothold in the region.  When this 
strategy proved unsuccessful, the United States terminated its financial support in 
1975 (Jacobs 2002).  An Interim Mekong Commission was established shortly 
thereafter without the participation of Cambodia, which by that time had been taken 
over by the Khmer Rouge regime.  When Cambodia sought to rejoin the river basin 
commission in 1992, a new debate over the structure, purpose and procedures of the 
organization commenced.     
The restructuring of the Mekong regime with Cambodia’s participation was a 
contentious process, although Cambodia’s membership was not the key point of 







original Mekong Committee served their current national interests, as the 1957 
Statute and the subsequent 1975 Join Declaration of Principles required committee 
approval of all diversion projects, including those on tributaries rather than the main 
stem. Thai officials did not want to give the other member states the right to veto their 
water projects, and proposed language that would call for a review of the original 
committee’s basic documents. The animosity between Thailand and Vietnam 
intensified when Thailand suggested that member states should meet with all of the 
basin states, including China. The Vietnamese officials feared that the Thais were 
looking for an ally in support of limited restraints on national development projects. 
(Browder 2000).  
By mid-1992 the Mekong regime was on the brink of collapse. Strategic 
maneuvering over protocol and representation had undermined the good faith 
of the parties. UNDP officials were alarmed at the turn of events. UNDP’s 
contribution to the Mekong regime over the years had totaled almost U.S. $50 
million (1992 dollars), representing the largest development program of the 
longest duration that the UNDP had ever supported.(Browder 2000, p. 248). 
 
The UNDP convened a reconciliation meeting in October 1992 and 
established a Mekong Working Group that would negotiate the terms of the 
restructured regime. The main topic of disagreement – MRC veto power over 
proposed water uses – was overcome when the Vietnamese negotiators suggested the 
phrase “prior consultation which aims at arriving at agreement.” Although the 
negotiation process continued through 1994, about a year behind schedule, this 
language was ultimately accepted to address the consultation issue in the final version 







The MRC has existed in its present form since 1995, when member states 
signed the Agreement on the Cooperation for the Sustainable Development of the 
Mekong River Basin. The vision of the MRC is to “bring about an economically 
prosperous, socially just and environmentally sound Mekong River Basin,” (MRC). 
The MRC is the sole organization in the region that is tasked with balancing the 
objectives of economic development with environmental preservation of the basin’s 
resources for future generations.  The authority of the organization rests with the 
member states themselves; it is no longer under the umbrella of the United Nations or 
any other organization. Vietnam is one of the four member countries of the MRC, 
along with Cambodia, Lao PDR and Thailand. Myanmar and China are also involved 
in the MRC as dialogue partners. Matthews and Motta (2013) are among the many 
scholars critical of China’s limited engagement as a dialogue partner; in this capacity, 
China is represented at major summits and annual meetings but is not constrained by 
any of the principles outlined in the 1995 Agreement: 
No formal agreements exist between China and downstream governments on 
the management of the Basin. China has ‘dialogue status’ with the Mekong 
River Commission (MRC), the main river basin organisation (RBO) in the 
region, with which it shares hydrological data from the Lancang, but it has so 
far declined the invitation to become a member. Notwithstanding China’s 
stance that the Lancang cascade is a national issue that it has generally been 
unwilling to discuss, it has continued to engage in hydropower development 
policy with downstream nations. The downstream governments have been 
reluctant to engage with China on the Lancang cascade’s impacts due to 
China’s relative military and political power and the country’s large 








The non-membership of China is a significant weakness of the MRC, not only 
because of its rapid upstream development that directly affects the river resources, but 
also because of its role as a major financier of projects in the Lower Mekong Basin.  
The organizational structure of the MRC consists of three principal organs: the MRC 
Council, the Joint Committee and the MRC Secretariat (See Figure 3.1). MRC 
Council members serve at the ministry or cabinet level in each of the four member 
countries, thus in the case of Vietnam the representative to the Council is the Minister 
of MONRE.  
The Council meets annually to discuss current issues with respect to 
management of the Lower Mekong Basin and to review compliance with the 1995 
agreement.  The Joint Committee meets twice annually, and is responsible for 
implementing decisions taken by the Council. The Joint Committee is composed of 
members holding a position within their home state of Head of Department or higher. 
In practice, this means that the member of the Joint Committee is the Secretary 
General of his or her country’s National Mekong Committee.  In Vietnam, this is a 
sub-unit located with the MONRE.  The third primary organ of the Mekong River 
Commission is the Secretariat, which carries out the day-to-day functions of the 
organization.  The Secretariat is led by a CEO and is responsible for providing 
technical and administrative support to the member states, as well as coordinating 








Figure 3.1 Mekong River Commission Governance Structure 
Source: Mekong River Commission  
 
The Secretariat is undergoing a transition period as the MRC works toward a 







budget of $20 million that mostly came from donor governments (MRC).20 The move 
towards financial self-sustainability has coincided with increasing frustration from 
donors that the member states are perceived to be going through the motions of 
cooperation over their development initiatives, without actually using the 
organization to reach basin-wide agreements.  The largest donor to the MRC, 
Denmark, had provided $86 million to the organization since 1995, but terminated its 
funding in 2015 following a critical review that identified wasteful spending and 
questioned the technical capacity of MRC staff to provide reliable scientific data 
about the effect of dams on agriculture and fisheries or long-term hydrological 
changes (Wright 2016).  Although the process to move toward financial self-
sufficiency was already underway, this withdrawal of donor funding has caused the 
process to speed up, with a new target date as early as 2020.    
The new structure of the MRC is intended to refocus the organization on the 
key functions of the river basin organization in accordance with the Roadmap of 
Decentralization and Reforms that was agreed to at the meeting of the MRC Council 
in June 2014.  Prior to 2015, the structure of the Secretariat consisted of 12 programs 
under four divisions: Environment, Planning, Technical Support and Operations, with 
offices in Vientiane and Phnom Penh (See Figure 3.2).  The organization also 
included three cross-cutting sections focused on Finance and Administration, 
International Cooperation and Communication, and Human Resources.  According to 
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the new structure approved in 2016, the Commission will retain a 4-part 
organizational structure, but will consolidate the cross-cutting sections within a new 
Administrative division, eliminating the Operations Division in which most of the 
MRC’s programmatic activities were housed (See Figure 3.3).  This more streamlined 
organization will move from a staff of 180 people to 90 during the transition period, 
ultimately arriving at a total of 50-60 professional and support staff once the 
transition is complete. These personnel cuts will be achieved in part by decentralizing 
projects that do not require coordination at the transboundary level or which are not 
supportive of the main principles of the 1995 Agreement (MRC). 
 
 








     
 
Figure 3.3 Post-Transition Organizational Structure of the MRC Secretariat 
 
A primary reason why donor support has waned for the river basin 
organization is the lack of progress over achieving cooperative agreements regarding 
exploitation of the river’s hydropower potential.  Within the 1995 agreement, the 
member states of the MRC agreed to five core procedures for the management of the 
river resources. The procedures are:  1) Procedures for Data Notification Exchange 
and Sharing; 2) Procedures for Water Use Monitoring; 3) Procedures for Notification, 
Prior Consultation, and Agreement (PNPCA); 4) Procedures for the Maintenance of 
Flows on the Mainstream, and 5) Procedures for Water Quality.  The PNPCA process 
has been especially contentious, because it sets up general principles for cooperation 







than the spirit of the agreement.  Article 5 of the 1995 Agreement stipulates that 
diversion projects on tributaries of the river shall be subject to notification of the Joint 
Committee, but establishes higher standards for cooperation for diversion projects 
planned for the main stem of the river. In this case, in addition to notification, the 
agreement calls for a consultation process that “aims at arriving at an agreement by 
the Joint Committee” (MRC 1995). An agreement is considered to be reached when 
there is a “decision of the Joint Committee resulting from prior consultation and 
evaluation on any proposed use for inter-basin diversions during the wet season from 
the mainstream as well as for intrabasin use or inter-basin diversions of these waters 
during the dry season” (MRC 1995).  This formulation has found to be lacking as Lao 
PDR in particular has gone through the motions of notifying the MRC of its 
mainstream hydropower projects and has considered that notification sufficient in 
meeting its responsibilities under the agreement, as reaching an agreement is not 
technically required under the language of the 1995 Agreement. As previously noted, 
the compromise language only requires “prior consultation which aims at arriving at 
agreement.” The other riparian states dispute this interpretation of the statute, arguing 
that the consultation processes have been insufficient and additional negotiations on 
planned hydropower projects should be carried out at the ministerial level.    
The Emergence of Civil Society in Vietnam 
There is some irony that in the case of transboundary cooperation 
authoritarian states such as Vietnam are disappointed with the consultative process, 







domestic level.  Nonetheless, over the past three decades the state has increasingly 
recognized the benefit of sharing the responsibility of collective goods provision with 
other actors outside of state institutions, thereby integrating them into the processes of 
governance.  Although the United States withdrew from Vietnam in 1973, the fall of 
Saigon two years later and subsequent unification did not usher in a period of peace. 
Vietnam soon found itself involved in a border conflict with neighboring Kampuchea, 
as the Khmer Rouge regime became suspicious of Vietnam’s regional ambitions 
following the US withdrawal. This led to a full-scale invasion by Vietnam in 1978, 
which was followed by a retaliatory attack by China in 1979.  The conflicts with 
Kampuchea and China continued to overextend the resources of the state, inhibiting 
its ability to shift to domestic priorities. 
The confluence of continued conflict, economic mismanagement, and 
unfortunate circumstances quickly proved ruinous to the economy.  In 1980, a series 
of typhoons destroyed 40 percent of the rice crop in the north (Kolko 1997).  While 
many scholars blame the centralized economy and collectivization of agriculture for 
the poor economic performance in the first half of the 1980s, there is some conflicting 
data regarding overall agricultural production during this period. Vietnam’s pro-
market leaders described the economic situation as calamitous, but official data, the 
accuracy of which is questionable, showed modest gains in both industrial production 
and agricultural output between 1980 and 1985 (Kolko 1997).  Kolko (1997) 
attributes the problems with the economy more to external factors, specifically the 







sector by the Communist regime. Regardless of the cause of the economic crisis, 
rising prices had destabilized the economy by 1985. In response to this crisis, Tan 
Phuong, the vice premier in charge of the economy, attempted currency reform that 
made the problem much worse: 
Retail prices between 1979 and 1985 rose consistently, nearly doubling in 
1982 alone, destabilizing the economy seriously.  In September 1985, Phuong 
and the reformers sought to reverse this pattern and organized a currency 
reform which produced a disastrous hyperinflation and far graver difficulties 
than at any time since 1979.  Prices over the next year increased at least 700 
percent and created a monumental crisis, and there was a disastrous decline in 
output of every sort. Phuong was fired in total disgrace but the damage had 
been done. (Kolko 1997 p. 27).  
 
While the causes of the economic crisis that wreaked havoc on the economy are 
multifaceted and the relative impact of the various causes is debated, this crisis led to 
increasing recognition among the Vietnamese elite that widespread political reform 
was needed.  
 The push for political and economic reform was controversial, however, not 
least of all because the Communist Party of Vietnam had been under the control of Lê 
Duẩn since 1960, the direct successor of Ho Chi Minh.  Lê Duẩn recognized that the 
economic crisis required reform, but the move toward a more market-oriented party 
was anathema to someone who had spent ten years of his young adulthood in colonial 
prisons for his political activity and who led the party throughout the most brutal 
years of the Vietnam War. Võ Văn Kiệt, who served as Prime Minster of Vietnam 
from 1991-1997, reflected on the ideological rigidity of Lê Duẩn, which was 








I understand that Brother Three [Le Duan] realized that what was taking place 
did not meet the requirements of the situation and needed to be changed. 
However, he was unable to transcend the framework of the economic model 
that enveloped the entire socialist camp. Although there were many questions 
raised by the social and economic difficulties, I never saw him formally set 
them out in front of the politburo or assign a group to research the 
fundamental essence of the problem which was that the centralized system of 
subsidies had been ‘revered’ [ton vinh] as one of the [basic] principles for 
many years. Thinking back over that period, any thoughts that were different 
from ‘approved official thinking’ [tu duy chinh thong] were subject to serious 
accusations. (Elliott 2012 p. 47) 
 
Lê Duẩn died in 1986, shortly before the 6th National Congress of the Communist 
Party.  While he is still revered by many as one of the top three Vietnamese leaders of 
the 20th century (along with Ho Chi Minh and Vo Nguyen Giap), his death 
symbolized and end to old-guard thinking and allowed for new blood to enter the 
party at a critical point in its evolution.   
 The 6th National Congress ushered in the period of Doi Moi reforms, which 
were aimed at strengthening the internal and external legitimacy of the government.  
The Doi Moi reform process marked Vietnam’s transition from a command economy 
to a “socialist-oriented market economy.”   Along with subsequent reforms that 
continued over the next 16 years, this process led to the creation of private enterprise 
and limited land use rights, as well as increasing inequality and marginalization of 
ethnic minorities.21  The economic growth that resulted from this transition to more 
market-based approaches was not spontaneous, but the beginning of some economic 
liberalization did have dramatic effects on the relationship between citizens and their 
                                                 
 
21 The initial reform effort led to declines in economic productivity.  Inflation in 1987 and 1988 
reached over 300 percent. Widespread famine in 1988 led to widespread food shortages, reaching 







state institutions, as well as the emergence of social groupings outside of the state 
apparatus.  First, the creation of the private sector led to the establishment of 
professional organizations.  Second, as the central government gave increasing 
autonomy to the provinces, this decentralization of power allowed for some 
community-based organizations to emerge.  Third, more international NGOs were 
permitted to operate in the country, arguably less because of the state’s newfound 
appreciation of political pluralism than for the attractive amount of foreign aid that 
came along with them. 
 It is for these dualistic instrumental reasons – the ability to help the state 
address social needs that it had been unable to ameliorate on its own, and drawing 
international financial resources into the country – that the state began to loosen its 
restrictions on civil society.  Prior to the Doi Moi political reform process, the rights 
of organizations to form and the rights of assembly were severely restricted, dating 
back to regulations enacted in 1957.  In 1992, the Ministry of Science, Technology 
and the Environment was given greater flexibility to authorize research organizations 
by giving them legal, registered status. Mark Sidel (2008) reports that:  
A number of urban voluntary organizations, including some of the most 
important policy research, social service, and social activist organizations then 
operating, were able to legalize under the 1992 Science and Technology 
Regulations and their successor, Decree 81 which now provides a protective 
regulatory umbrella for hundreds of science and technology research NGOs to 
exist. (np)  
 
By framing organizations that were providing services in line with state objectives as 







legal status ostensibly according to the organization’s mandate rather than whether its 
role was oppositional to state interests. 
 The legal status of the organizations that have emerged since the Doi Moi 
period has been determined ad hoc. The government approach has been to use legal 
decrees to provide authorization to groups that are not in conflict with government 
ambitions, and yet retain the political authority to restrict those that it finds 
threatening.  For example, the Freedom Forum, formed in the early 1990s by a 
foreign-trained attorney, was deemed unacceptable.  The group released several 
newsletters advocating for more rapid political reform.  The group was shut down in 
1992 and its leader, Doan Viet Hoat, as well as several of his colleagues, were 
sentenced to long prison terms (Sidel 1997).  On the other hand, the three main water 
management NGOs in Vietnam eventually gained their formal recognition under the 
1992 statute, becoming members of the Vietnam Union of Science and Technology 
Associations (VUSTA). In additional to environmental organizations, public health 
organizations are among those most likely to earn state approval as they can be 
recognized as “social relief establishments,” which have special recognition under 
Vietnamese law (Council on Foundations). Since the 1992 decree, additional draft 
laws have been considered that would streamline the cumbersome registration process 
and reduce some of the restrictions that limit participation in public affairs. The party 
and government have not allowed these proposals to go forward, showing the state is 
still protective of its ability to control organizations that may present a challenge to its 







Institutional Challenges to Achieving IWRM 
The authoritarian system in Vietnam – both the hierarchical formal structure 
and the limited political space for civil society – present challenges to the state’s 
effective management of its water resources. The complex process of water resources 
management necessitates a multisectoral and multilayered approach that accounts for 
the array of actors involved in its implementation.  In Chapter 1 of this dissertation, 
IWRM was described as  “a process which promotes the coordinated development 
and management of water, land and related resources in order to maximize economic 
and social welfare in an equitable manner without compromising the sustainability of 
vital ecosystems and the environment” (FAO et al., 2005). Put forward as an 
alternative to top-down, segmented management styles that have not proven 
successful, IWRM is intended to be a participatory mechanism that represents best 
practices for bringing together policy makers and change agents.  
Clearly, Vietnam and the other states in the Mekong River Basin have a long 
way to go before achieving the broad vision laid out by the IWRM process.  Rather 
than providing a forum through which cooperation over river basin management is 
strengthened, the underperformance of the Mekong River Commission has left its 
future in doubt.  Donor fatigue has set in as the consultative process for major 
development projects has failed to produce joint agreements, and even the process of 
consultation has been undermined by states appearing to not take the process 
seriously. The move toward financial self-sufficiency bodes well for the local 







its member states, but it will now need to meet its coordination objectives with a 
reduced portfolio, less funding, and a dramatically reduced staff. 
At the domestic level, water management in Vietnam remains very 
segmented, typical of authoritarian states that rely on a top-down policy apparatus. 
Primary responsibility for water resources management falls across two government 
ministries, and intersects with many others involved in administrative, budgetary and 
infrastructure capacities. While MARD has the primary responsibility for maintaining 
irrigation systems and making sure that water resources are provided for agriculture 
and aquaculture, this provincial use is artificially segmented from national-level water 
planning.  The National Mekong Committee is housed within MONRE, highlighting 
the distinction between local use and broader, systemic planning. In addition to this 
somewhat arbitrary division of labor across ministries, the relationship between the 
Communist Party and the government itself is complex, with coordination required 
between those two major bureaucracies as well as within them.  This dualistic system 
of party and government organs is replicated at each level of government, further 
producing a complex web of both vertical and horizontal lines of authority. 
In addition to these formal institutions involved in water resources 
management, participatory governance within Vietnam remains weak.   Vietnam has 
taken steps toward greater government accountability and burden-sharing with the 
civil society sector since the Doi Moi reform process began in 1986. Although the 
2013 Constitution reaffirmed the political control of the Communist Party, the public 







that directly challenged its authority the government might tolerate at least modest 
forms of dissent.  Nonetheless, Vietnam is a long way from a functioning democracy, 
as elections are not freely contested and citizens’ rights to speech and assembly are 
not formally protected in legal institutions, meaning that the state can reassert its use 
of repressive tactics should circumstances necessitate it.  On issues more politically 
sensitive than the constitutional reform process, the state still does use its discretion 
on when and where to repress its challengers.  
The complexity of informal and formal institutions of governance in Vietnam, 
as well as the state’s questionable tolerance of participatory processes, raises 
interesting questions for how it will move forward with the management of its natural 
resources. As the environmental crises in the Mekong delta continue to worsen, 
leading to increased calls for the state to protect its citizens’ collective goods, it 
remains to be seen whether the state will respond by engaging more holistically with 
internal and external stakeholders, or fall back on old methods of top-down decision-
making and/or repression of dissent. The next three chapters will analyze the strategic 
choices that the state makes in engaging with the various stakeholders involved in 
water resources management, focusing on the NGO sector, grassroots actors and 
transnational activists, and the state’s attempts to control these actors at the domestic 








Chapter 4: Cooperate, Repress, or … Both? The State and 
Environmental NGOs in Vietnam 
The Vietnamese state’s treatment of the emerging environmental NGOs in 
Hanoi has varied across groups and over time; the strategic choices that the state 
makes depend on its informational needs and other political objectives. Many 
environmental problems are marked by high levels of uncertainty and technical 
complexity, which leads to disagreements in interpreting evidence as well as over 
acceptable levels of risk. On the one hand, the NGOs are useful to the Vietnamese 
government because they provide the expertise needed to interpret data and to make 
policy recommendations. On the other hand, these NGOs have greater access to 
financial and technological resources that allow them to reach an audience beyond the 
state, and also have a greater awareness of the upstream-downstream cause-and-effect 
dynamics that the state wants to closely manage for its own geostrategic reasons.  
These tradeoffs have led to an inconsistent relationship between the state and the 
environmental NGOs, as the state has approached the groups for their guidance and 
expertise, as well as sanctioned these same organizations when they have 
disseminated information that conflicted with the state’s priorities.  This chapter will 
focus on this dynamic relationship in detail, exploring how the NGOs got their start in 
an authoritarian setting, what limits have been set by the state in how they are allowed 
to operate, and why the issue and actor characteristics are critical to understanding the 
strategic choices of the authoritarian state.  The analysis will show that the state does 







the Repression-Encouragement spectrum (See Chapter 1), taking into account 
whether the issue at hand threatens its control over domestic actors or its management 
of transnational issues.   
The Emergence of Environmental NGOs in Vietnam 
The Doi Moi reform process, or the transition to a socialist-oriented market 
economy, brought about political as well as economic transformation.22 This process 
of political reform created a new space for the emergence of domestic advocacy 
organizations, but this softening of the state’s position toward NGOs did not 
necessarily reflect a growing tolerance for political expression. Rather, the state 
encouraged the emergence of organizations that could help address social needs that 
the state had been unable to ameliorate on its own (Sidel 2008). In addition, local 
organizations are attractive partners for INGOs and donor countries that want to fund 
multi-stakeholder initiatives, so the state recognized the value of these organizations 
in drawing financial resources into the country (Gray 1999).  For these instrumental 
reasons, the Vietnamese state began to formally authorize the existence of various 
NGOs after the Doi Moi political reform process began in 1986. Although few in 
number, the environmental NGOs that emerged during this period came in response 
to increasing awareness about the impacts of climate change, upstream development 
and population growth (Fabres 2011). In contrast to organizations focusing on more 
politically sensitive issues, such as corruption, HIV/AIDS or human trafficking, 
                                                 
 







NGOs focusing on environmental issues were authorized because of their utility in 
addressing well-known functional problems without directly undermining the 
authority of the state (Thayer 2009; Wischermann 2003).  
Interviews with the leaders of environmental NGOs in Vietnam reveal that 
even for organizations operating in this relatively “safe” policy area, the state still 
carefully controls the dissemination of information when it overlaps with politically 
sensitive issues. These NGO leaders report that government officials have restricted 
the content of what can be published in the media and have sanctioned the 
organizations for disseminating information without state authorization.  Nonetheless, 
each of the three NGOs also report frequent and often cooperative communication 
between the organization and government officials. Thus while the emergent NGO 
sector is not fully free to operate without restrictions, there are individuals and 
organizations that challenge the state, provide technical expertise, and generate 
attention to issues of concern, performing the same types of functions that NGOs in 
more open societies do. These organizations thus operate in a space that lies 
somewhere in between the extremes of being independent from or blocked by the 
state, and in fact depending on the specific issue area and political climate, the 
strategy of the state toward the NGO can vacillate along this spectrum of political 
independence.    
The emergence of NGOs in Vietnam that do find ways to confront the state is 
an interesting phenomenon that the academic literature is still attempting to explain. It 







boomerang model developed by Keck and Sikkink (1998), a classic model of NGO 
strategy in authoritarian settings. (See Figure 4.1). The boomerang model depicts 
blockage between the NGOs and the authoritarian state, which is unresponsive to 
direct pressure. The NGOs thus network with INGOs to pressure their target state 
from the outside. Given the state’s interests at the international level, this can be an 
effective way to generate pressure on the state to obtain concessions on an otherwise 
domestic issue. This model shows that there are strategies available to political 
activists despite constraints upon freedom of speech and assembly; these constraints 
simply shift the strategies available to them and highlight the importance of linkages 
with external actors.  Vietnamese NGOs also incorporate strategies that rely on 
external actors to advance their interests, but the relationship with the state is more 
nuanced than this model of authoritarian state-civil society relations depicts, which is 









Figure 4.1: Boomerang Model with Adaptation of NGO Communication 
Source: Adapted from Keck and Sikkink (1998). Author’s adaptations in red. 
The adapted model shows NGO-state relations under authoritarianism, and the two-way information 
flow between local and transnational NGOs. 
 
Rather than depicting Vietnamese NGOs as blocked and dependent upon 
outside actors for political influence, these organizations increasingly operate 
independently and can directly challenge the state, even in an authoritarian setting 
where their right to expression is not guaranteed.  In one case described later in the 
chapter, an NGO that had been sanctioned for publishing information successfully 
challenged the legality of the government’s penalty, indicating that even the 
government is bound by the rule of law in how and what material it can censor, even 







to the state. Thus communication between the state and the NGOs may at times be 
adversarial, but the frequency of communication, as well as the often cooperative 
working relationship, indicates that this pathway is complex and dynamic rather than 
blocked, as indicated by the author’s addition to Figure 4.1.  
The Water Management NGOs in Vietnam 
A critical first step to understanding the relationship between the authoritarian 
state and NGOs is identifying when, where and how these organizations emerged. 
Interestingly, mapping out the origins of each of the water management NGOs 
reveals that each of the founders obtained direct or indirect capacity building through 
prior experience with international NGOs, what I call the “boomerang in reverse,” as 
depicted by the addition to the Boomerang Model in Figure 4.1 that shows a 2-way 
relationship between domestic and international NGOs.  Each NGO was established 
through a process of isomorphism, where the Vietnamese nationals who founded each 
organization transferred the model of the international NGO to the domestic context. 
The leadership of these NGOs is therefore composed of the highly educated 
Vietnamese elite who have access to information as well as exposure to and training 
from Western models of political activism. While not specifically representing 
foreign or elite interests, these NGOs also have limited representation from the truly 
local, grassroots delta residents on whose behalf they are working. This is critical to 
understanding the limitations of the emergent NGOs in Vietnam, as they purport to 
represent the interests of the downstream local stakeholders despite having little 







Although the emergent NGOs in Vietnam are typically led by the well-
educated elite, the capacity of the staff of the organizations is not typically very 
advanced compared to their INGO counterparts. On average, less than half of the total 
staff holds a bachelor’s degree (Taylor et al, 2012). Because of the dependence of 
these organizations on donor funding that is tied to projects, the financial resources 
for training can be limited.  
The majority of CSO staff are young and inexperienced. The leadership of 
most organizations surveyed stated that capacity building for their staff is a 
key concern. In Hanoi, more than 90 percent of the surveyed organizations 
send their staff to external training, although only 36 percent have a staff 
training budget. In HCMC, about 50 percent of the organizations invest their 
own budgets in staff capacity building. Interviewees commented that they 
struggle to allocate funds for capacity building since most of their budget is 
tied to specific project activities by donors. They are also under very strong 
pressure to cover salaries and overhead, leaving little flexibility. (Taylor et al., 
2012 p. 7.) 
 
Taylor and co-authors note that the organizations seek training opportunities that are 
provided by international partners at little or no cost to the local NGO. A key obstacle 
to strengthening the capacity of local NGOs in Vietnam is that staff turnover is high, 
which is attributed to the allure of the high salaries and benefits offered by INGOs 
(Taylor et al., 2012).  
These local NGOs play a critical role in bringing to national attention the 
social and environmental impacts of various water management schemes, but have a 
limited ability to mobilize grassroots activism and some efforts by them to do so have 
been blocked by the state. The modifications of Figure 4.1 thus show a more accurate 
picture of NGO operations in Vietnam since it includes direct contact with the 







“NGOs” are explicitly those formally recognized by the state and not grassroots or 
community-based organizations.23  This section will highlight in greater detail the 
emergence of each of these new professional civil society actors within Vietnam, and 
explore to what extent each organization has established a cooperative relationship 
with the state.  
There are only three local NGOs in Vietnam (excluding INGOs) that focus on 
the area of transboundary water governance: the Center for Water Resources 
Conservation and Development (WARECOD), GreenID and PanNature.24 Each of 
these organizations is based in the capital city of Hanoi, which reflects their primary 
role as research and policy-oriented organizations, as opposed to community-based 
advocacy organizations, which still do not exist in the Mekong delta.25 Because these 
groups represent an incipient civil society presence in Hanoi, it is critical to 
understand how they got started and obtained legal status, and what their current 
relationship with this state is. Since there are so few water management NGOs, it is 
possible to trace this process in detail for each organization.  
WARECOD: The oldest of the three NGOs, WARECOD “is a Vietnamese non-profit 
organization whose goal is to promote the sustainable use of Vietnam’s water 
                                                 
 
23 The participation of local stakeholders in the governance of the Mekong River water resources is the 
focus of Chapter 5. 
24 Only environmental organizations that have a dominant focus on transboundary water management 
are included in this study. Other environmental organizations, e.g., those with parochial mandates, do 
not fit within the scope of the case study on the state’s strategic choices with respect to transboundary 
water management. Nonetheless, these organizations could be an interesting source of data within an 
expanded research design on state-NGO relations (See Chapter 7 on future research trajectories). 
25 As discussed in Chapter 3, these organizations are formally recognized by the state as members of 







resources and gender equality in resource use and management.” 
(http://www.warecod.org.vn/) The founder of WARECOD is Nga Dao, who as of 
2017 still serves as the executive director while splitting her time as a research 
associate at York University in Canada. In 2003, Nga worked for International 
Rivers, a Berkeley-based non-profit organization that has a presence on four 
continents, focusing mainly on grassroots activism in Latin America, Africa and Asia 
(https://www.internationalrivers.org/). The Mekong River is the main focus of 
International Rivers’ Southeast Asia program, drawing attention to hydropower 
projects on the Upper Mekong in China as well as dams planned for tributaries within 
the region. At the time Nga was a consultant for the International Rivers’ Vietnam 
program, and because there were no NGOs working on water or river issues in 
Vietnam, she suggested setting up a network or forum to draw the Vietnamese 
people’s attention to some of the issues surrounding water resources management. 
She did organize a successful workshop that included members from the relevant 
government ministries in Vietnam, but the participants resisted continued 
participation in a “network” that did not have legal recognition. (In Vietnam, 
“networks” need to be housed under a single organization that has been recognized by 
the state.) After being turned away from several organizations, in 2005 Nga finally 
found an organization that was willing to house this network, the Ecological 
Economy Institute (Eco-Eco), which had been founded by scientists as a point of 
coordination among the various government ministries, and Vietnam Rivers Network 







of the network, Nga and a colleague decided it would be easier to set up their own 
NGO to house VRN. This was the motivation for the establishment of WARECOD, 
which was legally recognized by the Vietnam Union of Science and Technology 
Associations (VUSTA) in 2006, and the first organization registered by VUSTA 
working on water and river issues. VRN also remains as an active open forum, 
although the organization housing VRN now rotates on a 3-year schedule between 
WARECOD (in the north of Vietnam) and two research centers, the Centre for Social 
Research and Development (CSRD) in the middle of the country, and the Centre for 
Biodiversity and Development (CBD), which is based in the South.26 VRN still has 
no legally recognized status as an independent organization in Vietnam. 
 The original purpose of WARECOD was to serve as the host of VRN (Yasuda 
2015). However, management of this network is now listed as only one of the five 
main strategies that the organization uses to accomplish its mission of protecting 
Vietnam’s water resources. The other strategies listed on its website are: 1) 
Promoting an effective river basin approach in the Gam River basin; 2) community 
demonstration projects; 3) community empowerment, and 4) advocacy. As of 2016, 
WARECOD had two Directors (Nga Dao and another full-time director), and a staff 
                                                 
 
26 CSRD is also classified as an NGO as it is self-funded. However, as it has a broad mandate focused 
on social justice and poverty reduction that is not specific to water resources management, it is 
excluded from detailed exploration in this study (See footnote 3 in this chapter). However, the reverse 
boomerang effect applies to this organization as well. The founder of CSRD, Lam Thi Thu Suu, has 
received training and support from Western organizations including as a Fulbright Visiting Scholar and 
with a Bellagio Center Residency Award from the Rockefeller Foundation.  CBD is a unit within the 
Southern Institute of Ecology, a government research institute under the Ministry of Science and 







of nine, including two employees dedicated to working on VRN. The organization did 
not release detailed budgetary information, but the international and Vietnamese 
partners that are listed on WARECOD’s website are listed in Appendix 2. 
GreenID: The Green Innovation and Development Center (GreenID) “promotes an 
inclusive approach to sustainable development in Vietnam and the larger Mekong 
region, with a particular focus on the role of the energy sector and its environmental 
impact.” A primary focus of the organization is thus work related to advocacy of 
communities affected by hydropower development along the Mekong River. Its stated 
mission is to “achieve fundamental change in the approach to sustainable 
development by promoting sustainable energy sources, improved water resources 
management and inclusive decision processes.” (http://en.greenidvietnam.org.vn/) 
The founder and current executive director of GreenID is Nguy Thi Khanh. She has 
worked in advocacy related to environmental governance and sustainable energy 
development since 2000. From 2008 to 2011, she served as the coordinator for 
Vietnam Rivers Network (VRN), where she gained additional experience working 
with the network that had been established by Nga Dao. During that time, she realized 
that despite increased attention focused on environmental issues related to the 
Mekong River, there still was not an organization in Vietnam that was focused on the 
energy sector, promoting sustainable energy solutions and participatory processes. 
She established GreenID to fill this void, and the organization now has a three-part 
mission: providing research and policy recommendations; community-level 







recognized as a member of VUSTA in 2011. GreenID has expanded to include, in 
addition to the four founding board members, approximately 12 permanent staff and 6 
expert researchers that serve as associate members.  The donors and partners listed on 
GreenID’s website are listed in Appendix 2, although detailed budgetary information 
is not available.     
PanNature: People and Nature Reconciliation, or PanNature, 
(http://www.nature.org.vn/en/) is “dedicated to protecting and conserving diversity of 
life and improving human well-being in Vietnam by seeking, promoting and 
implementing feasible, nature-friendly solutions to important environmental problems 
and sustainable development issues.” The specific goals listed on the main page of 
their website include providing good governance of natural resources, public 
awareness, and fostering participation and transparency of public policies.  PanNature 
was established as a collaborative effort by a group of five individuals, each of whom 
held positions in either an international NGO or were working as local consultants on 
an international project. Of the three founders who remain on the staff as members of 
the management board, the current executive director came from a position with 
Fauna and Flora International (FFI), which operates in over 40 countries.  The 
Program Director for Policy and Education was working with the World Wildlife 
Fund (WWF), where he had previously held the position of senior environmental 
education program officer of WWF Indochina. The final member of the PanNature 
management board, the Program Director for Field Programs, had been a researcher 







overseen by FFI, before joining PanNature. One PanNature staff member discusses 
his experience working for an international NGO, and how the founding members 
decided to open their own NGO in Vietnam:  
For a number of years, we see that a lot of money [the INGOs] spent for 
nothing. Useless. We say, ok, we are Vietnamese. We can find some way to 
do better. So we, I think in early 2005 we discussed and set up the group. And 
then we get official registration to be an organization in January 2006. So now 
almost 7 years later … and we are still committed to working together. 
 
The founder thus each received training provided by Western NGOs, but aspired to 
use the funding that INGOs could collect more efficiently in their home country.  
This led to the creation of PanNature, which was successfully registered as a member 
of VUSTA in 2006.  In addition to its three-person management board, PanNature has 
a staff of about 25 employees, working in the divisions of Office and Administration; 
Finance and Accounting; Communication; Policy; and Resource Governance. The 
communications department is the largest division with nine employees, reflecting the 
important role that the organization places on information dissemination via its 
website. Budgetary information is not available from PanNature, but the donors and 
partners that are named on its website are listed in the appendix. 
 The founders of the three existing water management NGOs in Vietnam each 
thus benefitted, indirectly or directly, from earlier capacity building experience in 
INGOs (See Figure 4.2). Nga Dao’s creation of WARECOD was a direct result of her 
position with International Rivers and her responsibilities then to bring greater 
awareness of the environmental issues surrounding river management to the 







founders who did not have direct work experience in an INGO, but her idea to 
establish GreenID was a result of serving as a protégé to Nga Dao, coordinating the 
network that she had created under the newly formed WARECOD. Through this 
experience, she learned both about the vacuum that existed in Vietnam at the time for 
organizations focused on sustainable energy, and she also gained practical experience 
and contacts from Nga Dao on how to set up a local NGO thorough VUSTA. Finally, 
the team that created PanNature did so following work experiences with WWF and 
FFI. They came together recognizing their ability as local citizens to best understand 
the environmental needs of Vietnam as well as its political processes, and created 
PanNature with the intention of being able to most efficiently use the financing from 
donor agencies to practically address Vietnam’s environmental problems.   
 









All of the Vietnamese environmental NGOs were only formally recognized by 
VUSTA within the past 11 years, so the political space for them to operate is still new 
and evolving. Leaders of each of the NGOs confirmed that they interact directly with 
government officials, including members of the Vietnamese national committee to the 
Mekong River Commission (MRC), the regional intergovernmental organization that 
is dedicated to the management of the river resources.27 However, the perceived 
effectiveness of this communication was not uniform across the three groups. One 
interview subject emphasized that the communication between the NGO and 
government officials was perceived as mutually beneficial: the group was able to 
advocate directly, but the government also requested their consultation on policy 
documents and political developments, recognizing the group’s technical expertise.  
Other groups reported that the relationship was inconsistent and at times contentious, 
and that the nature of the relationship varied according to political developments. One 
subject who was frustrated with the government’s position gave this example of the 
relationship: “Even the Vietnamese government, one day they will say okay, you 
know NGOs, ‘Okay, what’s your opinion? We will use it’. And they allow us to talk 
there [about the Xayaburi Dam]. And then once we start talking about the impact on 
people, organizing, they say ‘No, stop.’”  In this case, the government reportedly 
limited the extent to which the press could report on a workshop held to discuss the 
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impacts of the controversial Xayaburi Dam that was being constructed in Lao PDR, 
because the government wanted to carefully manage any opposition to the dam that 
might exacerbate other geopolitical tensions in the region.  
Managing Information on Transboundary Issues (Issue Independence) 
The state’s sensitivity with respect to the reporting of the potential impacts of 
the Xayaburi Dam is not unusual; each of the three NGOs experienced censorship of 
material related to Mekong River hydropower development. (See Appendix 1.) 
Although the rationale for this censorship was not directly confirmed in interviews 
with government officials, the pattern and timing of these media restrictions indicate 
that the government was protecting its relations with neighboring Lao PDR, the site 
of the most controversial projects in the region – the Xayaburi Dam and the Don 
Sahong Dam, which are both now under construction. As detailed in Chapter 2, the 
interstate relations between Vietnam and Lao PDR are complex, as Vietnam must 
balance its interests with respect to hydropower development against its concerns 
about losing influence to China, a primary financier of these projects. 
The importance of its foreign relations with Lao PDR on the Vietnamese 
state’s interactions with environmental NGOs is evident from how key international 
events overlay with a shift in strategy. One NGO noted the difference in how the 
government responded to its work between 2011 and 2012, which was celebrated as 
the Vietnam-Lao PDR Solidarity and Friendship Year in recognition of 50 years of 
diplomatic ties and 35 years since the signing of a treaty of friendship and 







Minister of Vietnam on the impacts of the Xayaburi Dam, stating that the 
Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) completed by Lao PDR as part of its 
obligations under the Mekong River Commission’s Procedures for Notification, Prior 
Consultation and Agreement (PNPCA) process was substandard and insufficiently 
accounted for the downstream impacts on communities, fish stock levels, and saline 
intrusion downstream of the dam. The NGO reported that every major newspaper in 
Vietnam published its position, which is particularly notable given that Freedom 
House (2016) ranks Vietnam as having one of the harshest media environments in 
Asia.28 The following day the VNMC released a strong statement critical of the EIA 
that relied heavily on the NGO’s analysis. The VNMC reply statement to the EIA did 
not mince words in its response to Lao PDR, stating: 
Maybe because it was the first ever proposed use for a mainstream project, the 
associated Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) study carried out by the 
project’s developer was … inadequate, lacking appropriate and comprehensive 
assessments of the trans-boundary and cumulative impacts that the project may 
cause to the downstream, especially the Mekong Delta in Viet Nam. Though 
standard mitigation measures were mentioned in the project design … it was 
felt, nevertheless, that there was insufficient evidence that those measures 
would help mitigate the negative impacts of the project in reality. (VNMC 
2011). 
 
In addition, the VNMC statement called for a 10-year moratorium on the project in 
order to have time to better anticipate the environmental effects of the dam. Leaders 
                                                 
 
28 Although the constitution nominally recognizes the freedom of expression, speech that is critical of 
the government is prohibited. The language used to define such speech is broadly worded, allowing the 
state widespread authority to make criminal arrests under the guise of anti-government speech. 
Freedom House notes that the CPV, government institutions, or the army own or control almost all of 
Vietnam’s 850 print media outlets. In 2016, Vietnam updated its media laws, requiring journalists to 
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of the NGO claimed that they received praise for their statement from government 
officials and other water management experts, indicative of a synchronous 
relationship between the government and civil society actors at the time in both the 
content and delivery of their statement. 
 This contrasted sharply with the reception of the organization’s second letter 
in 2012, which media outlets were not permitted to publish. Although the content of 
the letter was similar to the April 2011 version and was written in response to the 
discovery that Lao PDR was not honoring its commitment to postpone construction 
that had been reached at the MRC Council Meeting in December 2011, the 
government’s restrictions indicated an unwillingness to so publicly criticize Lao PDR 
only one year later. As part of the 2012 Vietnam-Lao PDR Solidarity and Friendship 
Year, Vietnam and Lao PDR not only agreed to have more substantive and effective 
political cooperation, but the Vice President of Lao PDR announced that he wanted 
two-way trade with Vietnam to reach $2 billion by 2015 when his ceremonial 
delegation visited Vietnam. He also announced that Lao PDR would “continue to 
create favourable conditions for Vietnamese businesses to conduct business in Laos” 
(Viet Nam News 2012). This economic relationship is very important to the 
Vietnamese government, and maintaining a favorable investment climate may have 
influenced the decision to temper its rhetoric on the Xayaburi Dam. China also has 
sought economic influence in Lao PDR, and at the beginning of 2014 unseated 
Vietnam as the country’s largest investor with $5.1 billion in cumulative investment, 







Asia, the secretariat of the Vietnamese Communist Party communicated to its Laotian 
counterparts that it “feels threatened” by foreign investment competition from China 
and Thailand and its increasingly marginalized influence in Lao PDR (Vandenbrink 
2013). Thus although Vietnam likely remained concerned about the impacts of the 
Xayaburi Dam, given the political celebrations and increased economic competition 
from its regional neighbors, it no longer sought to highlight its differences with Lao 
PDR through public media outlets. As one NGO leader stated in an interview, “They 
are very scared of something ruining the relationship between the two countries. If 
Laos turned their back to Vietnam, they would hug China, and that’s a bigger issue.” 
Leaders from the NGO that wrote the two position papers on the Xayaburi Dam did, 
however, note that the government had asked for a confidential analysis of the 
developments in Lao PDR, indicating that it did still rely on the organization for its 
valuable analysis even when it did not want that analysis to be disseminated more 
widely.    
Another NGO reported a similar dynamic in its relations with the Vietnamese 
government of private cooperation and public repression on issues related to 
transboundary water resources management.  This NGO attempted to bypass 
government censorship by publishing its research in media other than state-controlled 
domestic newspapers. According to one NGO leader, after one newspaper told the 
NGO it could not publish on the Mekong hydropower issue because of the 2012 







newspapers and radio to get its message out.29  The NGO also tried to publish its own 
online newspaper with daily updates, but received its first punitive fine for doing so 
in 2011. For a while the NGO ceased online publication, but eventually switched the 
format of its online reporting to “research reports” and “policy briefs.”  In 2012, the 
NGO was fined by the government again for its online publications, but instead of 
paying the fine they hired a lawyer.  The NGO argued that because it was established 
under the science and technology law (under the umbrella of VUSTA), it was not 
required to conform to the state’s newspaper law and is authorized to publish 
scientific and technical information. The NGO and the Ministry of Information 
eventually reached a compromise, whereby the NGO would “accept its 
responsibility” but the assessed fine would be waived. The NGO has also sought 
permission from the government to publish its own newspaper, but as of the date of 
the interview had not yet received an official response. 
Although the government has repeatedly punished the NGO for its 
dissemination of information, the NGO has also provided the government with 
sensitive information about upstream developments that it obtained illegally from 
NGO staff who entered Lao PDR as tourists.  The MRC consultation process for the 
Xayaburi Dam had begun in 2010, but by April 2011 the MRC Joint Committee 
decided to table further consideration of the process until the ministerial meeting later 
that year. However, by June it had been reported that Lao PDR had authorized the 
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developer, Thailand’s CH. Karnchang Public Company, to continue work on the 
project. The perceived subversion of the MRC PNPCA process was a source of great 
tension among the MRC countries, with Cambodia even threatening to take Lao PDR 
to “international court” if it failed to abide by the agreements made at the MRC 
(Vandenbrink 2012). Amongst this turmoil, one NGO member reported doing the 
following: 
I and my colleagues we came to visit Xayaburi dam site two years ago. It’s very 
interesting, because the Karnchang Public Company Investment company they 
even hired lots of Thai people as a guard. But we played as tourist. We [found] 
access to the dam site. And then we move up to the river. We hire a boat. We 
wait until the nighttime. Took the boat down to the dam site. Took some picture, 
photo, movie, video of the dam. And the next time we came to see [an INGO] 
back in Lao in the daytime. But they were totally scared. They said, “Oh shush! 
Don’t tell us!” So we did it [circulated the information] ourselves. And after 
that we came back to Vietnam and we have a lot of information to share with 
the government, media, NGOs. So I think that we are very active. 
[The name of the INGO in Lao PDR is redacted.]              
  
Thus even though the NGO was being fined by the government for publishing 
information about the impacts of upstream hydropower projects, it was at 
approximately the same time providing the government with sensitive information 
about these projects that the Lao PDR government and the Thai developers had been 
attempting to conceal. 
Each of the three water management NGOs in Hanoi has fairly wide operating 
space considering the authoritarian context in which they are working. They do need 
to go through cumbersome approval processes with local authorities for their projects, 
but they are able to maintain their own websites, collaborate with international media, 







pattern emerges of a more adversarial relationship between the state and NGOs when 
it comes to publicly disseminating information on transboundary developments that 
might create challenges for the state’s foreign relations.  Each NGO faced media 
restrictions on its reporting, especially during the 2012 Vietnam-Lao PDR friendship 
year. The NGO that tried to circumvent these restrictions was punished twice, 
although the second fine was waived following a legal challenge. It is interesting to 
note, however, that the government’s repression was targeted on these organizations’ 
public reporting, and not other operations of the NGO. Given that the organizations 
were simultaneously providing the government with information and analysis, the 
dynamic of this relation is a complex one where the state attempts to balance the 
value that the NGOs provide with its ability to control the public messaging to limit 
the potential impact on its foreign relations.  
Limiting Direct Advocacy (Mobilizing Capacity) 
In addition to transboundary relations, interviews with the Vietnamese NGOs 
revealed that the state restricted the organizations’ activities when they attempted to 
conduct projects at the grassroots level. The local NGOs have made limited attempts 
to engage with local stakeholders in the delta to carry out advocacy capacity-building 
projects and to educate delta residents about upstream developments. However, the 
NGOs must get permission from the provincial authorities where they are going to 
conduct a project, which adds another layer of bureaucracy and a potential political 
obstacle to working with local stakeholders. Project organizers have been met with 







local stakeholders. There is thus still a disconnect between local stakeholders and the 
NGOs that purport to represent them, and multiple levels of the government have 
limited the opportunity for the NGOs to strengthen any potential grassroots 
mobilization. The actions of the various government officials seem to indicate that the 
state benefits from working with the NGOs directly, but does not want the NGOs to 
coordinate with or empower other actors within the state who could potentially 
challenge it. 
WARECOD sought to strengthen environmental knowledge and advocacy 
capacity-building by implementing Thai Baan projects in two delta provinces. Thai 
Baan research projects are a form of participatory rural appraisal, where a 
representative group of members of the community are trained to conduct research on 
a topic of their choice related to the environment or public health. The goal of Thai 
Baan research is to turn these participants into local researchers for the benefit of their 
communities. (“Baan” means home or village in Thai.) This approach to research was 
started in 2000 when the Thai government agreed to open the sluice gates of the Pak 
Mun Dam to evaluate the social and economic impacts of the operation of the dam. 
The villagers’ research was submitted to the Thai government alongside the research 
from academic institutions in order to ensure that the local knowledge and social 
reality of the affected people was accurately represented  (LRSA website). 
Attempting to adopt this grassroots approach to environmental advocacy, 
WARECOD initiated Thai Baan research projects in An Giang and Dong Thap 







went well in An Giang province, which is considered to be the most permissive of the 
delta provinces in terms of approving research activity. One NGO official reported 
that the province approved the project without much difficulty and attributed this to 
the organization already having strong connections at An Giang University. The 
presence of the university means that researchers and provincial officials have more 
regularized contact, and the provincial officials may have more readily approved a 
project that was supported by provincial residents who were known to them and who 
they trusted to participate in the project.  
 
Figure 4.3 Map of Mekong Delta Provinces  








The Thai Baan research did not go as smoothly in Dong Thap. From the 
beginning, it was difficult to achieve the necessary government permissions to 
conduct the project, which must be separately obtained in each of the provinces where 
the research is to be carried out. In addition, the sensitivities of the government to 
dialogue about transboundary impacts were evident even in the approval process, as 
research about change in the water levels needed to be referred to as “investigating 
the impacts of climate change” rather than the effects of upstream development. 
Although residents were permitted to document water quality and quantity changes, 
any phrasing that had implications for transnational relations was not approved. Even 
after the project began, the local authorities remained nervous about the motivations 
of the research and eventually intervened. The project participants in Dong Thap were 
summoned to the police station and the cameras that had been given to them to 
document their findings were confiscated. The provincial authorities also reported 
WARECOD to the Ministry of the Interior, so the police in Hanoi visited the 
WARECOD office in Hanoi and informed the NGO that they were researching issues 
that they were not given permission to address. At this time the project in Dong Thap 
was put on hold, and eventually the project was canceled when the project donor 
allowed the funds to be redirected elsewhere. This experience revealed that projects 
that are designed to involve local stakeholders and build their capacity to understand 
environmental impacts and advocate for their own interests can still be viewed with 







been a setback for local stakeholders in Dong Thap to try to undertake these types of 
capacity-building projects in the future, fearing further intimidation by the local 
authorities.       
Managing Foreign Influence (External Strategic Value) 
While the government of Vietnam has resisted attempts by environmental 
organizations to engage in capacity building or influence its foreign policy objectives, 
it has attempted to do so while trying to maintain the inflow of foreign capital that 
these organizations provide.  The Doi Moi reform process loosened restrictions on 
organizations that could assist the state in the provision of collective goods, and 
foreign assistance facilitates their ability to successfully assume this role.  
Simultaneously, these organizations are attractive partners for foreign donors who 
wish to bypass the state and strengthen the third sector as part of a broader strategy of 
improving governance and accountability. 
It is difficult to identify the precise amount of aid flowing from external 
sources to GreenID, PanNature and WARECOD. Financial reports are not publicly 
available (although these organizations are required to report foreign donations to the 
Vietnamese government). Interview subjects also did not provide detailed information 
on the organizations’ funding, although representatives of each organization 
confirmed that foreign partners are a primary source of financial resources.  Each 
organization also publicly lists foreign governments, INGOs, and even multinational 
corporations as its key donors on their websites.  GreenID lists 26 donors on its 







(SIDA) and the government of the United States. WARECOD lists 24 international 
donors including SIDA, and PanNature lists 23 donors including USAID, the World 
Bank and the European Commission.  A complete list of reported donors of each 
organization is provided in Annex 1.  The Asian Development Bank (2011) reports 
that in 2009, international NGOs brought about $260 million to Vietnam, and that 
local NGOs reported that their main funding sources are service fees, foreign funding, 
the government and private sources.   
While the government of Vietnam has welcomed overseas development 
assistance, it has also attempted to retain tight control over organizations that receive 
this external assistance.  The position of the Communist Party of Vietnam was 
articulated in Nhân Dân, a daily publication that serves as the mouthpiece of the 
party, regarding INGO-VNGO relations: 
The realities in recent years have indicated that a number of INGOs are keenly 
interested in political-social organizations in our country and have attempted 
to infiltrate, influence, and transform those organizations toward political 
activity in the absence of oppositional groups. By means of such activities as 
implementing projects, supporting, financing, and holding workshops and 
conferences with VNGOs, a number of foreign organizations have tried to 
grasp the internal understanding and viewpoint trend of VNGOs on the party’s 
leadership over popular organizations, provoke their separatism from the 
leadership by the party and state, and advocate the freedom to association in 
the Western standard. (tr. Bui 2015, n.p) 
 
Party officials thus realize that the policy objective behind international support to 
Vietnamese NGOs extends beyond direct support to the projects, with a key objective 
being to strengthen the civil society sector.30  Furthermore, the state must balance its 
                                                 
 







desire for external support for the projects with its resistance to the broader objectives 
of external donors.  In 2010, the government issued a new Decree on the 
Organization, Operation and Management of Associations (Decree 45), which placed 
additional restrictions on local and foreign NGOs. In addition to financial disclosures 
and other reporting requirements, the decree uses expansive language to identify 
noncompliant organizations. Under Article 24 of Decree 45, organizations must not 
“abuse its activities to harm national security, social order, ethics and national fine 
customs, practices and traditions, and legitimate rights and interests of organizations 
and individuals.”  The new decree thus makes clear that the state tolerates the services 
provided by local NGOs and their international partners, but at the same time remains 
in control of the emergent civil society sector through its formal power to restrict any 
organization that challenges its authority.  
Civil Society in the Vietnamese Context 
 The NGOs that have been established in Vietnam over the past decade do 
represent a uniquely Vietnamese form of “civil society.” The relationship between the 
state and these organizations is not characterized by “blockage,” as in the Boomerang 
Model, but is a more complex relationship that vacillates between cooperation and 
contention. At times, the government finds these organizations useful to achieving its 
own policy goals because of their ability to provide expert advice directly to the 
government, bring donor money into the state, or independently advocate a policy 
position of the state, thereby enhancing its legitimacy. When this occurs, the state 







strategies. Of course, these same organizations report being punished or fined when 
they engage in activities or express support of positions that do not so closely align 
with the government’s priorities. Referring back to the Repression-Encouragement 
spectrum depicted in Chapter 1, Figure 1.3, the government’s treatment of the 
Vietnamese NGOs is best characterized as wavering between exclusion and 
limitation, depending primarily on how contentious the issue is that that the NGO is 
addressing. The organizations are allowed to operate independently, manage their 
own websites, and speak to the press without interference from the government as 
long as the content of its statements does not threaten the authority of the state. 
However, should these organizations delve into subject areas that are deemed as 
“sensitive,” their activities can be shut down and their publications censored. As a 
transnational issue, hydropower development intersects with the government’s 
management of its foreign affairs, making this an issue that the government will 
address more repressively. The government also tries to limit the organizing impact 
that these NGOs could have on local stakeholders by limiting projects that have 
capacity-building or direct advocacy components. The mobilizing capacity of these 
organizations is perceived as a threat, and the organizations have been harassed by 
police or have had their projects terminated by national and local officials when their 
projects have been perceived by those authorities to have a mobilization component. 
 The creation of these young NGOs in Vietnam and the pathway through 
which they were established, which runs directly through well-funded and well-







NGOs operate in authoritarian settings and how the state responds to them. First, 
INGOs in Vietnam have played a tremendous role in capacity-building among elite 
Vietnamese. One of the most crucial roles that INGOs have played there is not 
through their own advocacy work, but in training the leaders who are capable of 
carrying out this work in their local contexts. This exposure to Western advocacy 
organizations was essential, since bottom-up advocacy is not well understood in 
Vietnam in the local cultural context, as the next chapter will reveal in more detail. 
Second, although there are limitations on the ways in which the Vietnamese NGOs 
can challenge the state, their pathway to the state is not blocked. Each of the NGOs 
has consistent communication with government officials, who often depend on them 
for policy guidance. INGOs are still important partners to the Vietnamese NGOs 
when they can disseminate politically sensitive reports that the local NGOs cannot, 
but the NGOs have more strategies available to them than total dependence on 
international partners. Finally, the establishment of an emergent civil society in Hanoi 
via the creation of these environmental NGOs is not the same as grassroots activism. 
The local stakeholders in Vietnam – the farmers and the fishermen who live in the 
Mekong delta and depend on the river for their livelihoods – are still largely excluded 
from the dialogue. Although the Hanoi-based NGOs do attempt to represent their 
interests, this falls short of direct participation by affected communities as these 
threatened and marginalized stakeholders are represented to the government only by 
proxy. Given that the government is particularly sensitive about projects that attempt 







expected to change anytime soon. Thus while the boomerang model is an outdated 
conception of how activism works within Vietnam, researchers must also be careful 
not to overstate how successful the NGOs have been in creating an emergent “civil 
society” in the context of an authoritarian state.  The civil society that exists primarily 
consists of the Vietnamese elite leading recognized organizations in Hanoi; the 
relationship between the state and the grassroots level is based on a different 
calculation along the Repression-Encouragement spectrum, which is the focus of the 









Chapter 5:  Control by Incorporation: The State and Local 
Stakeholders 
While NGOs in Hanoi present challenges and benefits to the state that it must 
navigate, this calculation is more easily managed toward stakeholders in the Mekong 
delta. This chapter explores the strategic engagement of the state toward these local 
actors, and how their capabilities and approach to water management shape the state’s 
choice along the Repression-Encouragement spectrum (See Figure 1.3). The delta 
residents have less exposure to Western forms of advocacy and information about 
upstream development given the extensive state control of the media and limited 
internet connectivity in the delta.31 In contrast to the vocal NGOs that use their 
platforms to challenge the information coming from the state and government’s 
strategic priorities, the delta operates under a form of more “traditional 
authoritarianism” in which information is controlled and direct challenges to the 
government are rare. However, residents do manage water resources through 
collective action and engage in spirited debates over best management practices, 
although these practices are focused on management at or below the provincial level. 
The debates over water management thus do not compete with other state interests at 
the transnational level, presenting less of a challenge to the state’s ability to control 
its relations with its riparian neighbors. “Participation” at this level of governance is 
thus easier to manage internally because of the residents’ tendency to focus on 
                                                 
 







parochial issues, as well as their limited interest and ability to coordinate with other 
actors who threaten state control. The state is thus able to co-opt the residents’ 
interests into its own institutions, such as the Farmers Union, which helps maintain a 
cooperative rather than a contentious relationship between local residents and the 
state.      
Local Governance and Stakeholder Participation 
The provincial level of government, which is the level directly below the 
central government, is responsible for state management of water resources within 
their localities. The Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (MARD) and the 
Ministry of Natural Resources and the Environment (MONRE) each have sub-
departments that operate within each province. (These departments are referred to as 
DARD and DONRE, respectively.)32 Officials at the provincial level thus have the 
authority to govern locally, and due to a more limited geographical scale they are also 
more capable of understanding the local impacts of water management decisions than 
their national-level counterparts. The provinces are also better placed (compared to 
the communes or hamlets) to channel concerns related to transboundary issues up to 
the national level of government where interstate relations are managed. This makes 
officials at the provincial level of government key informants for how the state 
manages stakeholder participation in water governance in the Mekong delta.   
                                                 
 







Of course, the responsibilities of provincial officials involved in water 
management are more complex than simply advocating on behalf of their farmers to 
higher levels of government; there are tensions between local actors and 
disagreements over policy priorities at this level of government as well. One of the 
most controversial issues within the rice-producing provinces in Vietnam concerns 
what type of dyke system to use to manage flood levels, which depends on what 
quality of rice the region intends to produce. Since the late 1960s/early 1970s under 
the “rice first” policy promoted by central planners, the use of high-yield varieties 
(HYV) have replaced higher quality flooding rice, which grows in flood water. The 
switch to HYV has meant a 10-fold increase in rice production from 1970 to 2013, 
but this variety relies on the use of costly chemical fertilizers that have a destructive 
effect on the long-term fertility of the soil.  The controversial switch to high dykes 
around much of the province eliminates flooding altogether, along with the benefits 
that flooding provides in terms of bringing nutrients into the soil. Charles Howie, a 
British scholar and advisor to the Faculty of Agriculture at An Giang University, has 
spoken to farmers in An Giang province about their reaction to the construction of 
high dykes for flood control: 
Farmers, in one commune I visited over a period of several years (2001-2007), 
argued against the government’s policy for their dikes to be being [sic] raised 
to the high dike level. They said it ‘would not be good value for money’, by 
which I understood them to be referring to the higher levels of chemical inputs 
they would need to apply in order to maintain yield levels after the dike was 
built.  They were being asked to pay most of the costs of construction but 
already they knew from farmers elsewhere that the profit per crop of raising 
three crops within a high dike would be less than the profits of growing only 
two crops per year: farmers would need to work longer and harder for the 







build high dikes has come from decisions at Province level and above to raise 
production levels, but this has been by quantity rather than quality, hence An 
Giang’s pre-eminent position as a high volume producer and exporter of rice.  
However, this high volume of production not only earns money for exporters, 
it is also the basis for the collection of 20% corporation tax collection by the 
province, and that income from tax pays for essential developments in health, 
education (including, for example An Giang University) and infrastructure—
all of which are vital to improving the lives of people.  This policy is one of 
the factors which has enabled An Giang Province to achieve an average 
annual growth of 10.112% growth in GDP between 2001 and 2011.  However, 
it does not appear to have improved incomes for most farmers and may be 
endangering the long-term health of the soil and rice production (Howie 
2013).   
 
The interests of local farmers, and particularly the long-term interests of those in the 
agriculture sector who hold concerns about soil quality, are thus pitted against a pro-
export policy that privileges short-term interests in the form of increased economic 
growth.  
This controversy is instructive to state management of participation in water 
resources management for two reasons. First, the focus on the policy choice of raising 
dykes and the tradeoffs that this entails reveals that the main grievances around water 
management within the provinces are managed domestically. The recent pushback 
from farmers against the state’s pro-export policy does reflect that this issue concerns 
multiple actors holding competing interests, but the policy decisions on dyke height 
are ultimately managed within the state. It is also not clear that the central 
government pushed a pro-export policy with a full understanding of the impact on 
local farmers, so the pro-export policy cannot be interpreted as an attempt to privilege 
certain interests over others as opposed to a policy with unintended consequences, as 







agricultural production over the long term, these issues are not among the key 
challenges raised by local stakeholders within the delta. The high degree of issue 
independence of dyke construction policy, or the lack of intersection with other state 
priorities such as its transnational relations, means that the state is expected to rely 
less upon repressive tactics in its interactions with local stakeholders.   
The second reason why the local controversies around water resources 
management is instructive to state management of participation of water resources 
concerns the impact on effective policymaking. The decision-making around dykes 
and crop yields demonstrates the difficulty in relying on a hierarchical system of 
governance to account for farmers’ interests. In this instance, the interests of farmers 
in preserving the quality of their land must be balanced against the shorter-term 
interest of high rice productivity, which benefits the enterprises that sell it for export 
and the community that benefits from tax revenues. With these competing interests, it 
is not clear that the concerns of delta farmers are even communicated up to higher 
levels of government, let alone accounted for in policymaking. Policies that came 
down from the central government that focused on and rewarded high productivity 
were well intended but insufficiently accounted for long-term consequences, which 
impact small-scale farmers most severely. These policy choices have led the state to 
seek more direct input from farmers through the Farmers Union, although 
incorporating farmers into a process of participatory governance remains a source of 







Mobilizing capacity, which is defined in Chapter 1 as encompassing political 
engagement and attempts to influence policy outcomes, is also weak among delta 
stakeholders. Evidence from interviews reveals that “participation” within political 
processes is not well understood as an effective form of political engagement. When 
provincial-level officials were asked about what opportunities downstream 
stakeholders had to participate in water resources management, multiple interview 
subjects responded that they participate in irrigation management systems. These 
groups consist of about 10 farmers coming together to share the costs of having a 
service provider pump water to irrigate their farmland. A typical response to the 
question of how stakeholders participate in water management comes from a 
provincial level official in DARD: 
“For the local people, for example farmers, they participate in water 
management in different ways. For example they can participate in the 
irrigation groups. So they have the right to manage the water [themselves]… 
For example, in each region there is a different provider, like service 
providers. So at the beginning of the year, [the farmers] come together and 
have a meeting and they will discuss about the service price, so the farmer can 
chose who is the best, who they can believe in, who provides the best price for 
them, and they will choose that person to provide them with irrigation service. 
In the next year if those people didn’t do the best job, they can choose other 
people.”  
 
In interviews such as this one, “participation” in governance is interpreted by the 
interview subject to mean direct management of functional aspects of water 
management, rather than large-scale or long-term aspects of governance, such as 
development policy at the basin level. Farmers on neighboring land do come together 







land. However, these small management groups are not involved in questions of 
water management policy that are determined at the provincial level and above.  
While government officials at the provincial and district levels consistently 
mentioned opportunities for stakeholder participation within local irrigation systems, 
none mentioned opportunities to provide input regarding geographically wider issues 
such as the impact of upstream developments. Multiple interview subjects at the 
provincial level of government stated that transboundary hydropower issues and 
participation at the MRC were managed at the national level, meaning outside of their 
mandates within the hierarchical structure of the Vietnamese government. The 
national level of government is thus expected to manage these issues without direct 
input from affected communities, which may be a convenience for a state that wants 
to preserve its control in managing water resources at the basin level, but ultimately 
means that the national government may not represent those interests, whether 
intentionally or unintentionally. The only observed regular, albeit indirect, connection 
between local stakeholders and national decision-makers outside of the typical 
hierarchical channels of representation is that the Vice Directors of the DONREs in 
the delta provinces do report to the National Mekong Committee (NMC) in Hanoi. 
However, the connection of these officials to local stakeholders is mediated through 
the district and commune levels, and so the pathway of participation from stakeholder 
to the national and regional levels of governance is indirect and passes through 







The limited engagement of local actors in the policymaking process 
concerning water management has negative implications for policy outcomes, as the 
pro-export policies discussed above reveal. Expecting national-level officials to 
represent the interests of sub-national groups in policy decisions without their direct 
input is highly problematic. Tun Myint (2012) collected survey data in the Mekong 
delta on what actors perceived as “urgent and important policy issues in the basin” 
including topics such as water pollution, environmental education, fisheries 
degradation and regional cooperation (66). His two sample groups included MRC and 
government officials in Lao PDR and Thailand, and non-state actors including 
experts, researchers, and NGO members. The difference in the issue rankings 
between these two groups “seems to suggest that the states’ development policies 
imposed on rural villagers may be at odds with the needs and desires of the villagers 
who see the issues of poverty differently from the state” (70). This means that where 
stakeholder participation is limited, these differences might not be recognized and 
thus policy choices would not reflect local preferences even in instances where state 
officials would theoretically represent their constituents’ interests above their own. In 
the case of Vietnam, this research demonstrates the danger of relying on a tiered 
structure of governance to channel up the interests of local stakeholders rather than 
including local voices in the venue where decisions are made. Representation of local 
voices, rather than direct inclusion, can lead to preferences being misunderstood and 
miscommunicated through the layers of bureaucracy. This can occur even when the 







in the additionally challenging context of competing with other national priorities or 
other domestic actors with conflicting interests. To use the language of Putnam 
(1988), in an authoritarian system, a government official is more likely to 
misunderstand the win-set of his domestic audience, and additionally may feel less 
beholden to represent their interests when they compete with other personal or public 
initiatives, as the domestic audience is not necessarily a constraining force on his or 
her continuance in office.    
Managing Stakeholders through Mass Organizations: The Farmers Union 
 The Vietnamese government does seek to promote mass participation and 
national solidarity through the Fatherland Front, which consists of more than 20 
different member organizations including the Youth Union, Women’s Union, and 
Farmers Union, as well as other trade and social welfare groups. Although the stated 
purpose of the unions is to encourage participation, it is simultaneously used to 
disseminate propaganda and implement national policy. Article 7 of the law 
establishing the Fatherland Front confusingly addresses “Propaganda and 
mobilization of the population in the realization of the people's right to be their own 
masters, execution of the policies and laws,” using the language of independence to 
justify national cohesion. The first clause in that article affirms that activities must be 
on the basis of the “realization of the Party's principles, policies, and the State’s laws” 
(Fatherland Front). Thus while these unions do provide a forum for farmers and other 







government employees who also set the agenda for what activities the unions will 
carry out.  
The role of the Farmers Union is fourfold: it provides vocational training, 
technical support and legal support to its members, and also carries out projects for 
community development. The Farmers Union is both the organization that presents 
the farmers’ voices to the government and party officials, as well as communicates to 
farmers the laws and regulations that have been established by the state. In An Giang 
province, for example, the provincial branch of the Farmers Union has 41 employees 
and 23,000 members. In order to become a member, farmers must register and pay a 
fee of VND 30,000 (approximately US$1.50). Each month, the provincial branch of 
the Farmers Union has a meeting with its membership that enables it to make 
recommendations to the Farmers Union national offices or, for issues of local 
concern, to the provincial branch of the People’s Committee. Some of the issues 
raised by farmers at these meetings include support for negotiating fair prices for 
agricultural inputs and outputs, addressing water pollution issues from local industry 
and fisheries, and the timing of opening sluice gates to manage agricultural flooding.    
While representing the voice of the farmers is thus one of the official goals of 
the organization, the Farmers Union has recognized in recent years that its capacity in 
this area has been inadequate. In particular, the “rice first” policy that came from 
central planners did not account for the rising costs of fuel and fertilizers that left 
middling quality Vietnamese rice unable to compete with higher quality varieties, 







however, carried out training to build the advocacy-capacity of its members, 
recognizing that farmers’ input is critical to effective policy-making. The Farmers 
Union partnered with Asian Partnership for the Development of Human Resources in 
Rural Asia (AsiaDHRRA), a Philippines-based nonprofit that is dedicated to 
organizing rural communities across Asia, to undertake a four-year project to train 
Farmers Union staff. The goal of the training was to understand better the difficulties 
that farmers face and to teach them to more efficiently advocate for and implement 
policies that will address these challenges. This push is largely due to the top-down 
policies that promoted high yields, which were not only uncompetitive on the global 
market but also required expensive fertilizers that have done long-term damage to the 
soil and reduced its fertility. In February 2013, the Farmers Union began an effort to 
increase the capacity of its staff nationwide by launching the project “Building Policy 
Advocacy Capacity for Vietnam Farmer’s Union Staffs,” (VNFU). In December 2013 
the workshop began the second phase of the project, which focused on developing 
trainers from the national and provincial level staff who would eventually be able to 
disseminate this training to leaders at the district and hamlet levels following a 
“Training the Trainers” format. (VNFU). At the opening ceremony of the initial 
workshop Mr. Leu Vu Dieu, Vice Chairman of the VNFU Central Committee 
recognized that the VNFU needed to evolve to become more capable of representing 
farmers’ interests:   
“Nowadays, some guidelines, mechanisms, policies relating to agriculture, far
mers, and countryside are insufficient. This fact requires VNFU to become 
socio-political organization representing legitimate and legal rights and 







efficiency of participating to contribute and advocate policies for farmers’ 
interests. However, almost VNFU’s staffs have never been trained basic 
knowledge and skills in this area.” (AsiaDHRRA 2013). 
 
While this does demonstrate a strengthened interest in including farmers’ voices in 
policy-making, the issues that the union addresses is limited to domestic agricultural 
policy even though farmers are of course impacted by the upstream developments that 
affect their water resources. The discussion of regional-level water management 
policy, even the transboundary impacts within Vietnam, is reportedly not part of their 
mandate as this is the purview of the government ministries.    
 Despite this ongoing attempt to achieve greater grassroots participation at the 
domestic level on agricultural issues, the obstacles to increasing this form of 
participation are evident. A staff member of the Farmers Union at the provincial level 
attended one of the first advocacy capacity-building workshops of the new program, 
and reported that the concepts that were being taught were confusing to her. She 
stated that  
“We were told that policies need to come from the ‘bottom up,’ but I don’t 
really know what this means in practice. I know what it means, but it is not 
well understood how this happens in procedure. I don’t know what procedures 
we are supposed to do.”  
 
This statement highlights the multifaceted problems that Vietnam faces in achieving 
greater participation in policy making. Even within the Farmers Union where greater 
levels of participation are being encouraged, the method of consultation with local 
groups is not part of the governance tradition. The actual processes of participatory 
governance are thus still not well understood, so there is still much work to be done in 







 Aside from the Farmers Union, which of course is a state institution as a part 
of the Fatherland Front, there are limited opportunities for farmers and fishermen 
living in the Mekong delta to engage in political organizations. There are no 
organized advocacy groups operating independently in the Mekong delta that provide 
an alternative venue for grassroots advocacy. There are only three local NGOs in 
Vietnam that work on the area of 
water governance: GreenID, 
PanNature, and the Center for 
Water Resources Conservation and 
Development (WARECOD); their 
operations are detailed in Chapter 
4.33 As noted in the previous 
chapter, attempts by these NGOs to 
engage local stakeholders in 
projects that were designed to 
increase their advocacy capacity 
were not uniformly supported by 
provincial level officials. It is thus 
interesting to note the difference in 
reaction to a capacity-building project run through a state-sponsored institution for 
                                                 
 



































Table 5.1 Comparison of Capacity-Building 








local officials, and a similar project initiated by an NGO where the target population 
was local residents (See Table 5.1 for a comparison of the key project characteristics). 
This may be partly explained by the state’s direct input into the content of the training 
led by AsiaDHRRA, which was focused on identifying parochial challenges faced by 
farmers. The Thai Baan project was focused on allowing stakeholders to conduct their 
own research on topics that they identified themselves. Government opposition to the 
NGO project with local stakeholders may have also reflected concern about these 
stakeholders operating against rather than within state institutions, presenting a 
challenge to state control.  The Farmers Union project was focused on channeling any 
grievances through the institutions of the state.    
Local Knowledge of Upstream Development and Regional Governance  
While farmers may be able to voice concerns to the government via the 
Farmers Union, these concerns tend to focus on issues that are local and observable. 
Their participation in broader policy areas is constrained by a limited understanding 
of transboundary water issues due to censorship and limited access to media, although 
improvements in some more progressive provinces have been noted.34  NGOs report 
that journalists have been instructed not to report on their activities at times, and the 
NGOs themselves have been fined when they have posted information online that the 
government disallowed. This means that in rural communities, where internet access 
                                                 
 








is limited and the news is primarily conveyed by the government over loudspeaker, 
knowledge about upstream developments and governance processes is low and thus it 
is impossible to expect local citizens to express informed preferences on the issues.  
The state maintains this status quo by controlling the media and the content of 
information that the NGOs are allowed to disseminate.    
NGOs have attempted to hold workshops in order to inform residents about 
the MRC PNPCA process and the impacts of upstream hydropower projects, but have 
found that it is challenging to generate interest among local residents. The NGOs 
report that local residents do not understand the relevance of these processes to their 
own lives, a Catch-22 situation that the NGOs have not yet been able to overcome. 
Discussing the reaction of local residents to a workshop organized at Can Tho 
University, one NGO staffer stated: 
“They don’t know PNPCA. They don’t know PNPCA at all. One woman from 
the Women’s Union, she told me it’s very difficult to understand. ‘I know this 
process. We need to have the local participation but [the local stakeholders] 
don’t know it yet.’ And one more thing: Some of the technical terms in 
PNPCA are very difficult to understand, and that’s why they are not interested 
in this. Also we just organized a workshop in Ca Mao in cooperation with the 
Ca Mao’s Women’s Union. And the local people - we tried to present the 
PNPCA process and tried to tell them about the hydropower dam effect on the 
Mekong mainstream because now it’s not clear. In part perhaps it’s not clear 
because it’s such a major period and maybe by 2015 [the dam] will be done 
and we don’t know what can happen in the future. That’s why we want to 
deliver our message to them right now and so they can have better 
preparation. But one of the local people say, just say to my colleague ‘Maybe 
in 10 more years we can understand it but now we cannot understand it at all.’ 
So this is the problem how we can communicate [the urgency].”  
 
The NGO that organized the workshops reported that it was difficult to convey to 







construction that action against the dams needed to take place now, and that by the 
time that the impacts were felt the damage would be irreversible.  
 A staff member from a different Hanoi-based NGO reported similar 
experiences in getting local stakeholders to understand the long-term impacts of 
hydropower projects that were not yet visible. She compared the experience to when 
she worked with villagers who had been displaced from the construction of the Bakun 
Dam in Sarawak, Malaysia. This dam project displaced 10,000 indigenous people and 
submerged 700 square kilometers of forests and farmland. (International Rivers, 
“Bakun Dam”). Although the staff member does express concern that local residents 
do not fully realize the threat to their homeland and livelihoods, she does state that the 
dissemination of information about planned projects is improving particularly in An 
Giang province which has a strong research and scientific community.  
[Referring to the dissemination of information:] “It’s better than before. Right 
now a lot of information was disseminated to the local people in the delta. Not 
everywhere, but in An Giang for example, because the local authorities are 
very progressive and they were against the dam too. In other provinces it’s not 
that way. People still, they don’t know much about the impact of the dam. 
Even if you just talk about it, it’s hard to imagine. I work a lot with the 
Sarawak people when they were displaced. I talked to them before they were 
displaced and after they were displaced. And people before, they were 
displaced they had no idea. They said “Oh, I have to move somewhere.” You 
lose your land! There will be water! They heard it, and that’s it. It’s strange, 
like they didn’t buy it. You know what I mean? They didn’t really feel what’s 
the problem until it actually happened. So I think it is the same for people in 
the delta. … Because they don’t see it today, it’s more long term. It’s maybe 
not this generation. It’s maybe next generation when the siltation for the delta, 
the soils will not be fertile like before and the fish and everything. It changes 
gradually and it’s hard to get people really thinking about it beforehand.” 
 







Can Tho and Ca Mau provinces thus have faced uphill battles in generating 
stakeholder interest. They have expressed that it is difficult to convey urgency when 
local stakeholders do not yet have any experiential evidence of how the projects will 
impact them. The impacts are still unknown and technically complex, which makes 
them still harder to communicate to stakeholders with limited familiarity with the 
scientific concepts or upstream developments.    
The challenge of increasing stakeholder awareness is not only in balancing 
short-term costs with long-term impacts. Other research that examined the perception 
of local stakeholders on environmental change has demonstrated a discrepancy for 
this group in understanding the cause of the observed changes (Xuan T.M. 2012; 
Ehlert 2012).  For example, Xuan’s work shows that her research subjects in An 
Giang province have recognized an increased variability in the climate and water flow 
over the past 10 years, but ultimately attribute these observations to the will of God. 
This shows that the most remote local stakeholders still lack a full understanding of 
the causes of the impacts that they see in their water quality and quantity, and cannot 
be expected to advocate on their own behalf without better access to education and 
information.  However, the state actively limits access to this education and 
information, privileging the maintenance of its own control over strengthening the 
advocacy capacity of local stakeholders on transnational, rather than parochial, water 







Hypotheses on the Absence of Grassroots Activism 
While an incomplete understanding of upstream development may account for 
some local actors’ limited participation in the governance of delta resources, the lack 
of grassroots activism across the delta provinces is notable given the dire 
environmental threats the delta is facing. The “grievance” of environmental 
degradation does not appear to be formulating into a “claim” around which 
stakeholders mobilize. While it is methodologically problematic to attempt to explain 
why something is not happening since it requires eliminating all possible alternative 
hypotheses, the lack of activism is curious, and raises questions about whether this is 
connected to the strategic choices of the authoritarian state. It is worth briefly 
examining the evidence and exploring possible theories as to why grassroots activism 
is not being observed in the delta, even if all of the alternative explanations cannot be 
eliminated. 
The specific characteristics of certain environmental problems with the 
Mekong delta may have inhibited grassroots activism because they make the 
problems hard to identify and to address. These issue characteristics include 1) the 
complexity of the causes and impacts of hydropower development, climate change, 
and urbanization; 2) the uncertainty regarding the long-term impacts of present-day 
activities; 3) the non-linear effects of action, where the costs of a conservative 
approach are felt in the present while the benefits are reaped in the future; and the 
problem of 4) geographical diffusion, where the root causes of environmental 







with the jurisdiction over these projects, are geographically distant from where the 
negative impacts of these projects are most acutely felt. Each of these issue 
characteristics independently shapes actors’ ability to go through the complete  
process of claim formation: identifying the problem, solution, and actors capable of 
providing it. Table 5.2. shows how characteristics of the issue of transboundary water 
management in the Mekong Delta may affect the process of claim formation.35 These 
issue characteristics present a set of obstacles that reduce the probability of activism  
from taking root at the local level that interact with, but are independent from, the  
challenges of resource mobilization and repressive political opportunity structures. 
 
Table 5.2 Issue Characteristics and the Process of Claim Formation 
                                                 
 
35 In contrast, engagement on the issue of dyke construction has been much more active, as described 
earlier in the chapter. Dyke construction represents an issue that is geographically proximate, and 








Extent of problem is 
unknown 
Effectiveness of 
potential solutions is 
unknown 
Identification of 
responsible actors is 
hindered by parties that 
shift/deny responsibility 
or debate necessity of 
action 
Complexity 
Cause and effect is not 
connected 
Solution(s) may be 
unknown or falsely 
identified 
Relevant actors 
upstream may be left 




Long-term costs of 
inaction are 
undervalued relative to 
the present because 
visibility of impacts is 
delayed 
Solutions are viewed in 
terms of tradeoffs: long-
term benefits with 
immediate costs 
Costs and benefits are 
not weighed the same 
by relevant actors 
Geographical 
Diffusion 
Local stakeholders are 
unaware of upstream 
activity linked to the 
problem 
Local stakeholders are 
unaware of upstream 
activity (and thus, 
solutions) linked to the 
problem 
The authorities with 
jurisdiction (e.g., at the 
regional level) are 
inaccessible or 









Attempting to explain how movements achieve mobilization potential, van 
Stekelenburg and co-authors provide a framework that links the three ingredients of 
shared identities, grievances (instrumental and ideological), and emotions into a 
single model (van Stekelenburg  and Klandermans 2007; van Stekelenburg et al., 
2011; Klandermans and van Stekelenburg 2013). (See Fig. 5.1) When combined, 
these three ingredients are expected to increase a movement’s motivational strength. 
Nonetheless, these categories do not explain why some grievances are politicized, 
while others are not.  Issue characteristics, such as those described in Table 5.2, play 
a role in determining which grievances become politicized and transform into claims. 
In order for issues to become politicized, the potentially mobilized public must have a 
minimal awareness of the issue, ideas of how to seek redress, and a target perceived 
to be able to provide that redress. These three components are each sufficient rather 
than necessary to achieve mobilization; for example, it is possible to have 
mobilization on a contentious issue even though a clearly articulated form of redress 
is lacking. However, weakness across all three of these broad components limits the 
ability to mobilize populations who either do not recognize the issue, the solution, or 








Figure 5.1 An Integrated Framework of Movement Strength 
(From: van Stekelenburg and Klandermans, 2007; van Stekelenburg, et al., 2011; and Klandermans 
and van Stekelenburg, 2013). 
 
While collective identity and emotional amplification thus increase the 
probability of mobilization, particular issue characteristics that decrease awareness, 
methods of redress, and a target capable of providing redress cause attrition from 
achieving motivation to mobilize. Once this motivation is achieved, the structural 
conditions that limit or facilitate dissent – political opportunity structures and material 
resources – become more relevant to determining the success of collective action. 
Figure 5.2 shows a modified version of van Stekelenburg’s integrated framework that 
demonstrates how certain issue characteristics can diminish the motivation for 
mobilization, even where a grievance may be present. (The diminishing connective 
arrows in the model represent attrition from the identity group to those participating 
in collective action.) The modified framework also extends the causal chain, to show 







characteristics into the model focuses attention not only on variables that increase the 
likelihood of mobilization, but also factors that limit it. It thus provides an 
understanding of successful instances of mobilization as well as the “dogs that don’t 
bark,” such as the case of grassroots activism on water management in the 
Vietnamese delta. In the Mekong delta specifically, a poor understanding of how 
upstream dynamics affect downstream users, the lack of an identifiable solution to 
upstream development, not knowing or having access to the relevant authorities, and 
the repressive political system are each expected to diminish the likelihood of 
grassroots activism in the delta. 
      
 
Figure 5.2 Attrition within the Integrated Framework 








The factors that may increase or decrease the probability of mobilization do 
not operate fully independently of each other. For example, the issue characteristic of 
complexity might be partially overcome in the context of a more inclusive regime, or 
permissive opportunity structure, where the local population has independent access 
to information to better understand the nature of the issue and the resources to 
mobilize. The repressive state environment also plays a role in limiting public 
dissemination of information as well as access to national and regional policymaking 
bodies, potential alternative targets. However, issue complexity may also limit 
political mobilization in wealthy democracies, or lead to other forms of politicization, 
and is thus analytically different from structural factors.  The complexity of the issue 
of climate change, for example, may have affected mobilization in the United States 
as the waters become muddy with the voices of climate change deniers as well as 
more nuanced debates on the timing and extent of its impacts (Elsasser and Dunlap 
2013; Brulle, Carmichael and Jenkins 2012). Issue characteristics are thus a unique 
and analytically important factor to include in the study of claim formation. In order 
for mobilization to eventually take place, participants must first translate a grievance 
into a claim, which is logically prior to overcoming mobilization obstacles of limited 
resources or political opportunity. In order for activism to take place, potential 
participants must have sufficient awareness of the issue and potential remedies to 
make overcoming the secondary challenges of mobilization and political opportunity 







Irrespective of whether issue characteristics account for the lack of activism, 
the absence of grassroots activism at the local level may be simultaneously beneficial 
for an authoritarian state that does not want to face political challenges to its control, 
and detrimental for governance of the water resources of the Mekong delta at the 
local, national and basin level. Proxy representatives – both state and non-state actors 
– have their own interests and are bureaucratically and experientially distant from the 
residents that they purport to represent.  It cannot be assumed that the interests of 
local residents will be understood at higher levels of governance, nor can it be 
assumed that claims will be formulated when a problem reaches a certain level of 
severity. Motivational strength may be limited by resource constraints, limited 
knowledge, psychological barriers or other obstacles. When these challenges are 
present, even the most urgent needs of local stakeholders may be left unaddressed. 
Populations living within authoritarian states are particularly vulnerable to this 
dynamic as their challenges are compounded by limited access to information and 
little experience with bottom-up advocacy.  
State Co-Optation of Stakeholder Participation 
The state’s strategy in managing the activities of local residents most clearly 
fits within the category of co-optation.  The controversies within the rice-producing 
provinces over the optimal dyke height and crop yield strategies show that local 
residents take an active role in how government policies will affect their lives and 
their livelihoods. This activity is not repressed by the state, but rather is channeled 







represent the interests of the farmers. Although the Farmers Union is also used to 
promote government policy downward, the state has more recently recognized the 
benefit of including farmers’ voices in decision-making and has funneled resources 
into improving the advocacy capacity of Farmers Union employees. This shift to 
recognizing the value of participatory decision-making processes was a result of 
learning from past mistakes, when centralized planning led to poor policy choices 
regarding cropping methods that have not been economically or environmentally 
sustainable in the long term. The state has recognized that effective policy-making is 
strengthened with the participation of local actors, but has crafted that participation to 
take place through its own institutions in a way that does not undermine the authority 
of the state.   
It is interesting to note that in interviews with local government officials and 
staff of the provincial Farmers Union that some of the concepts related to 
participatory governance seemed unfamiliar. This means that even if the central 
government recognizes the value of more participatory processes and issues a 
directive, that the provinces might struggle to interpret and implement it. Similarly, 
even if the provincial officers seek participation from local stakeholders, those 
stakeholders may not understand how to perform this role. The provincial official 
who cited the irrigation management groups as an example of how farmers participate 
in water management did not interpret the question in terms of linking stakeholders to 
policymakers, but rather the decisions they could make that were independent of 







hierarchical structure of government, in which local stakeholders could channel up 
their needs through the different scales of government, and regional politics would be 
handled by the central government without direct input from delta residents. A similar 
conceptual barrier was observed with the staff member of the Farmers Union who did 
not understand the notion of “bottom-up” advocacy when it was taught to her at a 
training workshop. This type of grassroots advocacy is unfamiliar in an authoritarian 
context, and thus challenges remain in adopting a more participatory process even in 
cases where one level of government may recognize its value. 
The level of familiarity with grassroots activism is a key distinction between 
the Farmers Union officials, tasked with representing local stakeholders, and the 
NGOs that operate in Hanoi that have had exposure to Western advocacy 
organizations. These organizations are consistently frustrated in their interactions 
with local stakeholders who reportedly lack sufficient awareness of upstream 
developments to view their impacts as urgent. Part of this knowledge gap is attributed 
to state control of the media, which is even more effective in rural areas where high 
levels of poverty and limited internet access mean that there are few alternative 
sources of information. It is also interesting to note that although the state recognizes 
the value of having farmers’ input into policymaking channeled through the Farmers 
Union, that NGO efforts to directly strengthen the capacity of delta residents was 
restricted in some provinces, as described in Chapter 4. This lends support to the 







balances these benefits against any potential challenges to the ultimate authority of 
the state.    
The state’s strategic interaction with local stakeholders in the Mekong delta is 
consistent with the theoretical framework presented in Chapter 1. This framework 
predicts that the state is more likely to choose repression towards actors that 1) 
engage on issues that intersect with other state priorities, 2) have a high level of 
mobilizing capacity, and 3) do not attract strategic resources (material or political) 
from external actors. The state appears to encourage strengthening the advocacy 
capacity of farmers in the Farmers Union in large part because their interests are 
parochial. The state and stakeholders have a shared interest in managing agricultural 
policy effectively, and the authority of the state is not undermined by hearing the 
perspective of local stakeholders since it does not overlap – at least from the 
perspective of local stakeholders interviewed – with other strategic objectives of the 
state over which it strives to maintain control. In addition, strengthening the capacity 
of the farmers is an initiative that has received international support and funding. The 
partnership with Philippines-based AsiaDHRRA to carry out the capacity-building 
project has recently brought in even greater international financial resources. In 
September 2016, the Vietnam Famers Union and the International Fund for 
Agricultural Development (IFAD), a specialized agency of the United Nations, held a 
signing ceremony to extend the program for famers’ capacity building through 2020. 
However, the state does restrict connections being forged between the local 







capacity-building of the local stakeholders as long as they continue to work in 
isolation from those groups, facilitating that ability of the state to co-opt their 







Chapter 6:  State Blockage of Transnational Activism 
In its management of transboundary resource issues the Vietnamese state not 
only faces challenges from domestic actors, but also from their potential international 
partners. As Chapters 4 and 5 have shown, the state is capable of internally restricting 
NGO activities and media coverage of material that it finds objectionable, and has 
been willing to do so when those actions undermine state control.  However, the state 
faces more significant challenges in restricting transnational actors or institutions over 
whom it has no direct authority. Realizing this, domestic actors may try to circumvent 
the authority of the state by partnering with transnational actors or directing their 
action toward international organizations that provide an alternative venue for their 
grievances to be heard. How does the state respond to the potential challenge to its 
control presented by these forms of transnational activism? This chapter provides two 
lessons for how the state manages challenges to its control over water resources 
management. First, the Vietnamese government, together with the other authoritarian 
riparian states, has restricted access to the Mekong River Commission (MRC) by 
design in order to avoid challenges to its authority.36  This limits the ability of 
domestic actors to redirect their activities toward a regional institution to bypass the 
restrictions of the state. Second, international NGOs and even informal transnational 
networks serve as valuable partners to the emergent civil society in Vietnam to draw 
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attention to domestic resource issues. These actors can advocate and disseminate 
information on behalf of local actors, and cannot be so easily controlled by the 
authoritarian state.     
Authoritarian Regimes and International Actors 
If the state is restricting the ability of domestic NGOs to generate attention to 
their advocacy message, transnational networks provide a mechanism through which 
this message can be disseminated in alternative fora. Keck and Sikkink’s “boomerang 
model” (1998), or Risse and Sikkink’s updated “spiral model” (1999), which better 
accounts for variation within the target state as a result of transnational activism, have 
provided the foundation to understanding how transnational advocacy networks 
operate. These models specify how citizen advocates activate networks to shift the 
venue of activism to more sympathetic states and international actors in order to 
generate pressure for domestic change (See Figure 6.1). The Boomerang Model 
identifies three main pathways through which stakeholders can potentially pressure 
for change. Pathway 1 is to directly pressure the government. This pathway is 
depicted by the model as blocked and ineffectual, hence the need to look outside of 
the state for partner actors to assist in advocacy efforts.37 Pathway 2 is for domestic 
actors to ally themselves with international NGOs to raise the awareness of a state 
perceived as more sympathetic to their interests, which can then put bilateral pressure 
                                                 
 
37 However, as explained in Chapter 4, the relationship between the state and domestic NGOs in 
Vietnam is dynamic and complex. The state does restrict some of the organizations’ activities but also 
has a cooperative relationship with them on other issue areas. It is therefore inaccurate to describe the 







on the domestic regime. This is depicted as the most frequent and effective channel 
available to local stakeholders, hence the bold arrow connecting State B to State A in 
Figure 6.1. Pathway 3 is to generate pressure on the regime of State A from State B or 
international NGOs indirectly through the vehicle of international organizations. This 
pathway views the international organization as another source of normative political 
pressure on State A, rather than a policy-making body in its own right.  The strategic 
response of authoritarian states to international organizations as proxies for domestic 
constituencies remains undertheorized, though an emerging literature notes that 
authoritarian states may band together to promote their own interests in regional 
organizations in ways similar to how liberal democracies have channeled them as a 








Figure 6.1 Boomerang Model with Adaptation of Potential NGO Targets 
Source: Adapted from Keck and Sikkink (1998). Author’s adaptations in red. 
  
 
The Boomerang Model is limited to instances in which activism is mediated 
by another state, and does not acknowledge a pathway in which citizens directly 
interact with the international organization, which represents a potential fourth 
pathway available to local stakeholders that is worthy of further attention. Tarrow 
(2005) does extend the boomerang model beyond state-to-state interactions to focus 
on the role of international institutions as both a target and source of political 
pressure. Tarrow has coined the term “externalization” to refer to “the vertical 







(p.32).38 He argues that externalization is a process that works in relation to three 
contextual factors: the domestic opportunity structures available; the framing of the 
relevant issue; and the form of collective action chosen by domestic actors 
(information diffusion, institutional access, or direct action). It is thus theoretically 
possible for international institutions to change the opportunity structures available to 
stakeholders in an authoritarian state by providing an alternative venue for social 
movement activity. This may be especially true of regional organizations, due to their 
legitimacy, scale and function which may make them effective agents of political 
change. If international organizations provide an alternative venue that allows local 
stakeholders to express their voice, then domestic and international opportunity 
structures are not fixed situations that permit or constrain action, but rather 
dynamically interact to shape the strategic choices of actors.  Actors may target these 
institutions to put indirect pressure on one of more of its members. 
 According to the Boomerang Model, Pathway 2 and Pathway 3, or 
partnerships with IOs and INGOs, are both ways to circumvent the state’s institutions 
of repression. This raises the question relevant to the study of Vietnam’s 
environmental resources: How does the authoritarian state manage its control over 
water resources management given these potential transnational partners for its 
domestic actors? Just as the relationship between the state and domestic NGOs cannot 
be statically described as “blockage,” the relationship between the Vietnamese 
                                                 
 
38 An example of this is the opportunity provided by an international institution like the European 
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government and international actors is expected to be dynamic and based on state 
interests. Where INGOs and international institutions provide the potential to bring 
new resources to the state, the government is expected to be more permissive. 
However, where they advance interests that interfere with other state priorities or 
demonstrate the potential to mobilize against the state, the strategic choice is expected 
to be more repressive. This chapter will thus explore in detail the ability of local 
stakeholders in Vietnam to advance their advocacy activities through these alternative 
pathways, and the extent to which the Vietnamese state can and does permit or 
repress these transnational efforts. 
Participation of Local NGOs at the MRC: Rhetoric vs. Reality 
The regional institution that local Vietnamese stakeholders may choose to 
target for advocacy activities related to water governance is the Mekong River 
Commission. The MRC has existed in its present form since 1995, when member 
states signed the Agreement on the Cooperation for the Sustainable Development of 
the Mekong River Basin (1995 Agreement).39 Vietnam is one of the four member 
countries of the MRC, along with Cambodia, Lao PDR and Thailand. Myanmar and 
China are also involved in the MRC as dialogue partners. The vision of the MRC is to 
“bring about an economically prosperous, socially just and environmentally sound 
Mekong River Basin,” and the MRC claims to use Integrated Water Resources 
                                                 
 








Management (IWRM) as a cornerstone of its approach to managing river basin 
planning (MRC). According to the FAO and Dutch government in a document 
prepared for the International Conference on Water for Food and Ecosystems, IWRM 
“is a process which promotes the coordinated development and management of water, 
land and related resources in order to maximize economic and social welfare in an 
equitable manner without compromising the sustainability of vital ecosystems and the 
environment” (2005). The MRC is the sole organization in the region that is tasked 
with balancing the objectives of economic development with environmental 
preservation of the basin’s resources for future generations. 
Despite the organization’s focus on equity and social welfare, local 
stakeholders in the partner countries have not had consistent access to the MRC to 
advance their own interests. While the MRC has acknowledged the need for public 
participation in management since its creation in 1995, the degree to which 
stakeholders have been involved in policy and development processes in practice has 
varied by issue area and with the changing leadership of the institution. The first CEO 
of the MRC, Yanasabu Matoba, stated that “Public participation is not the 
responsibility of the MRC but that of its member countries,” and that the public 
should “go to the embassies of the member countries or through the donors,” if they 
needed information on the MRC’s activities. (Ha 2011, p. 131). Despite this ominous 
start, the MRC did begin developing its policy on public involvement in 1997, in 
conjunction with a workshop organized by the UN ECOSOC Commission for Asia 







MRC,” was eventually endorsed in 1999, although it gives only a broad overview of 
the concept of public participation. It did not confer basic rights to participate in 
planning to key stakeholders, or indicate how information collected during 
consultations would be incorporated into decision-making processes. (Chenoweth, 
Ewing and Bird 2002).  
Subsequent CEOs have made public dialogue a higher priority, although it is 
unclear to what extent the member states supported the participatory rhetoric that 
came from the Secretariat. This rhetoric reached a high point under the leadership of 
Jeremy Bird, CEO of the MRC from 2008-2011. Nonetheless, during his tenure there 
were no standardized mechanisms for open dialogue across policy areas, and policy 
prescriptions remained vague: 
It was not until 2009 that the MRC responded concretely to the problem by 
issuing a new communications strategy. This strategy explicitly declared the 
need for greater discussion, dissemination of information, publication of the 
MRC’s roles, and the need to establish avenues for public feedback on 
projects. By 2009, after nearly two decades of turmoil over the lack of 
information coming from the MRC, its new CEO, Jeremy Bird (who had 
previously been head of the World Commission on Dams) saw the vital need 
for a better communication strategy with the public. Over the years, public 
participation was a repeated refrain from both civil society and the donor 
community. Bird recognized donor demands as well as the importance of a 
coherent communications strategy from his previous position. Being 
accustomed to dealing with controversial issues, he realized the MRC must 
address these concerns and improve its information sharing. Over the past 
year, the MRC has released policy studies, posted meeting notes, and held 
stakeholder forums. (Ha 2011, p. 131-132).  
 
The CEO of the MRC Secretariat from 2011-2015 was Hans Guttman, a Swedish 
national who began his three-year tenure at the end of 2011. The position was left 







MRC were unable to reach consensus on replacing Guttman with the organization’s 
first leader from a member state. Pham Tuan Pham of Vietnam assumed the position 
of MRC CEO in January 2016. While it remains to be seen what emphasis the new 
CEO will place on stakeholder participation, during his term Guttman continued 
Bird’s emphasis on multistakeholder participation in his public remarks (Guttman 
2013), but there were no institution-wide efforts to heighten participation as a 
priority. Currently, whether or not built-in mechanisms for dialogue and public 
consultation exist vary by project area, although there is a formal process in place for 
consultations with the other governments for proposed developments on the 
mainstream of the river. 
The state-to-state dialogue on hydropower projects is contentious before local 
stakeholders are even brought in to the process. Lao PDR was perceived by the other 
member states as not taking the Procedures for Notification, Prior Consultation and 
Agreement (PNPCA) process, which is part of the 1995 Agreement, seriously when it 
built the Xayaburi Dam and most recently in October 2013 when it announced its 
plans to begin construction on the Don Sahong Dam. In the former case Lao PDR was 
perceived as going through the motions of the required prior notification and 
consultation, without actually taking the expressed concerns of the downstream 
members into account. In the case of the Don Sahong Dam, Lao PDR has claimed 
that only notification (not consultation) is necessary due to the location of the dam. In 
January 2014 the member states agreed to take the Don Sahong Hydropower Project 







member states’ ministers of water and the environment. The decision was made at a 
Special Session to discuss the project after no consensus was reached on whether the 
notification or prior consultation process should be applied to the project. At the 
Council meeting in June 2014, Lao PDR agreed to resubmit the project through the 
prior consultation process, but International Rivers reports that construction has 
already begun on the bridges and access roads for the project (Ross 2014). Going 
through the full consultation process at the MRC thus seems to be viewed by the 
Laotian government as an inconvenient bureaucratic obstacle while the decision to 
build the dam is already a fait accompli. The Don Sahong dam is thus one of the most 
controversial projects currently under discussion at the MRC, and the target of much 
criticism from both local and international civil society organizations.  
In order to assess the unmediated access that local stakeholders have directly 
with MRC officials, interviews were conducted with four current members of the 
MRC staff, one seconded worker at the MRC employed by the German government, 
and one former MRC staff member. One of the interview subjects represented the 
International Cooperation and Communications Section, the department responsible 
for handling the media outreach of the MRC. Also included were staff members from 
the Sustainable Hydropower Initiative and the Basin Development Plan, the two main 
functional units relevant to the study of transnational relations in the region. Each of 
the interviews confirmed that there was very limited direct interaction between local 
stakeholders in Vietnam and the MRC staff. There was in fact a clear discrepancy 







that emphasizes participation and the processes that are followed internally.  The 
review process of the 2011-2015 Basin Development Plan provides key insights on 




The webpage of the Basin Development Plan programme states that “the BDP 
aims to promote participation and joint cooperation among stakeholder groups 
throughout the region. One way that the BDP includes stakeholders in the basin 
development process is through annual regional stakeholder forums [emphasis in 
original].” (BDP). While these regional stakeholder forums were held in 2008, 2009, 
and 2010 during the time that the 2011-2015 Basin Development Strategy was being 
reviewed, there was no “annual” meeting that openly involved external stakeholders 
in basin development initiatives between 2010 and December 2014. Several reasons 
were provided by MRC staff as to why multistakeholder consultative meetings had 
not been held. First, the staff member from the BDP indicated that they were not 
necessary once the Development Strategy had been finalized and published. This 
statement reveals that stakeholder participation was not viewed by MRC staff as 
having inherent value, but was only necessary on a temporary basis until the strategy 
was developed, rather than on an ongoing basis. This limits the ability of the regional 
organization to serve as an effective alternative site for grievance articulation, given 








Participation in Planning Meetings 
In November 2014, the BDP held the Fourth Regional Forum on the Basin 
Development Strategy, the first regional planning meeting since 2010. Interested 
participants were invited to apply online to attend the forum with the message on the 
MRC website:  
The Forum strives to balance representation by various groups of 
stakeholders; government, non-state actors, and private sectors. The event can 
accommodate up to 250 participants. Some stakeholders will be directly 
contacted by the MRC, but most are encouraged to respond to the application 
for open registration. In particular, the water-using and developing sectors as 
well as broader stakeholders who attended previous consultations and forums 
on basin development planning are invited to apply. 
 
The process for participation in the regional forum was thus open, but controlled by 
capacity limits and through an application process that privileged certain sectors and 
actors perceived by organizers as essential as noted above, potentially limiting actors 
representing other interests. One of the key messages reported in the wake of the 
meeting was the continued need for improved participatory mechanisms. The official 
report of the meeting noted that  
“This could take the form of strengthened stakeholder participation in MRC 
Governance Meetings and/or a Regional Stakeholder Platform to engage 
regularly in the preparation and implementation of the MRC strategic plans. 
Also, specific approaches and mechanisms under the Platform tailored to each 
group of stakeholders could be considered, such as the setting up of a 
stakeholder working group specifically for the private sector (since investment 
from the private sector now outweighs those of the public sector in all MRC 








Strengthening opportunities for stakeholder participation within the basin 
development plan thus continues to be discussed within the context of official 
meetings, but implementing a sustained platform for dialogue remains elusive.  
 
Ad Hoc Meetings: Conferences and Direct Contact 
Outside of the BDP planning process, local stakeholders are included within 
MRC planning meetings on an ad hoc basis. For example, an International 
Conference was held in April 2014 to take place ahead of the Second Mekong River 
Commission Summit, which is the meeting of the heads of state of the member 
countries that is held every four years.  This conference, which was held under the 
theme of “Cooperation for Energy, Food, and Water Security in Transboundary 
Basins Under Changing Climate,” gathered over 300 participants from shared river 
basins all over the world. This two-day conference was not only intended to inform 
the discussions of the summit leaders, but also draw attention to the issue of shared 
basin planning in future assessments of the sustainable development goals and the 
2015 Conference of Parties to the UNFCCC. In addition, a multistakeholder meeting 
was also held on December 14, 2014 as part of the PNPCA process for the Don 
Sahong hydropower project. This meeting was in part an attempt to improve upon the 
PNPCA process on the controversial Xayaburi dam, which was considered 
unsatisfactory by downstream states and civil society organizations.40 Two members 
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of GreenID and one representative of the Vietnam Rivers Network were listed as 
NGO participants in the formal report of the meeting. While events such as the 
International Conference in advance of the summit meeting and the Regional Public 
Consultation on the Don Sahong Hydropower Project are promising in terms of 
providing an opportunity for multistakeholder dialogue, such events are still not a 
regularized part of the MRC’s operating procedures. 
Given former CEO Guttman’s public support for participatory procedures, 
however, it leads to the question of why the organization’s processes have not 
matched this public rhetoric. Staff members of the MRC each confirmed that member 
states of the organization formally and informally block the channels of 
communication between their local communities and MRC staff members. Staff 
members report that the MRC policy, which is determined by the member states,41 is 
that they should not directly reach out to local stakeholder groups but that 
communication with member states should be channeled through that state’s National 
Mekong Committee (NMC). Staff members did emphasize that they had an “open-
door policy” with respect to stakeholders and researchers who wish to speak to them 
about the MRC’s activities, but they are instructed not to initiate contact with local 
                                                 
 
its annual report to the Council on procedures about lessons learned so far from the first PNPCA 
process. We believe that, inter alia, the participation of civil society should be improved, and that the 
consultation period of six months is too short. We recommend that all ambiguities regarding the 
application of the PNPCA be resolved before any future mainstream project proceeds.” 
41 The member states of the MRC have very different levels of political freedom and participation. This 
has made agreement on public participation challenging, with formal statements relaying only broad 
principles and leaving state responsible for managing participation through their respective National 







groups or communities in member states of their own volition. The member states 
themselves thus control the extent to which groups have access to the MRC by setting 
such boundaries, which diminishes the ability of the MRC to carry out its role as a 
transparent and participatory coordinating body.                     
 
Extra-Systemic Advocacy 
Of course, participation in official dialogues and meetings are examples of 
advocacy strategies that are available to local stakeholders should they want to work 
within the system, but there are other options available to them. Even on issues where 
they may be excluded by the MRC from formal participation, local stakeholders may 
choose to target the MRC through other forms of advocacy that draw attention to their 
concerns, such as protest or unsolicited pressuring, if they consider the venue to be 
useful in generating political change. For example, in April 2012, Save the Mekong, a 
coalition of local and international stakeholders including the three Vietnamese 
NGOs discussed in Chapter 4, sent a letter to Guttman that it also published publicly 
on its own website. The letter, which can also be found on the MRC’s website, 
pushed for clarifications on the status of the controversial Xayaburi Dam in Lao PDR, 
arguing the process of prior consultation had not yet been concluded. (Save the 
Mekong). This form of public advocacy demonstrates how local stakeholders are 
capable of bypassing the state in contacting the institution, which may be seen as 
having an important role in ensuring that the agreed upon processes of consultation 







therefore does not fully constrain the ability of local stakeholders to access the 
institution, although it does shape the ways in which they engage with it. 
Barriers to Entry: Additional Obstacles Faced by Local Stakeholders 
The ability of local stakeholders to engage independently with the MRC is 
dependent on them having the time, resources, and ability to do so. The interviews 
with MRC officials and stakeholder groups revealed not only the that MRC provided 
few opportunities for direct engagement, but also that the NGOs themselves faced 
constraints that restricted their transnational advocacy initiatives. 
 
Limited Institutional Capacity 
MRC staff members did report occasionally being contacted by environmental 
groups from Thailand, the member state in the region with the strongest civil society 
and the most developed economy. Some staff members also reported being contacted 
by civil society groups from Cambodia, although it was noted that these groups 
tended to have a limited understanding of the estimated impacts of dams planned 
along the river’s tributaries. Staff members had not been directly contacted by local 
groups or organizations from Vietnam or Lao PDR, and speculated that this had to do 
with both of those countries lacking a tradition of an engaged civil society due to their 
communist regimes. Other potential reasons for the limited contact by Vietnamese 
stakeholder groups were the lack of resources needed to travel to the MRC Secretariat 
in Vientiane, Lao PDR to attend formal or informal meetings, as well as the constraint 







published in the languages of the member states, English is used as a common 
language for communication between the member states in synchronous meetings, 
limiting the participation of local stakeholders who lack language training. This 
constraint affects many of the affected communities, where high levels of poverty 
limit access to formal education.  
 
Limited Leverage 
Interviews with the local NGOs within Vietnam confirmed the limited dyadic 
relationship that was reported in interviews with MRC officials. The NGOs’ 
communication with staff at the MRC is channeled through national-level officials, 
and the local NGOs rarely bypass this channel through direct communication with 
MRC staff. (However, the umbrella group Save the Mekong, in which the local 
groups participate, is active at the regional level; see the following section.)  None of 
the groups report direct communication with the Secretariat of the MRC, and the 
perception was evident across the interviews that the organization is too weak for it to 
be worth the costs of targeting it. Members from each of the organizations pointed out 
that the organization was incapable of doing anything without the permission of the 
states, and thus did not serve as an alternative venue of action. One interview subject 
more directly stated: 
“We don’t work with the Secretariat of the MRC….  I don’t think they really 
do anything with that [opportunities for stakeholder participation]. So that’s a 
problem. And you know that – they have no kind of legal power. So 
everything is just suggestions and whoever listen to it, or if they don’t want to 







passive? I don’t know. Because they don’t really have power over whether 
Laos can build the dam or not, so it’s hard.”   
 
The same interview subject also cited resource constraints, and that there might be 
more effort by local groups to reach out to the Secretariat if it were located in an 
accessible place. However, the main reasons why each of the organizations did not 
channel activism efforts to the MRC was that it seemed to add a layer between them 
and the state governments, perceived to be the real source of power, rather than serve 
as a way for them to cultivate an ally who would help them generate pressure on or 
build awareness on the effects of upstream developments.  
 
International Political Constraints 
Another complexity regarding stakeholder access to the Mekong River 
Commission concerns the political climate in Lao PDR, where the Secretariat is 
located.  Interviews conducted with staff of INGOs working in Lao PDR revealed that 
concerns about repression from the government constrained their activities. Foreign 
workers in development who touched upon sensitive subjects have had their visas 
revoked, and Laotian nationals fear more direct government retaliation. Many of the 
development workers in Lao PDR, even those working for major international NGOs, 
entered the country on tourist visas and do not have formal permission from the 
government to work, so it is necessary to keep their work activities to limited 
visibility. The operating space for civil society has deteriorated since the 
disappearance in December 2012 of Sombath Somphone, a prominent local civil 







were he was transferred to another vehicle, according to surveillance video. The 
circumstances surrounding his disappearance have led many human rights 
organizations to claim that he was abducted by government-linked groups (RFA 
2013). A statement released by U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry on the one-year 
anniversary of the disappearance reads “Laos has taken steps in recent years to 
become a responsible partner in the community of nations. Sombath’s abduction 
threatens to undermine those efforts” (U.S. Dept. of State 2013).  His disappearance 
is not unprecedented in Lao PDR, and at least ten other activists are missing and 
presumed to also presumed to have been subject to “enforced disappearance,” 
according to Radio Free Asia. 
The oppressive and even frightening context for activism in Lao PDR thus 
limits the operating space for civil society groups to target the Vientiane-based 
Secretariat. Domestic environmental NGOs within Lao PDR are monitored and have 
little political space to express criticism of government activities. Even the 
international NGOs, which generally have greater freedom of operation due to the 
widespread visibility they can generate, must balance raising awareness with a level 
of cautiousness so that their staff is permitted to live and work in Lao PDR. 
Vietnamese NGOs are thus dually constrained by the repressive environment in their 
authoritarian home state, as well as where the regional institution is based. While the 
political situation might not affect formal meetings that the MRC organizes in which 
contention is limited, the political context does constrain the ability of development 








Direct contact between local stakeholders and the regional organization, or the 
potential fourth pathway added to the Boomerang Model in Figure 6.1, is thus not an 
effective way for local stakeholders to circumvent the authority of the state in the case 
of the MRC. Participation in MRC meetings is constrained by the member states, who 
maintain control of which domestic stakeholders are invited as participants. As will 
be discussed in the following section, even when large, well-funded international 
NGOs bring negative attention to the organization or its member states, the civil 
society organizations may be punished by reducing their access to decisionmakers. 
These controlled participation mechanisms thus reflect an unwillingness of member 
states to grant the regional organization too much formal or informal power; the MRC 
remains a forum in which the states actively control whose voices may be heard. 
Although the state is less capable of restraining public activism outside of the 
structure of formal meetings, the MRC remains a target of limited political activism 
due to other constraining factors. Resource constraints, language barriers, and the 
oppressive political context within Lao PDR, as well as the perceived ineffectiveness 
of a consensus-based intergovernmental organization, have limited stakeholders’ 
capability and motivation to utilize the MRC as an agent of political change. 
Advocacy through INGO Partners 
While the MRC is perceived as institutionally weak and is not actively 
targeted by domestic stakeholders within Vietnam, INGOs might nonetheless serve as 







activism takes place under the Boomerang Model is via pressure channeled on states 
by other states, unmediated through international institutions. This raises the question 
of whether and how local activists within Vietnam partner with INGOs to advance 
their cause, and how the Vietnamese state reacts to political pressure potentially 
coming from outside, rather than within, its borders. 
The two INGOs that are officially recognized as partner organizations of the 
MRC, and thus might be likely partners of the domestic Vietnamese NGOs, are WWF 
and IUCN.42 However, their own position with respect to the MRC has been 
questioned as they were not invited to the MRC Council meeting in January 2013, 
which is normally offered to partner organizations with observer status.43  INGO staff 
members report that they believe this to be due to WWF reporting that the Xayaburi 
Dam would have negative environmental impacts (although this criticism came from 
WWF International, rather than the Lao country office), and that as a form of 
retaliation the government of Lao PDR objected to their attending the meeting, 
effectively exercising a veto since the MRC operates on a consensus basis. The MRC 
position on this controversy is that the organization was in the process of reviewing 
who should attend the meetings, noting that many NGOs might want to attend beyond 
those partners, and that until the process was worked out WWF and IUCN should not 
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PDR, are members of the organization. However, much like the terminology applied to Vietnamese 
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issues. In practice, the similarity to an NGO is also seen by its removal, along with WWF, from 
participation in MRC annual meetings.   
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be part of those discussions. IUCN addressed this issue in one of its related project 
reports:  
For over a decade, IUCN has consistently been invited as an observer to all 
MRC Joint Committee and Council meetings. However, from mid 2013 
onwards, IUCN was suddenly no longer been [sic] invited to these meetings, 
as MRC suggested it was reviewing the criteria for observer status at these 
meetings, and surprisingly decided that while they were reviewing the criteria 
they would not invite the former observers. However during this period IUCN 
continued to collaborate closely with the MRC Development Partners Group, 
contributing to joint statements that the group makes to the MRC. Much of 
what IUCN input to this is based on the experiences of MWD. Finally in late 
2014 IUCN was re-invited to a Council meeting (thanks in part to the 
lobbying efforts of certain development partners) (Mather 2015, p. 13).  
 
The Lao government has a history of reacting against outspoken NGO activists.  In 
addition to the suspicious disappearance of local activist Sombath Somphone, the 
country director for Helvetas Swiss Intercooperation, Anne-Sophie Gindroz, a Swiss 
national, was asked to leave Lao PDR after reporting that the government had created 
“a hostile environment for development and civil society groups by stifling freedom 
of expression and association” ahead of the 2012 Roundtable Implementation 
Meeting in Vientiane, an annual process for dialogue on foreign aid (Vandenbrink 
2012b). Her situation sent the message to leaders of other INGOS that while they 
might not be at physical risk from the government the way that local activists may be, 
that according to one INGO interview subject, the Lao government has also found 
ways to “push people out of the country nicely.” This thus constrains the work of 
INGOs working on controversial hydropower issues from the outset, as they worry 
about losing work visas and access to decision-makers that are necessary for the 







reports of similar disappearances of environmental activists in Vietnam, political 
dissidents have been sentenced to lengthy prison sentences.44 
Taking into account these circumstances, it becomes less surprising that WWF 
and IUCN do not have strong working relationships with the domestic NGOs in 
Vietnam that focus on transboundary water issues. The INGOs have to carefully 
balance achieving the environmental objectives of their respective organizations with 
maintaining permission to operate from the government of Lao PDR. These two 
organizations have developed very different work patterns, with IUCN working on 
regional Mekong issues through a cooperative dialogue and WWF focused on 
country-specific environmental issues. In the WWF-Laos Strategy Report for 2015-
2020, the controversial hydropower projects in Lao PDR are not even mentioned. The 
report identifies Places Goals and Species Goals, focusing on the protection of four 
identified forest and freshwater sites, and five threatened species. The WWF-Vietnam 
office has a much more expansive portfolio with 11 issue areas, including sustainable 
energy and climate resilience. However, the scope of these projects, such as the Low 
Carbon Development (LCD) Project that entered into its second phase from 2015-
2018, is focused on local and national planning, rather than tackling the more 
contentious root problems within these issues areas that must be addressed at the 
regional level. 
                                                 
 
44 For example, John Sifton, the Asia Advocacy Director of Human Rights Watch, testified before a 
subcommittee of the House Committee of Foreign Affairs in 2013 that in the first few months of 2013, 
more people had been convicted in political trials than in the whole of 2012. At least 40 people were 
convicted and sentenced to prison for peaceful dissent in 2012, which was also an increase from the 







In contrast to taking a fragmented approach that allows WWF to carry out 
domestic projects that host states are willing to permit, IUCN does address the need 
for participatory management of the Mekong River basin more directly.  IUCN 
carried out a four-year project called the Mekong Water Dialogues that lasted from 
September 2010 – December 2014. The purpose of this phase of the project was “to 
mainstream stakeholder participation in water resource related decision-making in the 
Lower Mekong Region, thereby contributing to the overall goal of improved 
livelihood security, and human and ecosystem health in the Lower Mekong Region” 
(Mather 2015). The project engaged government, civil society, and the private sector 
of the four states of the Lower Mekong Basin in order to improve governance at the 
national and regional level. While the project reports successes in information sharing 
and dissemination of knowledge products, it was not as successful at building lasting 
strategic alliances, which the final report acknowledges are still issue-specific or ad 
hoc (p. 6). The effect that the information sharing would have on governance 
processes is also unclear, since these processes were not adequately measured by a 
specific set of indicators from the outset.  
Within the context of the Mekong Water Dialogues, the IUCN did work 
closely with the Vietnamese government in the planning of the Mekong Delta Plan 
(MDP), a 100-year vision for the delta to prepare for climate change adaptation and 
water management that is a joint initiative of the Vietnamese and Dutch governments. 
The MDP did involve a range of stakeholders within Vietnam, as the plan touched 







debated within the provincial Farmers Union (See Chapter 5).  This incorporation of 
local stakeholders within the MDP planning process is considered to be a key 
contribution of the IUCN project:   
Public consultations were intended to get feedback on MDP recommendations 
from those who would be most affected by them.  In 2012, a consultation 
about version 1.0 of this plan was held in Hau Giang Province. However, 
results from this consultation were not satisfactory to the delta’s experts and 
citizens. They therefore came to MWD to propose to us to take a lead on the 
process in 2013 to ensure a wide range of voices would be heard. By the end 
of 2013 a revised version of the MDP, integrating comments and perspectives 
coming from the public consultations facilitated by MWD, was presented to 
the Prime Minister for approval. (Mather 2015)          
 
Nonetheless, the achievements of the Mekong River Dialogues are more modest 
when viewed at the regional level, rather than within the participant countries. The 
most significant changes noted in IUCN’s final report concern changes to national 
water law, protection of specific sites, and national dialogues, and the project 
accomplishments are presented by country rather than for the region as a whole. The 
project was thus successful in its mission of bringing stakeholder groups into 
domestic planning processes, although there is no evidence that these achievements 
transfer to the regional level of governance.  Additionally, the local stakeholders that 
were included in the project were reached through government ministries, provincial 
authorities and local experts; there is little evidence of collaboration with the local 
NGOs.     
 International Rivers, a Berkeley, California based non-profit, works 
internationally on the protection of the world’s major rivers, and its Southeast Asia 







INGOs operating in the region, it works most closely with the domestic NGOs in 
Vietnam, which is not surprising given that one of the founders of the Vietnamese 
NGOs started her career working for International Rivers (See Chapter 4). While this 
organization works more directly with the NGOs rather than the governments, as 
IUCN and WWF do, it is also the least well-funded INGO and does not have observer 
status at the MRC, so its impact as a potentially strong, transnational voice capable of 
carrying the message of the local stakeholders to decision-makers is more limited. On 
the contrary, due to its consistent position against the hydropower development of the 
Mekong mainstream, one the of the staff members of the MRC referred to 
International Rivers as having an “anti-dam” orientation that made them hard to talk 
to, and cited IUCN and WWF as being more pragmatic working partners.  The 
tensions between the “mainstream” INGOS and International Rivers go beyond 
different perspectives on the possibility of sustainable hydropower. The types of large 
grants that the major INGOs can win and disburse were viewed by one International 
Rivers staffer as having a distorting impact on the local NGOs, who would partner 
with the larger organizations in order to ensure their organization’s survival, with the 
effect of watering down their objectives by matching the objectives of the donor of 
the grant money.  Under these circumstances, the International Rivers staffer sees the 
more mainstream NGOs as not representing the needs of local stakeholders, but rather 
causing them to lose their independent voice in order to meet more instrumental 







 While not an INGO per se, the Save the Mekong Coalition plays an interesting 
role in bringing greater voice of local NGOs to regional negotiations. Save the 
Mekong is an informal grouping of organizations that is primarily virtual; it has no 
office space or operating budget. It does run a website that assists in information 
sharing, and the primary form of communication that its membership uses is through 
participation in a google group, which also helps protect the identity of members 
operating in countries that are less permissive of environmental activism. Despite the 
informal nature of the organization, there are procedures in place for speaking on 
behalf of the network, and no member can make a statement under the Save the 
Mekong name without getting the consensus of the group, which one network 
member’s staffer described as a frequently contentious process given the diversity of 
groups within the membership.  Nonetheless, Save the Mekong has played a very 
visible role in regional negotiations; for example, the Report of the Regional 
Consultation on the Don Sahong Power Project contained in the annexes statements 
from NGOs as well as statements submitted online through the MRC portal. The two 
“NGOs” that provided statements to the meetings were Save the Mekong and 
Vietnam Rivers Network (See Chapter 4), both loose networks of organizations rather 
than independently operating NGOs. Of the 10 stakeholder statements that were 
submitted online through the MRC portal, three were from Save the Mekong and one 
was from Vietnam Rivers Network, with the other statements from Cambodian 
coalitions or international NGOs. The Save the Mekong Coalition letters were signed 







PanNature, GreenID, and WARECOD, as well as NGOs operating within and outside 
of the delta region.  Save the Mekong thus gives unity to an otherwise geographically 
and sometimes ideologically disparate set of organizations, and by operating virtually 
the coalition brings political cover to those members who might not be able to express 
their position freely through their own websites or national media.  The Coalition also 
gives legitimacy to the activities of a broad set of local stakeholders, showing that 
their position on the development of the Mekong River represents a large swath of the 
delta population rather than just the activities of a small organization or elite set of 
actors. 
 In sum, it is not the well-funded, large INGOs that are channeling the message 
of the local stakeholder groups within the delta to add pressure to states or 
international organizations, as depicted in the Boomerang Model. Rather, the 
strongest presence of the domestic organizations is observed through the Save the 
Mekong Coalition, which has no office, no budget and primarily exists in virtual 
space. Interestingly, because the coalition is informal, the governments of the member 
countries, including Vietnam, have little ability to control its message. In Chapter 4, 
the government of Vietnam exercised repression of local NGOs by restricting what 
could be published in newspapers, intimidating staff and project participants by 
visiting the offices of NGOs or summoning individuals to police departments, not 
approving projects, and fining NGOs that were not in compliance. The virtual 
presence of Save the Mekong limits the ability of the state to carry out these 







being semi-anonymous, it is also a low-cost way to organize, meaning that it avoids 
many of the pitfalls of more direct forms of advocacy at the transnational level that 
are described in section 3. The coalition is able to disseminate its message relatively 
easily through its own webpage or through the sites of any of its members that are not 
subject to national controls. This makes the coalition an unmediated voice on behalf 
of its member organizations, since it is a direct representation of their interest not 
influenced by funding sources or external agendas. The larger INGOs certainly still 
play an important role in advancing the need for greater stakeholder participation 
within the MRC, but they themselves are not immune to punishment when their 
advocacy efforts on controversial issues rankle the governments of targeted states, 
and thus must balance this role with their long-term interests in maintaining their 
ability to work in the region and have access to decision-makers.            
Transnational Blockage and NGO Responses 
The Repression-Encouragement Spectrum discussed in Chapter 1 applies at 
two different levels to NGO engagement with the Mekong River Commission. First, 
the member states have applied a strategy that vacillates between exclusion and 
limitation of civil society actors as part of the MRC’s institutional design.45 There are 
few opportunities for NGOs to participate in planning meetings or stakeholder 
forums, and when they are allowed to participate the member states have control over 
                                                 
 
45 Because the internal decision making process of the MRC is not known, it is difficult to assign 
responsibility to a specific member state for the organization’s policies. In this case the states’ strategic 







which civil society actors from their states attend. The organization also appears to 
have punished WWF for speaking out against Lao PDR’ hydropower development, 
indicating a willingness to shift down the spectrum from limitation to exclusion when 
deemed politically necessary. In addition, states have refused to cede any sovereignty 
to the organization by making all decisions subject to consensus, and thus the 
organization at best can serve as a coordinating body for subjects on which states are 
generally in agreement. Because the organization has limited influence on its member 
states as an independent actor, there is limited utility to the NGOs to bypass the state 
governments and target the MRC as a potential ally or source of influence. The MRC 
is very limited in its ability to address the controversial issues on the development of 
the river and its influence is confined to encouraging a transparent process to be 
followed. The institutional design of the organization has thus left it politically weak, 
and this weakness has led to donor fatigue and an uncertain future for the 
organization as it transitions toward local ownership.46  
Even though the consultative processes are difficult and having a limited 
impact on outcomes, the publicity that the MRC does give to the importance of 
multistakeholder participation is viewed by some as an accomplishment within a 
region that consists of authoritarian states that share a contentious history. However, 
given the member states’ resistance to allowing more widespread participation,47 who 
                                                 
 
46 The MRC’s transition to greater local ownership is discussed in Chapter 3. 
47 During an interview I conducted with a Thai national and former MRC employee, the interviewee 
emphasized that participatory governance was very much encouraged in Thailand and something that 







is driving the public emphasis on multistakeholder participation within the 
organization? One of the most unexpected observations from the MRC staff 
interviews was the degree to which member states actively controlled who could be 
involved in MRC meetings and programme activities, since this finding differs so 
strongly from the publicly available material on the MRC website and their 
publications that tout the organization’s inclusive approach. One potential explanation 
for this discrepancy, supported by one MRC staff interview, is that the emphasis on 
participation is donor-driven and/or donor-directed. In other words, by including 
participatory language in its external communications, the MRC gains more 
legitimacy in the eyes of its Western donors.  An example of this is the MRC’s Public 
Participation in the Lower Mekong Basin, which was published with the financial 
assistance of AusAid. While an optimist might hope that such an emphasis on 
participatory mechanisms, even if externally driven, might influence the member 
states to adopt such norms and procedures, the plans for decentralization of the MRC 
by 2030 mean that such pressure is as likely to diminish in the future. The 
decentralization plan envisions that the MRC will be financially self-sustaining by its 
member countries by 2030 and will operate with a reduced centralized budget (MRC 
2012). While this is an important step forward toward local ownership of regional 
planning and decision-making, several of the interview subjects confirmed that 
attention to the inclusion of stakeholders in the governance processes could receive 
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less attention from the member states as a result, particularly when a reduced budget 
means that non-priority activities may need to be scaled back.  This is consistent with 
the framework presented in Chapter 1 with how authoritarian states strategically 
interact with domestic organizations; the revenue that is brought from international 
donor agencies makes them appealing partners. Should this external strategic value 
diminish, as it has in the case of the Mekong River Commission in recent years, so 
might the willingness of authoritarian states to engage with an organization at the 
transnational level.        
  The second application of the Repression-Encouragement Spectrum 
concerns the responses of the authoritarian states toward INGOs that may serves as 
proxy actors for domestic actors.  INGOs have a limited ability to step in and 
advocate on behalf of the local organizations within Vietnam, as well as within the 
other riparian states. The INGOs working within the region are in many cases 
operating under the same political constraints as the domestic ones. Although their 
international backing might mean that they are less likely to be subjected to direct 
repression, they still must carefully manage their operations if they are to continue to 
be allowed to work within the region.  This is particularly true in Lao PDR where the 
MRC is located, meaning that the regional organization is less likely to serve as an 
alternative venue where Vietnamese domestic actors might be able to target their 
activism. Given Lao PDR’s use of both violence and political means to undermine the 
activities of its challengers, Lao PDR’s strategic interaction with domestic actors has 







to externally targeting the MRC through protest and unsolicited pressure as the 
political space for civil society to operate in Lao PDR has tightened since 2012. 
Vietnamese stakeholders already have many challenges to overcome to achieve 
greater advocacy capacity, including language barriers, limited resources, domestic 
censorship and the lack of a tradition of participatory governance. While the salience 
of the water management issues will only increase for them as population growth, 
pollution and upstream development continue to affect their water quality and 
quantity, the competition with the development agenda of other member states with 
even more restrictive political opportunity structures may mean that this does not 
translate to greater opportunities for participation at the regional level. 
In addition, the INGOs working on environmental issues within the region are 
still not necessarily ideologically aligned with the domestic organizations in Vietnam. 
There is concern that when partnerships across these organizations are established, 
the objectives of the domestic organization are watered down by association with the 
more “pragmatic” INGOs that control the purse strings. Virtual space has allowed 
these domestic organizations to partner together to have a stronger voice in the form 
of the Save the Mekong Coalition, which has played an active role in publicly 
commenting on regional negotiations. This unfunded, virtual organization ironically 
represents the strongest balance of expressing the direct viewpoints of the local 
stakeholder groups, while avoiding the reach of the authoritarian state in controlling 








Chapter 7: Lessons Learned and the Future of Water 
Management in the Mekong Delta 
This dissertation has demonstrated that the authoritarian state does not 
respond uniformly to all types of civil society actors that can potentially challenge its 
legitimacy or authority. The state’s strategic choices with respect to domestic NGOs, 
local stakeholders and transnational actors can be better understood through 
application of the Repression-Encouragement spectrum. (See Figure 1.3). The 
strategic choice that the state makes from the range of options along the spectrum 
depends upon the characteristics of the actor as well as the issue being addressed. 
(See Appendix 1). In calculating how to best protect its control of the state while 
reaping the benefits provided by civil society actors, the state factors in the 
organization’s mobilizing capacity and external strategic value, as well as the specific 
issue that the organization is addressing. The state is least likely to use repressive 
tactics when the civil society actor has low mobilizing potential, is addressing an 
issue that does not intersect with the state’s other priorities, and provides value to the 
state from outside parties, such as by reinforcing its legitimacy or by bringing in 
external funding.  
Because these three determinants of state action can change over time as well 
as vary by organization, this dissertation provides a more nuanced understanding of 
the authoritarian state’s treatment of civil society, as previous research has treated 
civil society monolithically or created inflexible classifications of civil society groups 







interconnected issues that transcend politics and socio-economic development, cannot 
be so easily labeled as political or apolitical associations. The application of the three 
key variables to the Repression-Encouragement spectrum provides a dynamic model 
for when the authoritarian state will choose a particular approach, and is a model that 
can be applied to the full range of civil society actors and that accounts for variation 
in the strategic choice of the state. 
Another key lesson from this dissertation is that the reach of the repressive 
tactics of the state are not fully confined within its political borders. The data reveal 
that the state is able to affect potential alternative venues for activism, such as 
regional organizations, and is also able to impact the behavior of INGOs, despite 
them not being under the direct control of the state. The study of the MRC reveals 
that the member states of the organization created an institutional design that limited 
its ability to operate as an independent actor, as it functions strictly as an 
intergovernmental body with no independent control over policymaking. The MRC 
Secretariat reports to the member states, which have instituted rules limiting how the 
MRC staff should interact with local actors. The regional organization is designed so 
that civil society engagement is channeled through each state’s NMC, limiting the 
ability for local actors to circumvent the state, as well as the capacity of the 
organization itself to advocate on their behalf. The regional organization thus does 
not serve as a proxy actor for marginalized group due to its institutional weakness. In 
addition, the regional organization does not serve as a significant alternative venue 







face significant logistical and resource constraints in targeting the MRC in Laos, and 
these constraints are particularly prohibitive for civil society actors from developing 
states. The potential benefits of targeting a regional organization that is controlled by 
authoritarian state actors seem to have limited value to the NGOs. While some NGO 
and INGO activity was directed toward the regional organization, such as the letter 
requesting clarification on the Xayaburi dam consultation process drafted by Save the 
Mekong (2012), local actors reported that the MRC did not provide significant 
additional strategic options for advocacy activity. 
This dissertation also provided interesting lessons for how the authoritarian 
state can affect other transnational actors. It may come as no surprise that an 
authoritarian state is willing to punish a domestic NGO for publishing information 
deemed politically sensitive, as described in Chapter 4. However, the authoritarian 
state is also able to limit the advocacy capacity of international partners, which 
challenges earlier models of transnational activism (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Risse 
and Sikkink 1999). Transnational actors such as INGOs are theoretically able to help 
local actors circumvent the state and apply pressure from the outside. The data from 
this dissertation shows that the authoritarian state has also found ways to punish 
INGOs that are perceived to be overstepping their political boundaries. The removal 
of longstanding INGO partners from the MRC Council meeting in 2013 is an 
example of how the authoritarian state48 can retaliate against INGOs over which it 
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may not have any formal, direct control. In response, the INGOs are forced to decide 
whether to risk their partnerships or ability to work in certain regions, versus 
advocating with an uncensored voice on behalf of their local partners.  Ironically, the 
virtual network Save the Mekong – which has no staff and no budget – had the 
greatest political maneuverability to challenge the water management practices within 
the region. Because the network only exists online, the repressive tactics that the 
authoritarian state uses against other actors, such as fines, police harassment, and 
censorship, are ineffective against a network operating only in virtual space. 
While the lessons about transnational venues and partners reveal the scope of 
the authoritarian state’s repressive capacity, the focus of the dissertation remains the 
relations between the state and domestic actors. With this focus in mind, the lessons 
of this dissertation provide additional insight to the future of state-society relations in 
Vietnam as well as the effectiveness of future water resources management in the 
region. The implications for these two issue areas are discussed below, followed by a 
discussion of the research challenges of conducting field work in an authoritarian 
state and the identification of promising research trajectories that can build upon the 
findings presented here. 
Implications for Authoritarianism in Vietnam 
This dissertation demonstrates that environmental NGOs in Vietnam are 
thorny actors for the authoritarian state. Since the Doi Moi reform era, the Communist 
government of Vietnam has sought to base its legitimacy on its performance rather 







environmental NGOs provide useful services to the state such as research and policy 
guidance that can strengthen the state’s performance. On the other hand, given their 
advocacy potential, the environmental NGOs also have the capability to challenge the 
state’s control by mobilizing actors against it and questioning its decisions. The state 
must carefully navigate its strategic options with respect to these organizations, and 
attempt to reap the political benefits that they provide while mitigating their potential 
to undermine its interests. 
However, it is important not to overstate the potential democratic influence of 
these nascent organizations. Scholars have not agreed whether the emergence of these 
NGOs indicates the start of a political transition to a more inclusive regime (Kerkvliet 
2012; Mercer 2002). In the short term, the emergence of some civil society actors in 
Vietnam has strengthened the capacity of the state by replacing it in the provision of 
some social services, providing external legitimacy to donor states and development 
partners who prioritize working with NGO partners, and bringing in financial 
resources that those donors can offer (Sidel 1997). The political reforms that led to 
the emergence of these NGOs have thus strengthened Vietnam, from a period of 
economic crisis in the early 1980s to its current state as a lower middle-income 
country with a quickly growing economy (World Bank 2017). The data collected for 
this dissertation reveal a similar caution about the democratic influence of the 
domestic NGOs. The actions of the state toward the environmental NGOs, including 
fines for disseminating sensitive information and repressing advocacy capacity-







approval, and that the state is willing and able to move toward the repressive end of 
the Repression-Encouragement spectrum when challenges to its authority and 
legitimacy are recognized. While the organizations do occasionally find ways to 
subvert this authority, such as by disseminating information on the web either directly 
or via partners such as Save the Mekong, there is little evidence to show that the 
NGOs are having a more significant impact on shifting political norms within the 
society more broadly. 
While the political impact of these organizations remains unclear, this 
dissertation does provide important policy lessons for states and organizations that 
would like to play a role in strengthening democratic norms in Vietnam. First, this 
dissertation reveals that the establishment of NGOs followed an interesting pattern. 
Each of the founding members of the Vietnamese water management NGOs 
benefitted directly or indirectly from having previously worked for an INGO based in 
the West. The Vietnamese nationals who started the local NGOs gained professional 
experience working in Western NGOs, and they were able to apply the model of these 
advocacy organizations when they opened their own NGOs in Vietnam. While the 
INGOs have a dichotomous impact on the strength of Vietnamese NGOs – they are 
also viewed as siphoning off staff from the local organizations by providing attractive 
salaries and benefits (Taylor et al., 2012) – this pattern of institutional formation 
identifies a promising method by which to strengthen civil society in Vietnam. Hiring 







home countries to establish their own NGOs appears to be an effective way to 
strengthen a nascent civil society. 
A second entryway for the strengthening of civil society that this dissertation 
identifies is the role of virtual networks.  As noted above, the repressive strategies of 
the authoritarian state are difficult to target against an actor that is not represented by 
a particular person or location. Save the Mekong has been an effective platform for 
civil society organizations to circumvent the authority of the state. Because no single 
person or organization is responsible for the network, it simultaneously provides 
political cover for its members while adding legitimacy to their voice by speaking on 
behalf of a wider membership that represents stakeholders across the delta region. As 
internet access continues to grow in Vietnam and within other authoritarian states, the 
impact of such virtual platforms and the ability to spread their message quickly via 
social media represents a potential threat to the control of the authoritarian state. It 
remains to be seen how the authoritarian state will adapt to this challenge – whether it 
will develop news forms of repression to confront virtual actors or whether they will 
be more effective in holding authoritarian regimes accountable to the public.    
Implications for Water Resources Management in the Mekong Delta 
As discussed in Chapter 1, participation does not indisputably lead to better 
policy decisions; several scholars argue that it can in fact lead to sub-optimal 
outcomes (Tsebelis 2002; Layzer 2008; Berkman and Viscusi 1973). However, 
environmental issues present a unique set of characteristics – complexity, 







producing outcomes that are effective. The importance of participation to water 
management issues are encapsulated within the IWRM paradigm which, while not 
calling for any specific administrative model, does specifically emphasize 
decentralized decision making, the inclusion of marginalized groups, and cooperation 
within the regional delimitation of the river basin (FAO 2005). Given the importance 
of participation to effectively addressing the specific types of challenges presented by 
environmental problems, what do the lessons of this dissertation mean for the long-
term management of water resources in the Mekong Delta? The evidence presented in 
this dissertation shows that Vietnam is still very protective of its control, although 
there is also some evidence that the state recognizes that stakeholder participation is 
valuable to policymaking.  
The most optimistic evidence in terms of the authoritarian state increasingly 
valuing participation in the management of water resources is observed at the 
grassroots level. The pushback by delta farmers against the “rice first” policy 
advanced by the central government to boost agricultural exports did lead to state 
authorities recognizing that the voices of affected residents should be included in the 
policymaking process. In response to this, the state has made a more concerted effort 
to strengthen the advocacy capacity of local farmers, such as by the capacity-building 
training program led by AsiaDHRRA. There are three important caveats, however, to 
the impact that this greater advocacy potential will have on water resources 
management. First, interviews with stakeholders and officials within the delta reveal 







has no historical experience with democratic processes, the delta stakeholders are still 
learning what techniques are available to citizens in order to communicate effectively 
with political decision-makers. Second, the issues that local stakeholders are focused 
on tend to be parochial in nature. The increased efforts toward the inclusion of 
farmers’ voices may thus have an important impact on decisions regarding local 
issues such as dyke height and crop planning, but there is less evidence that 
transnational water management issues will be addressed even as the farmers achieve 
a stronger political voice. Third, while the state is encouraging farmers’ input into the 
policy making process, this is still conducted under the auspices of the Farmers 
Union, which is a part of the state bureaucracy. Thus while the state does appear to 
recognize that the inclusion of farmers’ voices is important to effective policymaking, 
it still is careful to co-opt these processes into state institutions, rather than to 
strengthen independent institutions that could potentially challenge the control of the 
state. 
At the national level, the emergence of the local NGOs since the Doi Moi 
reform process is a promising development, but other than using these organizations 
for policy guidance, the state is careful to limit the impact that they have on pushing 
for more participatory forms of water governance. The capacity-building training 
projects that were intended to strengthen local capacity were met with mixed 
responses from provincial level authorities. The organizations have also faced 
restrictions in the dissemination of information on subjects deemed by the state to be 







restraint such as through establishing virtual networks, as discussed above.  The 
strongest and most consistent benefit provided by these NGOs as far as the future of 
water management is thus that their expertise is conveyed to and relied upon by the 
state. On the other hand, the additional potential benefits that these new civil society 
actors could provide, such as training and communication to the general public, are 
still restricted by the state, limiting the NGOs’ ability to reach their full potential as 
participants in the process of IWRM. 
The state of Vietnam has also not fully internalized the principles of IWRM, 
as evident by its institutional structure in the management of water resources. As 
noted in Chapter 1, the IWRM paradigm is promoted “as an accepted alternative to 
the sector-by-sector, top-down management style that has dominated in the past” 
(GWP 2010a). While the economy and political opportunity structures in Vietnam 
have changed dramatically since the Doi Moi reform process, the state institutions 
have retained the hierarchical approach that the IWRM paradigm identifies as 
problematic. Policy directives still typically come down from the central government 
ministries to be implemented by their respective departments at the provincial level. 
Given that there are at least 7 ministries that have mandates that overlap with water 
resources management, as identified in Chapter 3, the unidirectional flow of 
information does not match with the prescriptions offered by the IWRM framework. 
In order for a  more integrated structure of water management to be achieved, greater 
coordination is still needed across ministries,  as well as between the stakeholders in 







The regional level of governance produced perhaps the most disappointing 
findings for the future of IWRM. In theory the MRC could have represented two 
potential reasons for optimism about the future of water management in the region. 
First, the regional institution could serve as an independent actor, with the potential to 
help draw attention to the interests of stakeholders in the delta at the basin level. 
However, the MRC was designed to have very weak authority separate from its 
member states, so it does not serve as a separate actor with the ability to influence the 
discourse. As noted above, the staff of the MRC Secretariat report to the member 
states, and are instructed to communicate with local stakeholders through the NMCs 
of each member state, i.e., through the channels of state institutions. Second, regional 
organizations have the theoretical potential to serve as an alternative site of advocacy 
for actors whose strategies are blocked by authoritarian regimes. There is little 
evidence to support this proposition as well, since the ability of domestic advocacy 
groups to participate in MRC meetings has been ad hoc, and the member states 
typically control the invitation lists. While INGOs and NGOs have attempted some 
extra-systemic advocacy, such as publicly demanding process clarifications from the 
organization, most NGOs reported that targeting the MRC as an alternative venue for 
advocacy campaigns produced limited results due to the strong control of the 
organization by its member states. 
There is also reason to be pessimistic about future of participation at the MRC 
as it moves to a decentralized structure by 2030. There is some evidence that the steps 







participation strategy and more inclusive and transparent processes were primarily 
driven by donor governments (MRC 2009). The move toward decentralization is an 
achievement toward the goal of local ownership, but as donor governments step back 
from the organization and allow the member states greater independence, they lose 
the ability to hold political sway over the institution’s procedures. The MRC 
welcomed its first CEO from a member state in 2016, Pham Tuan Phan, a Vietnamese 
national. Given the challenges to democratic governance within each of the member 
states of the MRC,49 it is unlikely that participatory procedures will be a high priority 
as these states take greater control of the organization, when they are not shown to be 
a very high priority within their domestic contexts.      
The Challenges of Field Research in an Authoritarian Setting 
While this dissertation has focused on the authoritarian state’s strategies 
toward civil society actors, it is worth stepping back to analyze the state’s effect on 
the conduct and findings of this research project. Data collection in an authoritarian 
context, and particularly through a methodology that incorporates interviews, has the 
potential to be problematic. Researchers may face difficulty in accessing interview 
subjects, and even when respondents are willing to participate, the results might be 
subject to bias, and sampling and validity issues if they harbor a fear of government 
retaliation. (Malthaner 2014). It is thus worth briefly discussing the procedures that 
                                                 
 
49 Freedom House ranks Thailand the highest on its measure of democracy among the four member 
states, but it is still ranked as “not free.” While Thailand has the most developed civil society of the 
four states, it has backslid in terms of commitment to its own democratic political institutions since the 







had to be followed  in the Vietnamese context, and the potential constraints or 
challenges that may have impacted the collection of data. 
While there is reason to be concerned about the willingness of private citizens 
or public officials to be forthright in an interview setting within an authoritarian 
context, I have little evidence to show that this concern was problematic to my 
research.  The Fulbright Program that sponsored my research required a university in 
Vietnam to serve as a local partner, meaning that they would be willing to provide 
logistical support as needed. While I originally requested to be partnered with a 
different university based on its convenient geographical location in the delta, the 
Fulbright Program partnered me with An Giang University because of its reliability in 
navigating the bureaucratic challenges that arise with securing visas, 
accommodations, and research assistance for foreign scholars.  The university 
facilitated my access to interview subjects by providing a note of introduction when I 
reached out to potential subjects, which indicated that my research project had been 
approved by the relevant authorities. Ultimately, I conducted more than 50 interviews 
in total, and only one person in Vietnam declined my request for an unspecified 
reason. This response rate is thus unexpectedly high, and one which I attribute to the 
university, as a government-sponsored entity, indicating that cooperation with my 
project was not only tolerated, but requested. 
In addition, the interview subjects tended to be surprisingly candid in their 
responses. Part of this may be due to the subject matter being perceived as less 







concepts such as participation or grassroots advocacy were not fully understood in 
terms of their relevance to governance by local-level officials in the delta; 
participation was explained in the more functional context of managing resources. 
While this discrepancy in interpreted meaning is useful to identify weaknesses in the 
integration of local voices in the policy making process, the alternative context 
understood by the interview subject did not seem to be perceived as politically 
sensitive. The NGO interview subjects did have a stronger understanding of more 
“Western” interpretations of participation, but also seemed remarkably candid in their 
responses. I was surprised to learn about the various ways in which the government 
punished the nascent civil society organizations, the ways in which the organizations 
actively circumvented these sanctions in order to get their message out, and how they 
spoke openly to me about conduct that was not always legal within Vietnam or within 
other states in the region. This experience of having easy access to interview subjects 
and forthcoming participants provides high confidence that the data collected through 
these interviews is reliable and unaffected by the political setting. 
While the experience of conducting interviews was relatively easy in 
Vietnam, the process was considerably more difficult in Lao PDR. The main subjects 
that I reached out to there were staff of the main INGOs and the MRC. These 
interviews proved challenging for different reasons. The staff members of the main 
INGOs in Lao PDR were willing to meet with me, but indicated a higher level of 
caution that the information provided be published without personal attribution. As 







repressive than in Vietnam, and the IGO staff members, while willing to share their 
experiences, appeared to be concerned about having in print any comments that might 
cause the government to retaliate against them. Interviews with MRC staff seemed 
less affected by political considerations, but reaching staff members, who I was told 
are bombarded by similar requests from researchers, was difficult to accomplish. The 
breakthrough to receiving a response came after an earlier interview subject working 
at an NGO in the region provided the direct contact information for an MRC staff 
member who was eventually responsive, and who also put me in touch with some of 
his other colleagues. 
While the authoritarian setting did not end up providing many observable 
challenges to the interview process, there were some ways in which the setting may 
have affected other forms of data collection. In particular, it was very difficult to 
obtain financial information about the NGOs operating in Hanoi. None of the NGOs 
publish or were willing to provide clear information about their operating budgets, 
expenses, or the amounts that they receive from donor organizations. Having this 
information would provide a stronger measure of external strategic value, one of the 
critical variables that I identify in determining the state’s response along the 
Repression-Encouragement Spectrum. Instead, the information that I have about the 
donor contributions to each organization is interpreted from the donors and partners 
that are listed on their websites, an imperfect measure of this variable (See Appendix 







maximize their control over their finances vis-à-vis the state and potential donor 
governments and partners. 
Overall, the authoritarian setting did not seem to present many challenges for 
the collection of data. I was required to report my travel plans to the local university 
(and hence, the authorities) that sponsored me in Vietnam, but still had unconstrained 
freedom of movement. I discussed the findings of my dissertation with Vietnamese 
scholars and officials at various levels of government, and found their feedback to be 
supportive and informative. This experience is consistent with the argument that 
many government officials in Vietnam are interested in engaging in dialogue about 
effective forms of governance, and do not hesitate to do so when no threat to their 
political control is perceived.  
Future Research Trajectories 
While this dissertation provides a range of lessons on the strategic choices of 
the authoritarian state in managing civil society, as well as the implications for water 
resources management in the Mekong delta, it also raises questions about the 
applicability of the findings to other contexts that provide promising avenues for 
future research. 
First, the case study of environmental management provided an interesting 
test case by which to observe the strategic choices of the authoritarian state because 
environmental organizations cannot be narrowly classified as “political” or 
“developmental” organizations. The authoritarian state is forced to more carefully 







singular focus on environmental organizations provided in this dissertation raises 
questions about the applicability of the Repression-Encouragement spectrum, and 
what variables might lead the state to move up or down that spectrum, to 
organizations addressing other complex issue areas. One potential avenue to further 
develop the findings presented here is thus to produce a comparative study of other 
civil society actors within Vietnam.  Public health NGOs in Vietnam, which share the 
characteristic of transcending the definition of “political,” represent a particularly 
interesting set of actors for comparison. While public health NGOs provide clear 
benefits in the provision of public services, Vietnam has been reluctant to address the 
root causes of HIV/AIDS, or to draw attention to the problem of sexual exploitation 
and human trafficking in the country (Vijeyarasa, 2010; Pham 2006). On the other 
hand, given that public health crises can often manifest much more quickly than 
environmental ones, the strategic choice of the authoritarian states in managing public 
health NGOs may differ from that of environmental challenges and remains an 
interesting potential avenue to explore. 
The lessons provided by the Vietnam case study also raise questions for their 
applicability to other authoritarian contexts. Other scholars have studied the 
emergence of NGOs in China and the response of the state (Teets 2014; Brettell 
2003), and a more direct comparison of these Communist countries would be 
worthwhile to identify similarities and differences. China has more advanced 
technological capabilities, so in particular the value of virtual networks would be an 







choices of the authoritarian state are particular to Communist states that are 
transitioning to more open economies, and thus even a comparison of China and 
Vietnam leaves open questions about the broader applicability of this dissertation’s 
findings to authoritarian states in general. Another potential research avenue is thus to 
compare the strategic choices of Vietnam to an authoritarian state with a different 
regime type, and to develop findings that may highlight how much of Vietnam’s 
choices are specifically attributable to its communist regime. 
Finally, although this dissertation has advanced the knowledge of the 
management of water resources management in the Mekong Delta, the region itself 
includes several different types of authoritarian regimes. A final promising pathway 
for future research is thus to expand the study of the state’s strategic choices to the 
other states along the Mekong River. While Lao PDR is a particularly challenging 
context in which to conduct research, the government of Cambodia would be the next 
interesting and logical place to study the state’s management of its water resources 
and strategic choices with respect to its civil society actors. In addition to the work of 
Tun Myint (2012) who has studied river basin management and NGOs in Thailand, 
developing a better picture of NGO advocacy and state responses in Cambodia (and 
Lao PDR) would help fill in the gaps to achieving a complete picture of participatory 
water resources management across the basin. 
Conclusion 
This dissertation has made three critical contributions that advance knowledge 







a disaggregated understanding of civil society as an actor, demonstrating that the 
authoritarian state responds differently to various civil society actors as well as to the 
same actor over time. Second, it provides a dynamic model that explains when and 
how an authoritarian state is going to respond via the Repression-Encouragement 
spectrum. Finally, in addition to the range of options available to the state presented 
by this model, three critical variables are identified that the state considers when 
determining its strategic choice – the mobilizing capacity of the civil society actors, 
their external strategic value, and the independence of the issue form other state 
priorities. The findings from this case study, which demonstrate that Vietnam still 
relies on repressive techniques to maintain its control across the local, national and 
regional levels of governance, have also revealed that the principles of IWRM have 
not yet been fully internalized or acted upon by a critical downstream actor in the 
Mekong delta.  Until greater progress is made in applying those principles to the 
institutional structures responsible for water management in the delta, effective 
management of the environmental challenges facing the delta will likely not be fully 
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Appendix 2: List of Donors and Partners of Vietnam NGOS 







Justice Initiatives Facilitation Fund 
Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung Hanoi 
Critical Ecosystem Partnership Fund (CEPF) 
CEPF, Vietnam Office 
Science and Technology Innovations for the Base of the Pyramid in Southeast Asia 
(iBOP Asia) 
NGO forum on ADB 
Global Green Grants Fund (GGF) 
IUCN 
LEVI Strauss 
Bank Information Center (BiC) 





Open Society Institution (OSI) 
Kepa 





Vietnam Rivers Network Members 
Department of Natural Resources and the Environment 
Branch of Aquatic Resources 
Chi Lӑng District’s People’s Committee 
Quy Hop District Women’s Union 
Me Linh District Women’s Union 
Trun Châu Commune’s People’s Committee 







Chu Phan Commune’s People’s Committee 
Lao Ho Commune’s People’s Committee 
Hu’u Kien Commune’s People’s Committee 
Châu Quang Commune’s People’s Committee 
Châu Ly Commune’s People’s Committee 
Bac Son Commune’s Peoples Committee 
Na Hang Town’s People Committee 
Center for Biodiversity and Development 






Rosa Luexemburg Stiftung, SE Asia 
The McKnight Foundation 
UNDP 
WWF 






Embassy of the United States of America 
Global Greengrants Fund 
Bank Information Center 
Both Ends Environment and Development Service 
BirdLife International 
Critical Ecosystem Partnership Fund 
Karuna Foundation 
Kepa 
International Institute for Sustainable Development 
ActionAid International, Vietnam 
The Toyota Foundation 
Global Subsidies Initiative  
International Rivers 
HSBC 












Save the Mekong 
Vietnam Academy of Social Sciences 
Institute of Energy 
Center for Sustainable Development of Water Resources and Adaptation to Climate 
Change (CEWAREC) 
Mekong River Commission 
International Rivers 
WARECOD 
Center for Biodiversity and Development 





Open Society Foundations 
ICCO Corporation 
The World Bank 
UNESCO 
SIDA Environmental Fund 
The Bookman 
Mrs. Katherine A. Malcolm 
Ford Foundation 
Blue Moon Fund 
The Rufford Small Grants Foundation 
Critical Ecosystem Partnership Fund 
Oxfam 
Revenue Watch Institute 
Cordaid 
European Commission 
The Asia Foundation 
Environmental Justice Foundation 
The McKnight Foundation 
National Academy of Sciences 
USAID 
German Catholic Bishops’ Organization (MISEREOR) 




Consultancy on Development Institute (CODE) 
Center for Water Resources Conservation and Development (WARECOD) 
Hang Kia – Pa Co Nature Reserve 
Ngoc Son – Ngo Luong Nature Reserve 







Yen Bai Provincial Forest Protection Department 
Ha Giang Provincial Forest Protection Department 
Viettel Corporation 
Fauna and Flora International (FFI) 
Wildlife Conservation Society (WCS) 
The Henry L. Stimson Center 
Forest Trends 
Wildlife at Risk (WAR) 
The Southeast Asia Extractive Industries Watch 
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